The integration of digital public infrastructure, like digital identity and wallets for accessing public and private services, has made internet access a necessity in India.

In 2024, India ranked second globally in Internet usage. Yet, only 49.15% of its population has internet access, with rural and remote regions remaining significantly unconnected. This divide is not merely a matter of connectivity, it reflects the limitations of existing infrastructure.

Terrestrial networks and mobile broadband, which serve most of the country, have limited reach in areas with difficult terrain or sparse populations. The cost of deploying and maintaining internet infrastructure in remote regions is estimated to be 10 to 20 times higher than in urban areas, offering limited financial incentives for providers to expand their services.

In this context, satellite internet is emerging as a promising alternative. Unlike terrestrial networks, satellite systems can bypass the challenges posed by geography, offering the possibility of seamless connectivity in remote regions of the country.

Recognising the potential of satellite internet to bridge the digital divide, the Indian government has opened its satellite Internet market to private operators. However, India’s approach to satellite communications is being shaped by competing imperatives of safeguarding national security, navigating geopolitical trade pressures, and pursuing sovereignty.

New frontier of great power competition

With a constellation of 7,578 satellites, US-based Starlink, owned by Elon Musk, dominates the global low-earth orbit satellite market. Its closest competitors, Eutelsat’s OneWeb, backed by Bharti Airtel and the United Kingdom government, with 630 satellites, Amazon’s Kuiper with 27, and Luxembourg-based SES with nine, lag significantly in scale.

In recent months, Starlink has either secured operational authorisations or is on the cusp of receiving approvals in several countries, including India. Starlink’s expansion into new markets has reportedly accelerated due to US officials pushing for regulatory approvals during trade negotiations.

Starlink’s expanding footprint has countries worried about reliance on foreign operators, and some are launching their own constellations. For instance, China aims to deploy three mega-constellations, including SpaceSail (Qianfan), Guo Wang (National Network), and the Hongyan Constellation, each of which has ambitions of deploying thousands of satellites over the next decade.

Similarly, the European Union is developing Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite (IRIS²), a multi-orbital constellation, funded by entities including SES, Eutelsat, Hispasat, Airbus, and Deutsche Telekom, which seeks to provide satellite Internet across Europe.

A contested terrain

According to reports, capturing just 1% of India’s consumer broadband market could help Starlink generate nearly $1 billion in revenue annually. The prospect of such high returns has attracted major global satellite-based Internet operators to the Indian market. To operate in India, these companies must secure the Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite licence from the Department of Telecommunications and authorisations from the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre (IN-SPACe).

Early entrants such as Eutelsat’s OneWeb and Reliance Jio’s joint venture with SES have leveraged domestic partnerships to successfully navigate this process. In contrast, Starlink and Kuiper faced regulatory hurdles, particularly concerning data localisation and foreign ownership restrictions. While Kuiper appears to be taking a cooperative approach in addressing regulatory expectations, Starlink adopted a more contentious stance.

In 2021, Starlink began pre-selling its services in India without formal approval, prompting the Department of Telecommunications to intervene by directing it to obtain the necessary authorisations. Starlink also resisted India’s data localisation requirements and was initially reluctant to comply with mandatory ownership disclosure norms. Indian regulations require all foreign entities operating in sensitive sectors to submit comprehensive details of their ownership structures, with specific scrutiny of investors from countries that share a land border with India, such as China.

Starlink cited restrictions under US privacy laws applicable to unlisted entities to decline to disclose the investors’ list. The company did submit a declaration affirming that none of its shareholders are from such countries. However, the disclosure fell short of the regulatory requirements prescribed by Indian authorities.

Despite these regulatory setbacks, Starlink’s entry into the Indian market gained momentum following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US in February 2025. Within a month of Modi’s meeting with President Donald Trump and Musk, Starlink announced retail partnerships with Airtel and Jio.

In May, the company received a Letter of Intent from the Department of Telecommunications, and in June, it was granted a Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite licence. To begin providing services in India, Starlink needed a final regulatory clearance from India’s space agency. On July 8, it received the IN-SPACe authorisation, valid for five years from the date of issue or until the end of operational life of its constellation, whichever comes first. In contrast, Kuiper, which was at a similar stage in the approval process, continued to face delays in securing regulatory approval.

While Trump’s tariff policies do not explicitly target satellite Internet services, India’s geopolitical priorities and ongoing trade negotiations with the US appear to be facilitating Starlink’s entry into India. Musk’s close relationship with Trump may have further influenced India’s decision to expedite Starlink’s regulatory clearance, including exempting key regulatory mandates such as full ownership disclosure. The opaque authorisation process raises critical questions about procedural fairness in the satellite communication market.

While framed as complementary technologies, satellite and terrestrial networks are increasingly vying for the same broadband market. Although trade imperatives have facilitated Starlink’s entry into the Indian market, its dominance in the business-to-business and business-to-consumer segments is not guaranteed. OneWeb is focusing on business-to-business services, whereas Jio will cater to both business-to-business and business-to-consumer markets. In the business-to-consumer segment, Jio’s venture holds a competitive advantage due to its established market trust and extensive telecommunication network infrastructure.

Starlink faces challenges not just in business-to-consumer and business-to-business segments but also for government contracts, as Indian authorities may prefer operators with domestic roots like OneWeb (partly owned by Bharti Global) and Jio Space Technologies (a joint venture with SES).

Starlink’s close affiliation with the US government and Musk’s positions, especially during the Ukraine-Russia conflict, may lead India to approach defense-related partnerships with caution. For instance, OneWeb has already begun providing services to Indian defense personnel under a provisional licence.

The underlying competition between terrestrial and satellite broadband is evident in India’s unresolved spectrum allocation debate. The government’s decision to administratively assign spectrum to Starlink has drawn fierce opposition from domestic telecom networks like Airtel and Jio, who argue that it creates an uneven playing field, favoring satellite operators.

Notably, the policy diverges from Starlink’s demand for a 20-year licence, instead imposing a licensing term of five years and 4% adjusted gross revenue as usage charges. This move appears to be an attempt by the Indian authorities to balance competing interests, but it faces legal scrutiny.

Critics of the decision contend it violates the Supreme Court’s 2G spectrum ruling, which mandates a “fair and transparent process for allocating spectrum.” The outcome of these challenges will determine whether India prioritises interoperability with global standards over domestic telecom interests. The spectrum debate raises critical questions about the balance of power between state and commercial actors – to what degree can satellite providers leverage their geopolitical connections to shape policy outcomes?

Balancing state control and national security

In addition to its geopolitical priorities, the Indian government is increasing regulatory oversight to mitigate national security risks. During the recent terror attack in Pahalgam in Kashmir, unauthorised Huawei-based satellite phones were allegedly used to circumvent the ability of security agencies to monitor communications in the region.

As satellite signals traverse international jurisdictions, it is challenging for national authorities to monitor and control communications over the LEO-satellite infrastructure. For example, in 2024, unauthorised Starlink devices were seized in the conflict-ridden and border areas of India. Allegations were raised about these devices being used by militants to circumvent the Internet shutdown imposed in Manipur and by drug smugglers to navigate the deep sea in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

Starlink denied Indian authorities’ request for information on seized devices, though Musk clarified on social media that unauthorised access was not possible as Starlink’s signal was turned off over India. Such incidents and Starlink’s non-cooperation prompted the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs to direct the Department of Telecommunication to implement necessary measures to avoid circumvention of geographic restrictions.

Complying with the home ministry’s directive, the telecom department has amended the security mandates for Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite licence holders. To facilitate state monitoring, the amended licence requires all communications to be routed through domestic gateways and operators to establish control centers for direct communication with Indian authorities.

Operators are required to “actively monitor” user activities within areas designated as Special Monitoring Zones and Exclusive Economic Zones by the government. The licence also places restrictions on cross-border flows of data, mandating localisation of data such as commercial records, call details, and IP details to be stored within India and prohibiting this data from being transferred, decrypted, or duplicated outside the country.

Operators must enforce government-issued website blocking orders and restrict services to specific individuals, groups, or entire regions during conflicts. Additionally, they are responsible for ensuring geofencing in debarred regions, particularly border areas. The amended licence also serves an industrial policy objective: to encourage local production of technologies. All Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite licence holders are required to put in place a manufacturing program that indigenises at least 20% of their ground segment of the satellite network.

These security mandates fail to address critical vulnerabilities stemming from trading technological dependence for operational convenience. Nations dependent on foreign tech firms risk losing autonomy when the commercial interests of tech firms fuse with the interests and strategic or security objectives of specific governments.

For example, as recently as February this year, US officials have attempted to use restricting Starlink access as diplomatic leverage over Ukraine. Since 2022, Starlink has restricted services multiple times, by geofencing near front lines or otherwise, which has impacted both Ukrainian and Russian forces. In late 2023, Starlink refused activation near Crimea, preventing a planned Ukrainian attack on Russian forces in the region.

In May 2024, the US Department of Defense restricted Russia’s access to Starlink. However, Russia found a way to circumvent these restrictions by procuring Starlink devices through black-market websites and fitting Starlink dishes on its military drones to attack Ukraine. Following the recent US sanctions against the International Criminal Court, triggered by its arrest warrants for Israeli officials, Microsoft, a US-based tech giant, swiftly complied, cutting off the ICC prosecutor’s access to emails.

Such incidents demonstrate how geopolitical conflicts now extend into the global digital communications infrastructure, which is increasingly being used to achieve foreign policy goals. The Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite licence enables the Indian state to control access to data, information, and service delivery. However, it does not address challenges that India will face when foreign firms act as tools of coercive statecraft.

India’s push for satellite Internet reflects a dual imperative: bridging its digital divide while safeguarding national security in an increasingly contested technological landscape. Despite growing competition in the satellite internet market, a fundamental question persists: can satellite internet effectively serve India’s population in rural and remote regions?

Satellite Internet is significantly more expensive than terrestrial Internet or mobile broadband in both underserved and well-connected areas. As a result, even though access will be technically available, many people might remain unconnected due to financial constraints in India’s remote regions. This marks a shift in the nature of the digital divide – from an issue of accessibility to one of affordability.

While satellite technology may offer a viable solution for remote connectivity, its integration into India’s digital infrastructure comes with geopolitical strings attached. The expedited regulatory clearances for Starlink, juxtaposed with delays for competitors, underscore how trade diplomacy and strategic alliances, rather than pure market logics, are shaping India’s satellite policies.

Yet reliance on foreign operators introduces vulnerabilities, and as seen in Ukraine, Russia, and ICC sanctions cases, technology services can become entangled in geopolitical upheavals. India is attempting to address some of these concerns, though its approach has been limited to introducing data routing and localisation requirements. These measures can go so far, and India needs to think deeply about balancing open markets with national priorities in an interconnected global system.

Jyoti Panday is Regional Director, Asia at the Internet Governance Project (IGP) at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Her research focuses on the political economy of digital platforms and services, as well as AI policy analysis, particularly where it intersects with internet governance, data governance, and international trade in semiconductors. Before joining IGP, Jyoti was with the Telecom Centre of Excellence at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad (IIMA). She has previously served as Asia Policy Fellow for the Electronic Frontier Foundation and is the author of the 2017 UNESCO Media Freedom Report for Asia Pacific. Jyoti has helped develop the Manila Principles, a framework of baseline safeguards and best practices to guide development of intermediary liability regimes for third-party content.

Saumya Jain is a Research Fellow at the Internet Governance Project (IGP) at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Her research focuses on telecommunications, media, and platform governance.

The article was first published in India in Transition, a publication of the Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.