(AP Photo/Christophe Ena, File)
Bottom Line Up Front
Gulf states hosting U.S. bases immediately became targets for Iranian missiles and drones in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury.
The goal of Iran President Masoud Pezeshkian’s apology to the Gulf was likely to frame the U.S. as the aggressor and highlight the Gulf States’ accommodation to U.S. military interests.
Gulf states may question continuing partnerships with the U.S. military in the future, since they have neither acted as a deterrent nor been able to protect from Iranian missile and drone incursions.
The perceived lack of U.S. protection for the Gulf states may affect how other allied countries view the rationale for hosting U.S. military assets.
Shortly after Iran retaliated against the United States and Israel in response to Operations Epic Fury and Roaring Lion, Gulf states hosting U.S. bases became the target of Iranian missiles and drones. As the barrage of Iranian ballistics continued against energy infrastructure, and the Strait of Hormuz subsequently closed, the global energy and economic repercussions became clear. On Saturday, however, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized to the Gulf states for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) attacks and announced that the Iranian interim leadership council approved a motion to stop all attacks on neighboring countries unless they target Iran, stating that he wishes to “solve this through diplomacy.” U.S. President Donald Trump responded to the apology by writing on social media that “Today Iran will be hit very hard.” Further stating that Iran’s promise to halt attacks on the Gulf states was “only made because the relentless U.S. and Israeli attack. They were looking to take over and rule the Middle East.”
Following Pezeshkian’s statement, the IRGC echoed the Iranian president’s remarks but warned that “should the previous hostile actions continue, all military bases and interests of criminal America and the fake Zionist regime on land, at sea, and in the air across the region will be considered primary targets.” The IRGC statement created confusion about Iran’s intentions toward the very states the president had just apologized to — all of which host U.S. military bases or other American interests. Just hours later, the UAE confirmed that Iranian drones had targeted Al Dhafra Air Base, and Qatar’s Ministry of Defense announced it had intercepted a missile attack, effectively undercutting Pezeshkian’s apology to the Gulf states.
Pezeshkian’s announcement was, in practice, far more conciliatory than the IRGC’s. As a civilian official, he is more likely to rely on diplomacy than his military counterparts. His initial message appears to have been an attempt to signal that Iran does not seek conflict with its neighbors, but that their ties to U.S. interests have made them targets — which helps to frame the conflict as primarily driven by the U.S. and Israel, not Iran. The IRGC, however, was more direct, stating that any location hosting U.S. military assets or interests would be treated as a legitimate target, despite the president’s apparent promise to stop attacking Iran’s neighbors.
This divide perfectly exemplifies the internal political dynamics within Iran. Civil servants within the Iranian political system historically do not have a say in foreign affairs. The center of power lies with the Supreme Leader and the IRGC, which has its own robust command system and answers to no one but the Supreme Leader, whose role was to balance militarism with diplomacy and politics. Without the presence of a Supreme Leader, the IRGC continues to function in a decentralized manner, but largely separate from the civil offices in Iran. This may also benefit the regime strategically. Through the clear distinction between the military and civil wings of the regime, Iranian politicians have greater latitude to justify controversial actions to their neighboring Gulf States.
It is likely that Gulf and Iranian diplomats are back-channeling on how to prevent further Iranian attacks on their territory, which have had severe economic repercussions regionally and globally. Such discussion likely centers on the role and presence of U.S. military infrastructure in the Gulf states. Iranian strikes have caused damage at several sites tied to U.S. military operations, including a key THAAD-related radar site in Jordan and facilities at the U.S. Fifth Fleet base in Bahrain. U.S. military installations have also not prevented Iranian missiles from causing very real damage across the Gulf, potentially putting into question the rationale for hosting them.
The Gulf states had no part in initiating this conflict, yet they have paid a far larger price than the U.S. In fact, in January, when U.S. President Donald Trump first began re-negotiating nuclear terms with Iran and subsequently began building up U.S. military force in the region, multiple Gulf leaders warned Trump of the dangers of re-igniting the conflict with Iran. According to reports from Reuters, leaders from Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt warned Trump that an attack against Iran “would have consequences for the wider region in terms of both security and economics that would ultimately impact the United States itself.” In January, this reportedly swayed Trump away from further escalation. Yet, by the end of February, when Operation Epic Fury was underway, the United States’ Gulf partners were not given advanced notice, even though it was clear they would become one of Iran’s main targets in retaliatory strikes.
AP reports that Gulf leaders have become discontent with the United States’ handling of the conflict and have expressed anger over the absence of prior notice of the operation. One anonymous official told reporters that Gulf leaders were “angry that the U.S. military has not defended them enough,” echoing other statements expressed by many in the region who felt the U.S. was prioritizing U.S. and Israeli assets over the protection of the Gulf States. Prince Turki al-Faisal, the former chief of Saudi intelligence, told CNN that this was “Netanyahu’s war,” alluding to the growing allegations, and statements made by White House Officials, that Israel had convinced the U.S. to join in strikes against Iran by forcing its hand.
It remains to be seen whether Gulf states will continue with their partnerships with the U.S. after, or even during, the war. According to the Financial Times, a Gulf official told reporters that “a number of Gulf countries have begun an internal review to determine whether force majeure clauses can be invoked in current contracts, while also reviewing current and future investment commitments in order to alleviate some of the anticipated economic strain from the current war.” It is highly likely that Gulf officials will reassess the utility of American military bases on their territory, which, as this conflict has demonstrated, have neither acted as a deterrent nor protected these states from the impact of missiles and drones. This would signify a significant recalibration of U.S. presence in the Middle East, which initiated its mutual defense assistance pact with Saudi Arabia in 1951. The perceived lack of U.S. protection for the Gulf states may also spill over into how other allied countries view the rationale for hosting U.S. military assets.