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Ukrainian forces have stepped up\u00a0their use of\u00a0\u201cmidstrikes\u201d \u2014 drones able to\u00a0hit targets several dozen kilometers behind the front line. Their success, alongside that of\u00a0\u201cdeepstrikes,\u201d has fueled assertions that Ukraine has wrested back the initiative and blunted Russia\u2019s advance. Ukrainska Pravda asked<\/a> soldiers how much the strikes on\u00a0the \u201cmiddle rear\u201d are actually changing the situation at\u00a0the front. Most were cautious about the claim that Ukraine has \u201cseized the initiative,\u201d saying front-line troops don\u2019t yet feel the effect \u2014 even as\u00a0the outlet calls the strikes promising and says their full impact is\u00a0unlikely to\u00a0be\u00a0felt until late summer or\u00a0early fall.<\/p>\n Ukrainian forces sharply intensified strikes on\u00a0Russia\u2019s \u201cmiddle rear\u201d in\u00a0the spring of\u00a02026. The main tool for these strikes has been the Hornet drone, a\u00a0light American model built by\u00a0a\u00a0company founded by\u00a0former Google CEO Eric Schmidt \u2014 who, one soldier said, \u201cneeds a\u00a0good testing ground\u201d for the weapons \u2014 along with its German and Ukrainian equivalents. In\u00a0early spring, the drones began hitting targets dozens of\u00a0kilometers behind the front, primarily near Donetsk. In\u00a0May, Ukrainian forces began intensive strikes on\u00a0the R-280 \u201cNovorossiya\u201d highway, which connects Rostov-on-Don to\u00a0Crimea via Mariupol, Berdiansk, and Melitopol. Those strikes, which Meduza\u00a0reported on\u00a0earlier<\/a>, helped cause a\u00a0gasoline shortage on\u00a0the annexed peninsula.<\/p>\n Amid the \u201cmidstrikes\u201d and strikes on\u00a0Russian oil refineries hundreds of\u00a0kilometers from the border \u2014 by\u00a0drones dubbed \u201cdeepstrikes\u201d \u2014 Ukrainska Pravda reports that some now claim Ukraine has seized the initiative in\u00a0certain sectors of\u00a0the front. Its reporters asked front-line soldiers whether they feel it.<\/p>\n \u201cI\u00a0don\u2019t know where we\u00a0seized the initiative \u2014 it\u00a0was just a\u00a0wave of\u00a0PR\u00a0activity on\u00a0some fronts, but in\u00a0time the initiative will swing back. On\u00a0the Sloviansk front, the Russian offensive hasn\u2019t stopped since the fall of\u00a0Siversk in\u00a0December 2025,\u201d said an\u00a0officer from one of\u00a0the corps operating in\u00a0the Donetsk region.<\/p>\n \u201cWe\u00a0are conducting active defense with elements of\u00a0counteroffensive action, but we\u00a0have not seized the initiative. May was a\u00a0month of\u00a0mounting enemy pressure, and early June was when it\u00a0played\u00a0out. The enemy decides where, when, and with what forces to\u00a0attack,\u201d said a\u00a0source fighting on\u00a0the Kramatorsk and Sloviansk fronts. \u201cOn\u00a0the Huliaipole front there\u2019s no\u00a0talk of\u00a0initiative, especially once the enemy\u2019s fresh forces moved up,\u201d added another source operating in\u00a0the Zaporizhzhia region.<\/p>\n Mykola Bielieskov, a\u00a0senior analyst at\u00a0the Come Back Alive foundation, said it\u00a0is\u00a0fair to\u00a0speak of\u00a0attempts to\u00a0halt a\u00a0decline at\u00a0the front that set in\u00a0during the fall of\u00a02023. \u201cI\u00a0would not yet use the term \u2018seizing the initiative\u2019 [\u2026] I\u00a0would put it\u00a0more cautiously \u2014 the situation has stopped getting worse,\u201d he\u00a0said. \u201cOur tasks right now are more modest \u2014 stabilizing the front line, keeping the enemy from advancing, with the aim of\u00a0strengthening our negotiating position,\u201d Bielieskov added.<\/p>\n An\u00a0officer from the 19th Corps, which is\u00a0fighting on\u00a0the Kostiantynivka front, was more blunt. \u201cNo\u00a0effect whatsoever, not a\u00a0drop,\u201d he\u00a0said.<\/p>\n Only one of\u00a0the outlet\u2019s sources immediately rated the \u201cmiddle-rear\u201d strikes a\u00a0success \u2014 a\u00a0serviceman from an\u00a0intelligence unit (Ukrainska Pravda does not specify which one) that has worked with such drones for several years. \u201cWe\u00a0are not just knocking out logistics \u2014 we\u00a0are doing something far greater,\u201d he\u00a0said. He\u00a0noted in\u00a0particular that drone strikes have left virtually no\u00a0electricity in\u00a0the Russian-occupied part of\u00a0the Zaporizhzhia region. The source also told Ukrainska Pravda that, as\u00a0a\u00a0result of\u00a0the strikes, Russian troops have been using the roads noticeably less often in\u00a0the occupied territories of\u00a0the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.<\/p>\n Ukrainska Pravda writes that the \u201cmiddle-rear\u201d strikes probably won\u2019t be\u00a0felt by\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s front-line troops until late summer or\u00a0early fall.<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s Defense Ministry has already announced a\u00a0tender \u2014 a\u00a0call for bids \u2014 to\u00a0produce more than 100,000 drones for strikes on\u00a0the \u201cmiddle rear,\u201d the outlet notes. While that tender is\u00a0still open, the ministry has redistributed several billion hryvnias (tens of\u00a0millions of\u00a0dollars) within its budget, funding drone purchases for the 20 most effective units. \u201cIt\u00a0all has to\u00a0be\u00a0done over the summer,\u201d said a\u00a0representative of\u00a0one of\u00a0the battalions that received Defense Ministry funds. Ukraine is\u00a0also counting on\u00a0receiving \u201cmiddle rear\u201d strike drones through international aid.<\/p>\n \u201cIf\u00a0everyone approaches this the right way, we\u00a0can impose a\u00a0logistics lockdown on\u00a0them [Russian forces],\u201d one of\u00a0the outlet\u2019s sources said.<\/p>\n But Ukrainska Pravda\u2019s central warning is\u00a0that Ukraine could fail to\u00a0capitalize on\u00a0this summer\u2019s opening. On\u00a0the ground, the outlet argues, Ukraine is\u00a0repeating its 2025 mistakes: at\u00a0Kostiantynivka, up\u00a0to\u00a0130 Russian troops have infiltrated the city \u2014 echoing the pattern that preceded the loss of\u00a0Pokrovsk \u2014 while the army still faces manpower shortages, \u201ckill zone\u201d expansion, and a\u00a0General Staff decision cycle so\u00a0slow that it\u00a0takes nearly a\u00a0year to\u00a0respond to\u00a0situations that call for a\u00a0month or\u00a0two. The report frames the summer as\u00a0a\u00a0fleeting \u201cwindow of\u00a0opportunity\u201d that Ukraine risks squandering.<\/p>\n At\u00a0Meduza, we\u00a0are committed to\u00a0transparency about our use of\u00a0artificial intelligence in\u00a0the newsroom. The story you\u2019re reading was written by\u00a0one of\u00a0our living, breathing journalists and translated from Russian using an\u00a0AI\u00a0model configured to\u00a0follow our strict editorial standards. This translation process is\u00a0the result of\u00a0extensive testing and refinements to\u00a0ensure our English-language coverage is\u00a0timely and accurate. A\u00a0Meduza editor reviews every draft before publication.<\/p>\n If\u00a0you find any errors in\u00a0this translation, please contact us\u00a0at\u00a0[email\u00a0protected]<\/a>.<\/p>\n