{"id":191216,"date":"2026-02-24T08:52:20","date_gmt":"2026-02-24T08:52:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/191216\/"},"modified":"2026-02-24T08:52:20","modified_gmt":"2026-02-24T08:52:20","slug":"california-jammin-wargames-show-armys-electronic-weakness-and-a-human-fix","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/191216\/","title":{"rendered":"&#8216;California jammin&#8217;: Wargames show Army\u2019s electronic weakness \u2014 and a human fix"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>WASHINGTON \u2014 Army brigades are struggling to overcome <a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/tag\/electronic-warfare\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">electronic warfare<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/breakingdefense.com\/tag\/artificial-intelligence\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">AI-generated<\/a> disinformation in wargames at the <a href=\"https:\/\/home.army.mil\/irwin\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">National Training Center<\/a>, a Rhode Island-sized swathe of the Mojave Desert where a full-time Opposing Force, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, puts visiting units through the wringer with simulated bullets and real radio jamming.<\/p>\n<p>Visiting units often lack the technical versatility and, even more important, the mental adaptability to keep fighting effectively with backup systems once their high-tech networks go down, current and former OPFOR officers told Breaking Defense in a series of interviews.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWe are definitely seeing, many times over, an over-reliance on technology,\u201d said Capt. Jake Thomas, who heads the information warfare section of the OPFOR staff.<\/p>\n<p>There is some good news, Thomas and his comrades said. Even with a wide array of electronic warfare gear, from backpack jammers to copies of high-powered Russian systems, the Opposing Force at the NTC can\u2019t completely shut down visiting units\u2019 communications, OPFOR officers and sergeants told Breaking Defense.<\/p>\n<p>A new tactical satellite (TACSAT) upgrade being rolled out for battalion HQs and higher is particularly hard to jam, one captain said. Even lower-echelon units with less sophisticated tech can switch to a backup system when their primary communications network is jammed \u2014 or at least to a backup of the backup of the backup. (Army doctrine calls for four layers, known as <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/PACE_(communication_methodology)\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">PACE<\/a>: Primary, Alternative, Contingency, and Emergency).<\/p>\n<p>A big part of the problem is that the backup systems lack the bells and whistles troops are used to. Instead of a digital map with friendly and enemy forces marked in bright colors with positions updated in near-real time, for instance, soldiers might have to make do with staticky radio calls or low-bandwidth text chat. Stripped of their high-tech tools, commanders struggle to keep up with a fast-changing battlefield, decision cycles slow down, and subunits make uncoordinated maneuvers that let the OPFOR pick them off one at a time.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cUsing their PACE plan \u2026 they are able to work around some of the jamming,\u201d added Capt. Jonathan Maher, former deputy commander for Centaur Squadron, which controls most of OPFOR\u2019s EW assets. \u201c[But] those communications between the higher and lower echelons take longer \u2026 It ultimately creates a slower reaction that gives us a tactical advantage.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Former Commander of Centaur Capt. Ethan Christensen added: \u201cIf we\u2019re effective, generally success for us is them just committing combat power in a piecemeal fashion.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The OPFOR finds plenty of ways to mess with visiting units\u2019 communications \u2014 and with their heads. One favorite trick is to find the radio frequencies the visitors are using to control their \u00a0drones and tune in to the feed: Inexperienced drone operators don\u2019t know such eavesdropping is possible and leave vital information visible on their displays, including their own GPS coordinates, which allows the OPFOR to launch a (simulated) precision strike. On a more sophisticated and unsettling level, the OPFOR now uses generative AI to flood the training area with disinformation, including deepfake voices \u2014 trained from online videos of speeches, public ceremonies, and so on \u2014 of the visiting commanders giving fake orders.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWe\u2019ve tested it successfully here,\u201d said Col. <a href=\"https:\/\/blackhorse.org\/regimental-leadership\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Kevin Black<\/a>, who commands the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, as the OPFOR is formally known. \u201cAnything from AI-generated memes to AI-generated operational orders, AI-generated voice manipulation and spoofing.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Training Shortfalls And Culture Gaps<\/p>\n<p>Part of the problem is that combat arms officers \u2014 trained as tankers or infantry \u2014 are often unfamiliar with the complexities and, especially, vulnerabilities of the communications systems they rely on to hear reports and issue commands. On the flipside, signals soldiers may know their systems well but not how they fit into the overall battle plan.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThere is certainly that divide,\u201d said Thomas, who started as an infantryman himself. \u201cThe role I am filling within the Regiment currently is essentially bridging that gap. [It\u2019s] definitely a steep learning curve that can boggle my mind even now.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Thomas has had plenty of time to climb that curve: He\u2019s spent seven years with the OPFOR regiment, averaging eight to 10 simulated battles against visiting brigades each year. That constant practice is the biggest secret of the OPFOR\u2019s success and would be impractical to replicate with every combat brigade across the Army. The OPFOR has also cobbled together a lot more jammers and drones than a typical brigade, although it\u2019s got fewer armored fighting vehicles and other conventional assets.<\/p>\n<p>But, Black told Breaking Defense, there are still lessons the larger Army can learn from the OPFOR about how to train. While the Regiment has the same digital maps and other \u201cexquisite\u201d command systems as the rest of the Army, \u201cwe\u2019re not relying on that,\u201d Black said. \u201cWe\u2019re pushing [information] on multiple levels all the time, whether it\u2019s through our primary or alternate, the contingency or the emergency network, and it doesn\u2019t slow us down if, hey, all of a sudden [one\u2019s] not working.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The key is trusting his subordinates to use their initiative and take action on the spot, he said, without waiting for approval from above, detailed digital instructions, or their tech support getting the network back online. That requires combat arms officers to be keenly aware of how well their communications are or aren\u2019t working and take charge of when to switch to backups, rather than delegate that decision to the techies.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe number one thing is those junior leaders you\u2019ve entrusted and empowered up front are probably the best I\u2019ve ever seen at jumping through our PACE plan,\u201d Black said proudly. \u201cThat troop commander is the one making those decisions, down front. \u2026 If we get jammed, if we lose our technical capabilities, our leaders can still execute.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"WASHINGTON \u2014 Army brigades are struggling to overcome electronic warfare and AI-generated disinformation in wargames at the National&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":191217,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[89688,22841,12755,7,9,8,89689,89690,89691,89692,89693,89694,1970],"class_list":{"0":"post-191216","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-california","8":"tag-11th-armored-cavalry-regiment-11th-acr","9":"tag-army","10":"tag-artificial-intelligence-ai","11":"tag-california","12":"tag-california-headlines","13":"tag-california-news","14":"tag-cyber-security","15":"tag-electronic-warfare","16":"tag-fort-irwin","17":"tag-in-focus-tactical-velocity","18":"tag-national-training-center","19":"tag-networks","20":"tag-technology"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/191216","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=191216"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/191216\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/191217"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=191216"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=191216"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=191216"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}