For much of the Afghanistan war, the only thing harder for the United States than winning was quitting.<\/p>\n
The country\u2019s longest war ended in chaos and defeat five years ago Sunday. Hundreds of thousands of Afghans, desperate to escape Taliban insurgents, swarmed the Kabul airport. Thirteen U.S. troops died there in a suicide bombing.<\/p>\n
But since then, the fears that prevented three presidents from quitting the war have proven to be unfounded. Afghanistan has not become a terror haven or launchpad for attacks in the United States.<\/p>\n
Today, the U.S. military is mired in a new war in Iran. Once again, the prospects for a military victory look bleak. Even President Trump has hinted that he would like to quit the war, only to reverse course and make a case for staying.<\/p>\n
\u201cWe don\u2019t have to be there,\u201d he said in an Oval Office address<\/a> in the spring. \u201cWe don\u2019t need their oil. We don\u2019t need anything they have. But we\u2019re there to help our allies.\u201d<\/p>\n The long war in Afghanistan raises hard questions for the generals and policymakers contemplating the way forward in Iran: Why was quitting in Afghanistan so hard? What does the long struggle to accept defeat there say about the Trump administration\u2019s predicament in Iran?<\/p>\n The United States has faced questions about quitting in just about every war it has fought since its emergence as a global power after World War II. \u201cSo much of what we\u2019ve been involved in these last several decades is really policing the empire,\u201d said Andrew R. Hoehn, a senior analyst at RAND Corporation, a think tank that studies security matters.<\/p>\n In most instances, U.S. troops have gone to war to impose order on an unruly world, or to defend American values. \u201cWe\u2019re not fighting existential conflicts,\u201d Mr. Hoehn said.<\/p>\n The aftermath of Osama bin Laden\u2019s death in May 2011 offered the best opportunity to leave Afghanistan. The perpetrator of the Sept. 11 terror attacks was dead, and a decade of drone strikes had decimated his organization. The Taliban insurgents, who had ruled Afghanistan and harbored Al Qaeda before the U.S. invasion, were proving almost impossible to eradicate.<\/p>\n \u201cIf American officials had known then what they know now, many of them \u2014 including me \u2014 would have argued more strongly for an early withdrawal,\u201d Carter Malkasian, who advised U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, recently wrote in an essay in Foreign Affairs magazine<\/a>.<\/p>\n Presidents and the Pentagon were motivated to keep fighting by concerns about the country\u2019s credibility, a sense of obligation to trusted Afghan allies and a feeling that defeat would dishonor the sacrifices made by dead and wounded troops.<\/p>\n For many of these officers, who lost close friends in firefights with the Taliban, the idea of quitting ran counter to years of training and experience.<\/p>\n \u201cSimply put, one reason the Americans did not leave Afghanistan earlier is that the U.S. military fights to win,\u201d Mr. Malkasian wrote.<\/p>\n Political and foreign policy leaders fretted about U.S. credibility on the world stage and the costs that they could pay at the ballot box for losing a war.<\/p>\n By 2011, U.S. troop levels had already begun falling in Afghanistan, and the Taliban recognized that it just needed to outlast U.S. troops and the exhausted American public\u2019s willingness to pay for the war.<\/p>\n As the prospect of defeating the Taliban grew more remote, U.S. political leaders shifted their goals. They focused on reducing casualties, cutting the war\u2019s costs and keeping the corrupt and unpopular Afghan government alive.<\/p>\n \u201cThey\u2019re like a doctor in a critical care ward that knows the patient is going to die,\u201d said Rosemary Kelanic<\/a>, the Middle East program director at Defense Priorities, which promotes a more modest U.S. foreign policy. \u201cThey\u2019re just hoping the patient dies after their shift is over. They don\u2019t want it to be on their watch.\u201d<\/p>\n The war continued for another decade after bin Laden\u2019s death, claiming the lives of another 868 service members. U.S. commanders who led troops in the war\u2019s waning years sensed that they were being set up to fail. On a recent podcast<\/a>, Gen. Austin S. Miller, the last commander in Afghanistan, recalled his mind-set when he was selected in 2018 for the job. He expected to emerge from his tour \u201cvery tired\u201d and with a \u201cdiminished reputation.\u201d<\/p>\n His situation, he joked darkly, was best summed up by song lyrics<\/a> from the rock band Steely Dan: \u201cI\u2019m a fool to do your dirty work.\u201d<\/p>\n Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth vowed earlier this year that the war in Iran would be nothing like the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Mr. Hegseth had deployed to both conflicts as a young Army National Guard officer. The experience left him angry and disillusioned.<\/p>\n \u201cHear it from me, one of hundreds of thousands who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, who watched previous foolish politicians like Bush, Obama and Biden squander American credibility,\u201d Mr. Hegseth told reporters in March.<\/p>\n Those wars were quagmires, he said. The Iran war, he promised<\/a>, would be different \u2014 \u201claser focused,\u201d lethal, swift and \u201cdecisive.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cThis is not Iraq,\u201d Mr. Hegseth insisted.<\/a> \u201cThis is not endless.\u201d<\/p>\n Iran responded to punishing attacks by closing the Strait of Hormuz. Earlier this summer, Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, conceded that U.S. bombs and missiles likely would not be enough to defeat Iran or to even reopen the critical waterway to commercial traffic.<\/p>\n \u201cAir power has got limits,\u201d he said in Senate testimony<\/a>, \u201cand we always have to be mindful of those.\u201d<\/p>\n Today the administration is betting that a U.S. Navy blockade of Iranian exports through the strait and economic sanctions will accomplish what the earlier airstrikes failed to do.<\/p>\n There are early signs of an uptick in the number of ships and oil exports transiting the strait.<\/p>\n Despite the modest gains, U.S. military leaders are no longer talking about a swift victory. Instead, they are describing a campaign that would squeeze Iran for months or longer.<\/p>\n Asked how long the Navy, already strained by long deployments, could sustain the blockade, Mr. Hegseth replied<\/a>: \u201cWe can hold it as long as we need to \u2014 indefinitely.\u201d<\/p>\n The challenge for the U.S. military resembles the one that it faced in Afghanistan. The Taliban insurgents were fighting for their survival. So too are Iran\u2019s leaders.<\/p>\n For the United States, the stakes are much lower, and so too are the costs of quitting.<\/p>\n The U.S. military likely could open the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war started. \u201cIt is a doable task,\u201d said Thomas G. Mahnken, who served as a senior Pentagon official under President George W. Bush. \u201cBut it would take some effort on the ground, just because the Iranians have spent decades building and fortifying positions.\u201d<\/p>\n For now, the costs of such an operation in blood and treasure seem higher than Mr. Trump or the American people, who polls show<\/a> oppose the war, are willing to bear.<\/p>\n