It is against this background that the repeal of the endangerment finding, and especially the repeal of associated federal climate policy regulations, could reverberate through the international community. The Paris architecture can deal with any country—even the world’s largest historical emitter—stepping in and out of the agreement. But actions that make it harder for future US governments to enact climate policies would not go unnoticed and may over time lead to a negative multiplier effect.
Some anecdotal signs already indicate that other countries are reacting to the United States’ climate negativity with negativity of their own. Indonesia’s special envoy for climate stated in January that his own country might consider leaving the Paris Agreement, saying that it is unfair for Indonesia to commit to climate action if a large country like the United States abandons the agreement. Argentinian president Javier Milei likewise expressed his desire for Argentina to leave the Paris Agreement. In New Zealand, one of the government coalition partners raised the possibility of leaving the Paris Agreement after the next national election in 2026. In the European Union, a former climate commissioner warns against “green backsliding.”
Another impact of the US withdrawal from the international climate stage is felt in its foreign assistance. South Africa was counting on financial support from the United States to gradually decommission coal-fired power plants, which will no longer happen due to the United States also withdrawing from the Just Energy Transition Partnership that supports the energy transition in emerging economies. Stakeholders in India expressed concerns about ripple effects for green hydrogen development and capital to finance clean technology investments.
But evidence for any multiplier effect, positive and negative, will be found in future NDCs. As it happens, the 2025 COP30, hosted by Brazil, will be the first annual climate conference after the new round of NDC submissions are due. The deadline to submit the new NDCs was initially set for February 2025 but later extended to September 2025. So far, only about 20 parties have submitted NDCs. Missed deadlines in multilateral forums are not necessarily unusual, given that each party will be constrained by its own domestic political circumstances. But it remains to be seen how many NDCs will be submitted and how ambitious the pledges contained therein will be.
In contrast, for the COP26 in Glasgow, which took stock of the first set of NDCs, well over 100 parties submitted NDCs, with most having done so well in advance of the conference. This included the United States, as President Joe Biden reversed the decision to leave the Paris Agreement only a few months after the US withdrawal had taken effect but before COP26, which was delayed by a year due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Even after the 2024 US election, the Biden administration still submitted a revised NDC for 2035, committing to 61–66 percent emissions reductions by 2035, compared to 2005. This revised NDC could be seen as a signal of what a future administration committed to climate policy might want to achieve.
But if actions are now undertaken to constrain the future regulatory capabilities of the federal government, other countries might adjust their expectations of what the United States can achieve over the next decade. Expectations about the relative supply and costs of fossil fuels versus clean technologies could lead to other countries moderating their NDCs. For poorer economies, expectations of reduced international climate finance could reduce the willingness to adopt more ambitious pledges.
In the European Union, lack of momentum is also visible. The world’s second-largest economy traditionally sees itself as a frontrunner in climate action and has indeed legislated extensively to achieve its 2030 climate target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 55 percent compared to 1990. For 2040, its proposed target is a 90 percent emissions reduction compared to 1990. The European Council—the body representing the EU countries’ heads of government—so far has not formally agreed to this target, which means the European Union has delayed its NDC for 2035, which depends on its 2040 target. EU decisionmakers cite ongoing challenges to industrial competitiveness and high energy prices. But the knowledge that the world’s largest economy is unwilling to commit to further climate action does not help the case of those promoting climate action in Europe.
Perhaps the most critical NDC will be the one that the world’s largest emitter, China, submits. In its current NDC, its main target is to ensure that its greenhouse gas emissions peak before 2030. China moving toward an absolute emissions reduction target would send a signal to other emerging economies to consider similar carbon constraints. The absence of a new US NDC, however, will remove any peer pressure from its greatest geopolitical and economic rival to enhance its current ambition.
The Paris Agreement is working, even if change is slow.