The American leadership, since the Post-World War II era, was based on a unique blend of military superiority, financial dominance, and the power to legitimize and persuade, also known as ‘soft power.’ This combination enabled Washington to be the center of gravity till now. The recent occurrences, however, suggest a peculiar shift where the gravitational pull of US power is waning, with a ripple effect and stakes for everyone, including Asia.
This dwindling pull of US power is not merely a fleeting moment but the result of a fundamental change in the US mien. With US actions losing credibility and alliance systems weakening from NATO to Asia, the international system is quite polarized and no longer structured around a single hegemon.
The United States military action in Venezuela at the beginning of January 2026 highlighted a remarkable contrast. Once Washington used to depend on diplomacy, coalition-building, and international institutions to legitimize its actions; now it seems ready to act without concern for the legitimacy and legality. The result is that what could once be possibly accepted or at least tolerated is now subject to global skepticism. The acts of American unilateralism are now echoed across Latin America and Asia and have strengthened the perception that US power is increasingly becoming more transactional than persuasive.
This change is now observable with the traditional partners of the US as well. US allies are not aligning or opposing; they are recalibrating. This can be depicted by the recent Canadian interaction with China. When Ottawa announced it will reduce tariffs on Chinese electric cars in exchange for agricultural export tariff relief, it was the first obvious sign that the country would rely on a wider Western consensus to set the terms of the trade confrontation in the past. Further cooperation pacts were a sign that Canada is prepared to diversify strategic and economic ties outside Washington.
Even Europe is reaching this reckoning. The cornerstone of transatlantic security, NATO is experiencing diminishing unity and a renewed debate over burden-sharing and strategic autonomy. Increasingly, European states are talking about the independent defense capabilities and wider engagement with other global actors. These discussions are not quite new, but they have gained strength in the recent crises as confidence in long-term US commitment wavers.
This tension was especially evident when Washington showed interest in Greenland and later involved NATO in the talks over the strategically important Arctic. The actions of Greenlandic leaders and European allies revealed increasing uneasiness with the unpredictability of the Americans and pointed to internal tensions in the alliance.
The implications are particularly important in the case of Asia. The Indo-US alliance has been touted as a significant element of the Washington Indo-Pacific strategy. However, according to recent evaluations, such as in Foreign Affairs, the relationship has never been under such a serious strain as now. The disagreements over the mediation role after the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in 2025, as well as punitive trade tariffs due to the energy partnership between India and Russia, have created a sense of anxiety in Washington.
The Indian response is a part of a larger regional trend. The Indian strategic autonomy is becoming more functional. New Delhi is keen to maintain diplomatic links across all power centers, as indicated by the recent top-level discussions between the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian officials. For most Asian states, managing the relations with the rival powers is not an exception but part of a core strategy now.
The US influence in the Middle East also seems to be weakening. Iran remains mired in political turmoil with protests and competing visions of the country’s future. Despite sustained US pressure, it has struggled to translate its leverage into stability, reinforcing the idea of exhaustion on the part of the US rather than decisive influence.
The trend is similar across regions. The United States is no longer exercising unchallenged leadership; it is simply dependent on leverage and coercion, trying to influence the results in a situation in an environment where partners feel less obliged to obey. This change is magnified by public opinion. Behaviors that used to be perceived as stabilizing are now seen by most as self-interested and unilateral. American moral authority is more often doubted now.
On the contrary, this environment has given China an advantage in its diplomacy. The growing involvement of Beijing in Latin America, its warming relations with Canada, and its cautious criticisms of US interventionism enable it to pose as a practical, although strategically aggressive, alternative partner. The comparison is potent since the ultimate foundation of soft power is perception and legitimacy and not the capability alone.
All this does not imply that the American power has vanished. The United States still possesses enormous military potential, technological superiority, and financial influence. However, soft power, the glue that transforms power into leadership, is waning. The question that is being re-evaluated by countries is not whether the US is still powerful or not, but whether their long-term interests will be effectively met by aligning with it.
For Washington, it is imperative to pause transactional leverage and pursue persuasive partnerships, as otherwise the world will keep shifting towards a multipolar order, one where the US leadership position will lose its superiority and will become just one of the many voices.