More than a year after the deadly Eaton fire swept through Altadena, killing 19 people, a new, outside review of firefighters\u2019 decision-making concluded \u201cthere was no failure\u201d by L.A. County fire officials in ordering evacuations. <\/p>\n
The report, released Monday and commissioned by the Los Angeles County Fire Department, found that incident command could not have \u201creasonably\u201d requested evacuation orders for the area earlier because they weren\u2019t aware the fire was moving into west Altadena.<\/p>\n
Over the last 16 months, The Times has reported on mounting evidence that fire was threatening west Altadena well before evacuation alerts were issued, with several spot fires and heavy smoke reported<\/a>, but it took hours to evacuate<\/a> the historically Black neighborhood. Those revelations \u2014 based on 911 calls, dispatch records and harrowing resident accounts of perilous escapes<\/a> \u2014 prompted the California attorney general in February to open a civil rights investigation<\/a> into potential disparities in the fire response, looking particularly at delays in evacuation alerts and resource allocation. <\/p>\n The new 51-page report<\/a>, however, doesn\u2019t acknowledge any shortcomings related to the evacuation alerts. Rather, it points out that many conditions that had existed there for years \u2014 streets aligning with the canyons, dense neighborhoods with heavy tree canopies that can help spread fire \u2014 combined with the strong winds and lack of intelligence from aircraft overhead \u201cmade stopping the fire spread impossible.\u201d <\/p>\n L.A. County Supervisor Kathryn Barger, who has previously said there was a \u201cbreakdown\u201d in how evacuation alerts went out, said the new report found that \u201cUnified Command did not engage in misconduct or intentionally delay evacuation decisions affecting areas west of Lake Avenue.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cAt the same time,\u201d Barger said in a statement, \u201cthis investigation should not be interpreted as dismissing the experiences of residents. Public trust requires both accountability and a willingness to learn from every aspect of a disaster response.\u201d<\/p>\n For many in the community, though, the report feels like another instance of the county, again<\/a>, failing to hear their concerns or learn how to better alert residents in future disasters. <\/p>\n The Altadena for Accountability group, which pushed for the attorney general\u2019s civil rights probe, dubbed the new report \u201cdeflection without accountability.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cThe Los Angeles [County] Fire Department declines to acknowledge any meaningful failures,\u201d the group said in a statement<\/a>, \u201cand offers little assurances that substantive changes will be made to better protect Altadena residents in the future.\u201d<\/p>\n Shimica Gaskins, an Eaton fire survivor and a leader of Altadena for Accountability, said the report \u201cdismissed or overlooked\u201d residents\u2019 experiences and failed to acknowledge evacuation alerts that came too late for too many.<\/p>\n \u201cI want to know, first, that you can be honest about what happened on Jan. 7 and the following days, so we know you\u2019re actually making the changes needed,\u201d Gaskins said of the county Fire Department. \u201cWithout that first step, there\u2019s no trust.\u201d<\/p>\n For Gaskins, the report fell short of determining whether the L.A. County Fire Department \u201cadequately protected all the communities.\u201d Still, she said, she is holding out hope for comprehensive findings from the attorney general\u2019s independent investigation.<\/p>\n Art Botterell, a former senior emergency services coordinator for the California Governor\u2019s Office of Emergency Services, also criticized the report, saying it struck a \u201cdefensive tone and did not answer the real questions: Why have so many Altadena residents complained about the warning process? Do those complaints have any validity or standing?\u201d <\/p>\n \u201cWails of \u2018but we didn\u2019t know!\u2019 and blaming inadequate intel are traditional deflections,\u201d Botterell wrote in an email, \u201cbut they don\u2019t improve future outcomes.\u201d <\/p>\n The report, completed by CityGate Associates, found \u201cthere was no failure … to request evacuation orders west of Lake Avenue sooner.\u201d The road is a main thoroughfare and marks an unofficial east-west boundary for the unincorporated town of Altadena. <\/p>\n \u201cBased on interviews, operational records, dispatch information, and incident communications, the investigation concluded that Unified Command acted appropriately amidst unprecedented fire and weather conditions that grounded aircraft, leaving them without aerial surveillance to track the spread of the Eaton Fire in real-time,\u201d the report\u2019s summary said.<\/p>\n The document\u2019s focus on how county firefighters handled evacuations followed a county-issued review<\/a> of evacuation alerts that revealed several L.A. County firefighters <\/a>had suggested to Unified Command staff just before midnight that \u201cevacuation orders should go out for the foothills of Altadena all the way to La Ca\u00f1ada.\u201d But three hours \u2014 or longer \u2014 passed before west Altadena was ordered to evacuate.<\/p>\n Monday\u2019s report simply said the calls for expanded evacuations that would have included west Altadena \u201ccould not be cross-verified.\u201d<\/p>\n Citing cellphone calls and texts between Incident Command and Operations from 11:24 p.m. to 11:32 p.m., the report found that officials were focused on the Eaton fire\u2019s eastern flank around northern Sierra Madre, and that firefighters on the ground on the western flank had not reported deteriorating conditions that would make the area a \u201cprime concern.\u201d<\/p>\n Around 1 a.m, the report found, incident commanders were \u201cstill blind to the fire\u2019s movements above them in the canyons.\u201d Unbeknownst to them, about 1,200 feet above Altadena, winds were pushing the fire west between Eaton Canyon and Rubio Canyon. <\/p>\n In the hours before incident commanders decided to evacuate most of west Altadena, incidents of spot fires in that area were mostly created by downed power lines or felled trees, not burning embers or from a \u201cmain fire front\u201d that wouldn\u2019t arrive until after 5 a.m., the report stated.<\/p>\n According to the report, commanders became aware of the fire\u2019s westward movement just after 2 a.m., and ordered evacuations for much of west Altadena at 3 a.m., with alerts going out at 3:25 a.m.<\/p>\n Since the firestorm, the department has created a new policy to issue evacuation warnings to zones bordering areas ordered to evacuate. But it did not do that for every community west of Lake Avenue the night of the Eaton fire and the report did not explore whether things would have been different for the victims if it had.<\/p>\n Also, though the report claims all evacuation zones west of Lake Avenue were ordered to evacuate at 3:25 a.m., at least two zones \u2014 the Calaveras zones<\/a> \u2014 were not ordered to evacuate until 5:43 a.m., according to county records and a Times review of the alerts.<\/p>\n The report does not identify that time gap or explore why it took so long to evacuate those neighborhoods. Heidi Oliva, a spokesperson for the county Fire Department, did not respond to questions about this inaccuracy in the report. <\/p>\n The Times has published a series of investigations into the late evacuation alerts in west Altadena<\/a> and other response disparities<\/a> compared with the more affluent eastern half of the unincorporated town. Fire damage was particularly widespread in west Altadena, and almost all of the fire\u2019s 19 deaths occurred there \u2014 among them a 54-year-old woman whose family alleges she died because of the delayed evacuation alerts<\/a>.<\/p>\n The report doesn\u2019t get into most of those concerns. But it points out that evacuations were made using predetermined evacuation zones, many of which used Lake Avenue because it\u2019s a major north-south street, which is a natural landmark \u201cthat could be utilized as an anchor for creating evacuation zones.\u201d <\/p>\n Lake Avenue has also long been known as a dividing line in the town\u2019s demographics, with discriminatory redlining in the mid-20th century keeping Black homebuyers from settling east of Lake Avenue for years.<\/p>\n In a statement, L.A. County Fire Chief Anthony Marrone said he hopes the report can provide the community more transparency, but understands \u201cthat no investigation can truly capture the horror and tragedy residents endured.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cMy focus is to ensure that the lessons learned from the Eaton and Palisades Fires are turned into lasting changes that will better protect our residents and neighborhoods into the future,\u201d Marrone said. <\/p>\n The report\u2019s only recommendations called for the Fire Department to develop another way to gather intelligence during a fire when aircraft can\u2019t fly, which the department said it has already done<\/a>, and to designate a technical specialist dedicated to \u201cincident intelligence, not consumed by immediate command.\u201d <\/p>\n Botterell questioned that recommendation, noting that such an admission about needing someone not consumed by command decisions implied the command team was overrun.<\/p>\n The report, Botterell noted, stated that the strategy during the Eaton fire was to prioritize \u201clife safety first, perimeter control, and defending buildings as resources allowed.\u201d But that, he said, left out a key element: alerting or informing the public. <\/p>\n \u201cThat shortfall of emergency public information, that was the real issue here,\u201d Botterell said. <\/p>\n \u201cThe fires were a tragic disaster and there\u2019s no reason to assume that any such event would go smoothly,\u201d Botterell added. \u201cBut each disaster is a teachable moment, and I\u2019m afraid the defensive tone of this report suggests a limited institutional capacity to learn from bitter experience.\u201d<\/p>\n