![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/large_000000.jpg\")
British troops evacuated from Dunkirk, France, on a destroyer about to reach Dover, England. May 31, 1940. Imperial War Museum in London<\/p>\n
FDR replied the next day. His response was not what Churchill hoped for. While Britian could buy military supplies from the United States and possibly obtain the torpedo boats, FDR flatly ruled out transferring destroyers:<\/p>\n
A step of that kind could not be taken except with the specific authorization of Congress and I am not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment.<\/p>\n
FDR knew the mood on Capitol Hill all too well. He had spent much of the prior five years battling a Congress that feared the United States might be dragged into another war in Europe.<\/p>\n
The Neutrality Acts<\/p>\n
The enthusiasm the U.S. public had for the decision to enter World War I had turned into buyer\u2019s remorse by the early 1930s. As the Great Depression deepened, a series of books, magazine articles, and congressional hearings popularized the idea that weapons manufacturers and financial interests had maneuvered the country into war to increase their profits. In this telling of story, President Woodrow Wilson had either been eager for war or had been pressured into it.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Screenshot-2026-09-02-112105.jpg\")
Republican Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota at a meeting of the Senate Munitions Investigating Committee, 1936. Harris and Ewing Collection, Library of Congress<\/p>\n
The evidence for the so-called Merchants-of-Death thesis was always scarce. But with the drumbeat for war growing in Europe, both Democratic and Republican lawmakers were eager to pass legislation they argued would prevent the country from being dragged into another war. In 1935, Congress banned the sale of munitions to countries at war. Roosevelt supported passage of this first Neutrality Act, but he soon came to regret it. The law did not distinguish between aggressors and victims, and it did not give the president discretion to apply it. FDR pushed Congress over the next four years to revise the terms of the neutrality act. Even though FDR\u2019s fellow Democrats dominated the House and Senate, each request prompted pitched battles on Capitol Hill, and FDR got only a small part of what he wanted.<\/p>\n
After Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Congress replaced the arms embargo provisions of the neutrality law with a so-called cash-and-carry provision. Belligerents could buy supplies from the United States provided they paid cash for their purchases and shipped their weapons in non-U.S.-flagged vessels. The revision meant that U.S. producers could still market their goods to countries at war, but it would be other countries that would bear the risk of their merchant vessels being sunk on the high seas.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Screenshot-2026-09-02-112156.png\")
A political cartoon suggesting that Americans wanted the United States to ignore growing tensions in Europe to focus on problems at home, by Nathan Leo \u201cNate\u201d Collier, March 18, 1939. Coppola Collection, University of Michigan Libraries<\/p>\n
Even this change, however, faced bitter opposition. Critics argued that the move favored Britain and France, because their naval superiority would deny German vessels access to U.S. ports. Proposing to go a step further and transfer U.S. destroyers to Britain would only antagonize anti-interventionist elements in both the Democratic and Republican parties just as Roosevelt was seeking an unprecedented third term in office. Moreover, FDR knew that some anti-interventionists would argue that British resistance was futile, creating the possibility that the destroyers would fall into German hands and possibly be used against the United States.<\/p>\n
Politics and the Law<\/p>\n
While the political winds in late spring 1940 argued against transferring U.S. destroyers to Britain, so too did the law. On June 20, 1940, Attorney General Robert Jackson, who would later gain fame as the chief U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials and then as a U.S Supreme Court justice, informed Roosevelt that selling or transferring the destroyers and the torpedo boats would violate the law. The Espionage Act of 1917 specifically prohibited transferring \u201cany vessel built, armed or equipped as a vessel of war\u201d to a country at war.<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Solicitor_General_of_U.S._Washington_D.C._April_26._A_new_photograph_of_Robert_H._Jackson_Solicitor_.jpeg\")
Robert H. Jackson speaking at a dinner reception, April 26, 1939. Harris and Ewing Collection, Library of Congress<\/p>\n
An additional wrinkle soon appeared. News of Churchill\u2019s request for destroyers and torpedo boats had reached Capitol Hill. Anti-interventionist lawmakers moved quickly to outlaw the transfers. On June 28, Congress directed that the president could not transfer military items to another country unless the chief of staff of the army or the chief of naval operations certified that they were \u201cnot essential to\u201d the defense of the United States. The constitutionality of the law was dubious; it essentially allowed a subordinate to overrule the commander in chief. Whatever the legal merits of the new law, it underscored FDR\u2019s political challenge. Providing Britain with destroyers or torpedo boats seemingly required specific congressional approval that might not be forthcoming.<\/p>\n
\u201cThis Is a Thing to Do Now\u201d<\/p>\n
Britian\u2019s situation was becoming increasing dire. By late June, Italy had entered the war on Germany\u2019s side, and Belgium, France, Norway, and the Netherlands had all surrendered. On July 10, Germany launched the Battle of Britain, a sustained aerial bombing campaign that devastated British cities, ports, and factories. At the end of July, Churchill repeated his request to FDR for U.S. destroyers in blunt terms: \u201cMr. President, with great respect I must tell you that in the long history of the world this is a thing to do NOW.\u201d<\/p>\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Winston_Churchill_at_Coventry_Cathedral_cph.3a18421.jpg\")
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill walks with the mayor of Coventry and a member of the Church of England clergy through the ruined nave of Coventry Cathedral after it was bombed by the German air force, November 1940. Library of Congress<\/p>\n
On August 2, FDR convened a cabinet meeting to discuss how to proceed. His advisers agreed, as FDR later wrote<\/a>, that \u201cthe survival of the British Isles under German attack might very possibly depend on their getting these destroyers.\u201d But his hands seemed tied. Jackson repeated his view that Congress needed to rewrite the law for the transfer to proceed.<\/p>\n A Trade, not a Transfer<\/p>\n As non-interventionists in Congress worked to hem in Roosevelt, a group of prominent Americans that included Time magazine publisher Henry Luce searched for ways to solve the president\u2019s problem. At a dinner at a New York country club in mid-July, the idea was floated that rather than simply transferring the destroyers to Britain, the United States should trade the ships for U.S. rights to British bases in the Western Hemisphere. Such a swap would allow Roosevelt to make a politically appealing argument: he was strengthening America\u2019s continental defense to help keep the country out of war. To build public support for the idea, Luce saw to it that Time magazine, which he owned and which was one of the most widely read periodicals in the country, ran an article in late July touting the strategic importance<\/a> of the Caribbean.<\/p>\n Luce raised the idea of trading destroyers for bases directly with Roosevelt at a White House dinner. The president expressed interest and authorized the secretary of the Navy to determine British receptivity to a possible trade. With Britain\u2019s situation growing increasing desperate and without any better options to pursue, Churchill agreed. The question now became whether a trade would gain more favor on Capitol Hill than a simple transfer.<\/p>\n \u201cSerious Consequences\u201d<\/p>\n To Roosvelt\u2019s immense frustration, the new proposal did not move opinion on Capitol Hill. It was not for a lack of trying on FDR\u2019s part. He inquired through intermediaries whether Wendell Wilkie, the Republican presidential nominee, would endorse the idea and perhaps urge Republican lawmakers to do so as well. While not opposing the trade, Willkie declined to make a public statement. FDR had no more success with Willkie\u2019s running mate, Charles McNary, who also happened to be the Republican Senate leader. McNary let it be known that he could not support legislation permitting a trade. He signaled, however, that he would not object if FDR could find a way to make the transfer without forcing Congress to vote on it.<\/p>\n Roosevelt\u2019s struggles were bipartisan. He invited Democratic Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts, the chair of the Senate Naval Appropriations Committee, for a three-day cruise on the Potomac in a bid to win his support. The cruise and a subsequent exchange of letters<\/a> failed to persuade Walsh, who had sponsored the June law requiring that the service chiefs approve the transfer of any military equipment to another county. Although Walsh agreed that acquiring more military bases in the Western Hemisphere would advance U.S. interests, he worried<\/a> that giving up even old destroyers would have \u201cserious consequences\u201d for U.S. national security and would be a liability in the upcoming elections.<\/p>\n A New Legal Opinion<\/p>\n FDR\u2019s escape from his dilemma came in the form of a fresh legal opinion<\/a> from Jackson that concluded that the destroyers could be transferred to Britain without congressional authorization. The attorney general\u2019s about-face on what the law permitted may have reflected a bit of presidential pressure. FDR told him<\/a>, perhaps jokingly, that if the legal obstacles to closing the deal weren\u2019t cleared up, that Jackson\u2019s \u201chead will have to fall.\u201d<\/p>\n But Jackson\u2019s reversal also reflected his reaction to lawyers who argued that his reading of the law was needlessly narrow. Earlier in the summer, an Interior Department lawyer had written a memo arguing that the president could transfer the destroyers without violating the law. FDR had dismissed the memo\u2019s legal reasoning as politically unsustainable. However, it caught the eye of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. He enlisted his former law clerk Dean Acheson<\/a>, a renowned international lawyer who would later become secretary of state, to make the argument publicly. On August 11, the New York Times published a lengthy letter-to-the-editor written by Acheson and three other distinguished lawyers arguing<\/a> that fresh legislative authority was not needed. Although Acheson would become famous during his time as secretary of state, and particularly at the start of the Korean War, for his expansive reading of presidential authority, the case he and his colleagues made on the transfer of U.S. destroyers did not claim that inherent presidential powers overrode the laws Congress wrote. Instead, their argument contended that existing law could be read to allow presidential action.<\/p>\n Jackson absorbed these arguments and revised his view. He now argued<\/a>:<\/p>\n The 1939 statue could be avoided by based on the chief of naval operations\u2019 judgment that the deal would, on the whole, be a boon to U.S. defense interests. He also concluded that the 1917 statue could be construed to bar only transfer of vessels that had been built with the intent or expectation that they would be transferred to belligerents.<\/p>\n That reading of the law meant that while FDR was free to transfer U.S. destroyers to Britain, the law barred him from transferring torpedo boats.<\/p>\n \u201cAn Epochal and Far-Reaching Act\u201d<\/p>\n The destroyer-for-bases deal was concluded on September 2, 1940. The United States agreed to transfer fifty World War I-era destroyers to Britain in exchange for 99-year rent-free leases to establish military and naval bases in Antigua, British Guiana, Jamaica, Newfoundland, St. Lucia, the Bahamas, and Trinidad. In deference to Churchill\u2019s wishes that the agreement not be entirely transactional, the United States received similar access to bases in Bermuda and additional sites in Newfoundland without providing anything in exchange.<\/p>\n The next day, the chief of naval operations certified<\/a> that the destroyers were \u201cnot essential to the defense of the United States\u201d because the acquisition of bases in the Western Hemisphere \u201cwill strengthen rather than impair the total defense of the United States.\u201d FDR then informed Congress of the deal, describing<\/a> it as \u201can epochal and far-reaching act of preparation for continental defense in the face of grave danger\u201d and \u201cthe most important action in the reinforcement of our national defense that has been taken since the Louisiana Purchase.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n In an impromptu press conference that same day on a train to Washington, a reporter asked FDR whether the Senate would need to approve the agreement with Britain. Roosevelt avoided a direct answer. After repeating part of his message to Congress, he said<\/a>: \u201cIt is all over; it is all done.\u201d The deal would be handled not as a treaty but as an executive agreement executed pursuant to his authority as president.<\/p>\n \u201cThe Country Will Undoubtedly Approve\u201d<\/p>\n Willkie reacted to FDR\u2019s announcement by saying<\/a> that \u201cthe country will undoubtedly approve.\u201d He called it \u201cregrettable, however, that the president did not deem it necessary\u2026to secure the approval of Congress or permit public discussion prior to its adoption.\u201c Three days later, Wilkie escalated his criticism, saying<\/a> that the deal constituted \u201cthe most arbitrary and dictatorial action ever taken by any president in the history of the United States.\u201d (Wilkie later said<\/a> that his \u201dregrettable\u201c remark was the sorriest thing he said on the campaign trail.)<\/p>\n Other Republicans said far worse things about Roosevelt. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. argued<\/a> \u201cthat if weapons are to be sent abroad, it should be done in the open, after debate, with public participation by the consent of Congress.\u201d Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan condemned<\/a> the deal as \u201cthe most arbitrary and dictatorial action ever taken by any president in the history of the United States.\u201d Representative George Tinkham of Massachusetts went even further, claiming<\/a> that \u201cthere is no difference between his [FDR\u2019s] action from either Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin.\u201d<\/p>\n Some constitutional experts also questioned what FDR had done. Edward Corwin, perhaps the foremost constitutional scholar of the day, lambasted<\/a> the deal: \u201cWhy not any and all of Congress\u2019s specifically delegated powers be set aside by the President\u2019s \u2018executive power\u2019 and the country be put on a totalitarian basis without further ado?\u201d<\/p>\n Despite the congressional and legal criticisms, Wilkie\u2019s assessment of public reaction proved correct. However FDR got to the deal, most Americans applauded what he had done. The deal\u2019s critics remained a vocal minority but failed to muster the votes needed to overturn it. Within months, Congress appropriated funds to fortify the bases that the United States had received from Britain, implicitly blessing the deal. By the end of 1940, having secured an unprecedented third term as president, FDR had turned to his next great project in aiding the British, the Lend-Lease Act<\/a>.<\/p>\n The Legacy of the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal<\/p>\n History suggests that Roosevelt was correct in his conviction that the United States needed to transfer the destroyers. Britain was imperiled. Had it fallen, Adolf Hitler might have succeeded in subduing the Soviet Union, allowing Germany to dominate the Eurasian landmass and threaten the United States. And while fifty aging destroyers did not turn the tide in the war, they provided a much-needed psychological boost to the British government and people. As Churchill wrote<\/a> in his memoirs, the destroyer-for-bases deal \u201cmarked the passage of the United States from being neutral to being non-belligerent\u2026. [A]ll the world\u2026understood the significance of the gesture.\u201d \u00a0<\/p>\n Whether FDR was right to bypass Congress in striking the deal, however, is a more controversial question. In writing the legal opinion that made the transfer possible, Jackson refrained from arguing that FDR\u2019s presidential authority trumped Congress\u2019s. The Supreme Court had opened the door to that argument four years earlier in its landmark Curtiss-Wright<\/a> case with its claim that the \u201cpresident is the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.\u201d Instead, Jackson noted that the president\u2019s power in foreign affairs \u201cis not unlimited.\u201d He based his conclusion on the permissibility of transferring the destroyers to Britain fundamentally on his reading of existing law.<\/p>\n The problem with Jackson\u2019s interpretation of the legal statutes was, as his critics pointed out, creative to the point of being tortured. He had found presidential discretion in statues that seemingly prohibited it. Jackson later acknowledged as much, writing<\/a>: \u201cI should readily agree that a respectable argument against [my] conclusion could have been made.\u201d Indeed, he had made just that argument two months earlier.<\/p>\n Jackson was the not the first executive branch lawyer to read a congressional statute to the president\u2019s advantage, and he was not the last. Since World War II, Democratic and Republican administrations have both frequently read legislation to allow them to do what it is they wish to do, to the point where legal principle sometimes seems to be Humpty Dumpty\u2019s: a word \u201cmeans just what I choose it to mean\u2014neither more nor less.\u201d<\/p>\n The challenge, or perhaps the impossibility, of writing laws so they cannot be creatively interpreted points to one reason Congress\u2019s say in foreign policy has declined so substantially over the last century. But the destroyer-for-bases debate also highlights how Congress has contributed to its own marginalization. Many senior lawmakers in both parties agreed with FDR on the need to aid Britain. They were not willing, however, to vote to do so. Letting the president solve the problem saved them from political headaches they wanted to avoid. But that short-term benefit came at the long-term cost of paving the way to an imperial presidency. It is a dynamic that continues to this day.<\/p>\n Oscar Berry assisted in the preparation of this article.<\/p>\n The United States celebrates its 250th anniversary in 2026. To mark that milestone, I am resurfacing essays I have written over the years about major events in U.S. foreign policy. A version of this essay was published on September 2, 2011<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"President Donald Trump\u2019s second term in office has been notable for his efforts to expand the boundaries of…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":757969,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[59,57,58,50,56,54,55],"class_list":["post-757968","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-united-kingdom","tag-gb","tag-great-britain","tag-greatbritain","tag-news","tag-uk","tag-united-kingdom","tag-unitedkingdom"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/757968","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=757968"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/757968\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/757969"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=757968"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=757968"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=757968"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Screenshot-2026-09-02-112432.png\")
Republican Senators Robert Taft (left) and Arthur Vandenberg (right) pose with Republican presidential nominee Wendell Willkie at the Republican National Convention in Philadelphia, June 28, 1940. Harris and Ewing Collection, Library of Congress<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Screenshot-2026-09-02-112529.png\")
Supreme Court Nominee Felix Frankfurter and his counsel, Dean Acheson, leaving the Capitol after a hearing by the Senate Commerce Committee, January 13, 1939. Harris and Ewing Collection, Library of Congress<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/NAS_Argentia_aerial_view_c1945.jpg\")
The U.S. Naval Station Argentia in Newfoundland, transferred in 1940 from Britain, 1945. U.S. Navy<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/VANDENBERG_ARTHUR_H._SENATOR_LCCN2016862584.jpg\")
Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan. Harris and Ewing Collection, Library of Congress<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/uk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/Wickes_class_destroyers_before_transfer_to_the_UK_1940.jpg\"){kind=spacer}
U.S. and British sailors inspect depth charges to be loaded on the USS Buchanan and the USS Crowninshield before transfer to Britain, September 1940. Library of Congress<\/p>\n