BrusselsWhen in 2016 the British voted in favor of separating from the European Union, the decision fell like a bucket of cold water on all the capitals. A net contributor to the bloc was leaving, one of the great economic and military powers and one of its most influential members. A decade later, the British Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, has opened the door to the possibility of the United Kingdom turning back. But would the European Union want to accept them?


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In these ten years, on both sides of the English Channel it has been noted that the expectations that had fueled the separation have not been met. Neither has the United Kingdom experienced the economic boost that Brexit supporters promised – in fact, its economy is in full recession –, nor has it gone so badly for Brussels without London. The circumstances, therefore, are very different from those that led to the breakup. If at that time it was the United Kingdom that forced the partners to negotiate the conditions of the separation, now, in a turbulent geopolitical context marked by the Russian threat, the unpredictability of the United States and Chinese competition, it is the EU that has the opportunity to decide the terms of a possible Breturn, the concept that has begun to be used to refer to the rapprochement of London to Brussels. And it is the United Kingdom, reluctant to remain in the geopolitical and commercial cold, that has incentives to join it.

London and Brussels are living a new honeymoon since the arrival of Burnham at Downing Street; Ursula von der Leyen’s rapport had not been so good with any of the four predecessors with whom she has coincided since she has been president of the community executive. The two leaders will have the opportunity to exhibit this complicity on November 20, at a summit that will be organized in the community capital to stage this rapprochement.

The rapprochement between the EU and the United Kingdom began in September, during a meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. As reported then by the Financial Times, the British premier shared with Von der Leyen the concern that British companies would be excluded from the made in Europe, the bloc’s new industrial policy to combat Chinese competition by favoring EU companies in subsidies and public contracts.

That conversation took the EU leaders by surprise. But, since then, all the leaders who have spoken out about a possible Breturn have welcomed the proposal with open arms. “Welcome back”, reacted the French president, Emmanuel Macron, in English at the end of September, after Burnham raised the possibility of rejoining the bloc. “This is very good news, both for his country and for Europeans,” he asserted. In a similar vein, the Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, the Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, and the President of the European Parliament Roberta Metsola have expressed themselves, to cite a few examples.

That the European Union has many reasons to want to get London back is a consensus. Internationally, it is not only a major military and nuclear power, but also a state with a seat on the UN Security Council. Economically, it is one of the world’s great financial centers. But what is the price Brussels would be willing to pay?

The trap of “à la carte selection”

At this moment, the most likely scenario is that the United Kingdom will seek to “join the customs union or the single market without being a full member of the EU,” explains Michael Emerson to ARA, an associate researcher at the think tank CEPS, who stresses that these options are the most sensible in economic terms. However, entering the single market would clash head-on with one of the great battlegrounds of British domestic policy: immigration. This framework requires accepting the indivisibility of the bloc’s four fundamental freedoms—movement of goods, services, capital, and people—a fact that would force London to renounce exclusive border control for EU citizens.

That is why European states warn that they will not allow the British neighbor’s accession to sacrifice the integrity of the common market. Taking into account the United Kingdom’s historical trajectory within the bloc—marked by constant exceptions such as remaining outside the euro and the Schengen area—diplomatic sources point out to this newspaper that they will not tolerate “cherry-picking.” “Either the customs union, or both things,” they affirm.

A warning that Emerson also shares: “The idea of trying to join only the parts of the single market that are most favorable to the United Kingdom is an illusion, as it would most likely be rejected by the EU,” he warns. Thus, the researcher considers that any reopening of accession talks would lead to difficult negotiations in which Brussels would demand the renunciation of old privileges and exceptions—opt-outs or the British rebate—which would cool London’s enthusiasm for readmission.

Meanwhile, the rapprochement is making headway through sectoral agreements. Regarding industrial urgencies, France and Germany have already indicated that they would accept including the United Kingdom in the made in Europe legislation, on the condition that the Burnham government aligns with the EU’s tariff position against Chinese electric vehicles. On the summit’s table, there are also three more files where a consensus could be reached more immediately: an agreement to eliminate health checks and red tape in food exports, the United Kingdom’s reincorporation into the Erasmus mobility program—with the question of who will cover university fees—and an alignment in defense matters to strengthen cooperation on key files such as military aid to Ukraine.