{"id":313712,"date":"2026-05-13T14:15:08","date_gmt":"2026-05-13T14:15:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/313712\/"},"modified":"2026-05-13T14:15:08","modified_gmt":"2026-05-13T14:15:08","slug":"can-the-state-force-religious-preschools-to-promote-other-religions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/313712\/","title":{"rendered":"Can the state force religious preschools to promote other religions?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Please note that SCOTUS Outside Opinions constitute the views of outside contributors and do not reflect the official opinions of SCOTUSblog.<\/p>\n<p>On Thursday, the court may decide, in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/cases\/foothills-christian-ministries-v-johnson\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Foothills Christian Ministries v. Johnson<\/a>, whether to consider an important question: Can the government force religious preschools to promote other religions? California and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit say <a href=\"https:\/\/cdn.sanity.io\/files\/pito4za5\/production\/b8aadf3040f2066f02361c9014003bf4b7d186d7.pdf#page=61\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">yes<\/a>. But three California churches <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/576\/155\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">argue<\/a> that this burdens both their free exercise of religion and free speech.<\/p>\n<p>The law at issue is a California <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/regulations\/california\/22-CCR-81072\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">statute<\/a> requiring licensed childcare centers to provide notice via signs and written forms informing parents and guardians that their child is \u201cfree to attend religious services or activities of his\/her choice\u201d and entitled to \u201cvisits from the spiritual advisor of his\/her choice\u201d \u2013 even at religious preschools.<\/p>\n<p>These interconnected free-speech and free-exercise issues lead to three questions presented in the Foothills\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/DocketPDF\/25\/25-802\/390756\/20260105112500702_No._Petition.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">cert petition<\/a>. First, petitioners ask whether \u201cCalifornia\u2019s religious services provision, requiring the posting of signage and handing out of written copies to parents, compel[s] speech in violation of the First Amendment.\u201d That is, can the state compel such speech in the first place? Second, the petition asks whether \u201cthe religious services provision with its spiritual advisor notice interfere with the free exercise rights of a parochial school\u201d \u2013 a question that underscores the church-autonomy issues at stake when the government instructs religious organizations about what sort of religious programming they must offer. And third, petitioners ask whether the statute, which contains several exemptions, is \u201cgenerally applicable\u201d \u2013 a key question that can determine the level of scrutiny the court applies (that is, what burden must be met to show the law is unconstitutional) and may make the difference in whether the law survives.<\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s begin with the religious-freedom aspect of the case. Under the free exercise clause, which generally prohibits government interference with religious exercise, it might seem obvious that a state can\u2019t mandate that petitioner Foothills Christian Church suggest, provide, or otherwise accommodate a Muslim imam, Buddhist lama, or Jewish rabbi to spiritually advise its schoolchildren. Nor would the free exercise clause permit the state to make the church say it\u2019s going to do so.\u00a0Either one infringes religious liberty by forcing a faith-based organization to point people to conflicting religious doctrines.<\/p>\n<p>But the 9th Circuit saw the issue differently. Specifically, the panel accepted California\u2019s argument that the statute is neutral and generally applicable, and therefore subject only to rational-basis scrutiny (the easiest showing to make). That legal test comes from the (increasingly disfavored) precedent <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/494\/872\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Employment Division v. Smith<\/a>, which gives a pass to neutral and generally applicable laws regardless of how much they burden the free exercise of one\u2019s religion. In other words, because the statute applies evenhandedly and without reference to or hostility toward a particular religion, it need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest (such as children\u2019s health and safety) in order to stand.<\/p>\n<p>The churches, on the other hand, question the premise that the law is evenly applied, pointing to more than a dozen statutory exemptions for groups like the YMCA, Boys and Girls Club, and similar organizations. And that aligns with the Supreme Court\u2019s decisions in key free-exercise cases like <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/508\/520\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/cases\/fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia-pennsylvania\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Fulton v. City of Philadelphia<\/a>, both of which demanded a showing of strict scrutiny to laws that allowed secular exemptions while forcing religious adherents to comply. In Church of the Lukumi, a city ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice was not generally applicable when it targeted certain religious rituals while allowing animal slaughter for other purposes, like hunting, fishing, or commercial food processing. Similarly, in Fulton, the city policy required adoption agencies to place children with same-sex couples, but allowed the presiding government official discretion to waive that requirement. Bottom line: exemptions are evidence that a law isn\u2019t evenhanded; and a law\u2019s evenhandedness is the touchstone for whether a religious burden is protected strictly or weakly under the First Amendment.<\/p>\n<p>But the Foothills petitioners argue that California\u2019s statute burdens more than the church preschools\u2019 free exercise; they say it impermissibly compels their speech, too. As noted, to operate as preschools, the churches must agree to prominently post signs advertising that children are \u201cfree to attend religious services or activities of his\/her choice.\u201d The churches must also provide printed handouts with the same information and obtain parent or guardian signatures acknowledging the advertised opportunity for teachings from different faiths. Petitioners challenge these requirements as forcing them to parrot the state\u2019s message and striking at the heart of the free speech clause.<\/p>\n<p>Again, the 9th Circuit disagreed. It held that this government-mandated script doesn\u2019t run afoul of the First Amendment because it is \u201ccommercial speech.\u201d Under a 1985 case called <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/471\/626\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel<\/a>, the government can require certain disclosures if they are \u201cfactual and uncontroversial\u201d and not \u201cunjustified or unduly burdensome.\u201d According to the 9th Circuit, California\u2019s statute merely requires regulated entities to provide factual information about state-law requirements.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, one might say \u2013 and the church petitioners argue \u2013 that the spiritual-advisor notice is not factual (California says it won\u2019t enforce the actual provision of spiritual advisors) and is controversial (the churches vehemently dispute having to say something that contradicts their beliefs). What\u2019s more, the churches contend that it is both unjustified and burdensome to be forced to redirect enrolled children and their families to other denominations or faiths.<\/p>\n<p>But this raises a larger point: Should the religious preschools\u2019 expression be treated as commercial speech in the first place? A form of the \u201ccommercial speech\u201d doctrine was <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/316\/52\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">first recognized<\/a> as a category of less-protected speech in 1942, in a challenge to a city ordinance banning public distribution of handbills. Since then, the court has <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/557\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">defined<\/a> commercial speech as speech that does \u201cno more than propose a commercial transaction,\u201d or confined it to commercial advertising or solicitations, like the labeling of products for sale. Government regulations on such speech are viewed more leniently than \u201cprivate\u201d speech.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>In practice, though, the court has extended the commercial-speech standard to speakers who were not selling or commercially soliciting anything. In the 2018 case of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/cases\/national-institute-family-life-advocates-v-becerra\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">National Institute of Family &amp; Life Advocates v. Becerra<\/a>, for example, a California law required licensed pro-life pregnancy centers to post signs and distribute notices telling women how to obtain free abortions. California justified the law largely on the grounds that the pregnancy centers were licensed by the state and could, in the state\u2019s view, therefore be required to post certain information. The court assumed without deciding that the compelled notice was a \u201ccommercial disclosure.\u201d (Because the majority found the compelled notice \u201ccontroversial,\u201d it nevertheless declined to apply Zauderer and instead concluded that the law likely failed a higher level of scrutiny, reversing the 9th Circuit\u2019s approval of the law.)<\/p>\n<p>In this way, NIFLA blurred the line between commercial and private speech. Is a message \u201ccommercial\u201d when it is not soliciting a transaction or advertising? Is speech by nonprofit entities \u201ccommercial\u201d? The court has not said. And that could matter for the Foothills petitioners. The religious preschools\u2019 speech is neither proposing a commercial transaction nor advertising \u2013 they are categorically required to post signs and distribute written notices about religious services and spiritual advisors regardless of when, what, or whether they are saying anything.<\/p>\n<p>The court\u2019s decision this term in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/cases\/chiles-v-salazar\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Chiles v. Salazar<\/a> adds another interesting wrinkle. In that case, Colorado had prohibited licensed mental health counselors from engaging in talk therapy aimed at aiding clients who wanted to resist their same-sex attractions or transgender identity. The 8-1 majority rejected Colorado\u2019s argument that it could use a licensing scheme to regulate speech in that manner. Harkening back to NIFLA, the Chiles majority explained that while there are a few categorical exceptions to strict scrutiny for speech regulations, not one \u201c\u2018turn[s] on the fact\u2019 that a licensed professional happens to be speaking.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>California makes an argument similar to that of Colorado, namely that the state can condition licensure \u2013 here of preschool facilities \u2013 on adhering to certain related speech requirements. That argument has not fared well at the court in recent years. As in NIFLA and Chiles, the state is using the licensing of facilities as a hook to control licensees\u2019 speech through its \u201creligious services\u201d statute. Because the Chiles decision emphasized that licensing itself does not diminish the licensee\u2019s First Amendment rights, the court should analyze the Foothills case as involving fully protected speech. As Justice Neil Gorsuch put it, \u201cthe First Amendment\u2019s protections extend to licensed professionals much as they do to everyone else.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>All that said, perhaps the cleanest path \u2013 one petitioners and a few amici urge \u2013 is summary reversal (deciding the case without full briefing or oral argument) based on NIFLA. The court could grant the petition, vacate the 9th Circuit\u2019s decision, and send the case back to the lower court in light of NIFLA, signaling that the 9th Circuit should have followed the reasoning in that case and struck down the compelled notice under heightened scrutiny because it was not \u201cfactual and uncontroversial.\u201d That result would protect free speech and religious liberty. But the doctrinal questions raised in Foothills, especially those regarding commercial speech and religious institutions, would remain \u2013 and are likely to arise again sooner rather than later.<\/p>\n<p>Disclosure: Denise Harle represents the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates D\/B\/A NIFLA in an amicus brief that the organization filed in support of the petitioners and was counsel for NIFLA in National Institute of Family &amp; Life Advocates v. Becerra. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Please note that SCOTUS Outside Opinions constitute the views of outside contributors and do not reflect the official&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":313713,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[7,9,8],"class_list":["post-313712","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-california","tag-california","tag-california-headlines","tag-california-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/313712","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=313712"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/313712\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/313713"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=313712"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=313712"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us-ca\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=313712"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}