On 4 February 2026, the United States (US) hosted the 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial. The meeting saw the signing of 11 new bilateral frameworks and memoranda of understanding (MoUs), the announcement of Project Vault, and the launch of the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) as the successor to the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP). Amid intense international momentum towards supply-chain resilience, each of these initiatives formed a piece of the larger puzzle of the US’s attempt to reshape the global critical-minerals landscape. As India pursues its own goals and deepens cooperation with the US, the US–Mexico Critical Minerals Action Plan provides an instructive comparison for the terms India should seek.
The US-Mexico Critical Minerals Action Plan
The US–Mexico Action Plan was the most detailed outcome to emerge from the Ministerial, as it built on the countries’ existing strengths and close trade relationship. Mining is already a key pillar of Mexico’s economy, and the US is the primary destination for its mineral exports and the main source of mining equipment. Mexico’s geological endowments make it the world’s largest producer of silver (with silver officially added to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) 2025 Critical Minerals List), place it among the top 10 globally in copper reserves, and make it the fifth-largest producer of molybdenum. Its proximity to the US, combined with United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade preferences, has further enhanced Mexico’s competitiveness in lithium and battery-material markets.
Proponents of the Plan have argued that the agreement has implications that go beyond mining and will help Mexico integrate as a partner into a technology supply chain stretching from mines to semiconductors to AI and quantum technologies. The Plan is to be implemented by the US Trade Representative and Mexico’s Secretariat of Economy and has three pillars.
1. Coordinated Trade Policies and Price Floors
The main mechanism is the development of border-adjusted price floors for critical minerals imports. These minimum import prices would prevent below-cost dumping as a direct counter to Chinese state-subsidised mineral exports. The specific minerals to be covered are yet to be announced and will significantly influence the effectiveness of the Plan.
2. Plurilateral Agreement on Supply Chain Resilience
The price floor will be embedded within a broader plurilateral agreement. It calls for provisions to strengthen supply chain resilience, including coordinated trade measures, harmonised regulatory standards for mining, investment promotion and screening mechanisms, joint research, coordinated rapid responses to supply chain disruptions, and coordinated stockpiling, among other measures.
3. Collaboration on Financing and Geological Mapping
Both governments are to identify specific mining, processing, and manufacturing projects in the US, Mexico, or third countries for prioritisation for financing and policy support. These projects must comply with internationally recognised responsible business conduct standards. Concerning geological mapping, the Plan calls on both parties to share information on potential mineral deposits identified by their respective geological survey agencies. This aspect goes beyond conventional trade and investment agreements.
Building on the existing trade relationship, the agreement can be seen as seeking a shift in Mexico’s role from a resource supplier to a value-added partner in advanced technology ecosystems. Additionally, cooperation on technology, funding, and information sharing would strengthen the Mexican industry and maximise the value of its resources.
Stockpiling coordination would create emergency supply protocols with both commercial and national security value. This would create a buffer against state-driven supply disruptions and reduce China’s leverage, particularly as Mexico’s import dependence on China continues to grow.
Costs and Constraints
Despite the promise of the Plan, critics from civil society and academia are concerned that the deal benefits the US far more than Mexico. They argue that price floors would include Mexican exports and would shield the US from global market fluctuations at the cost of the Mexican industry. Visibility into Mexico’s reserves and influence over mining and trade policy would erode Mexico’s autonomy and create a centre–periphery relationship that echoes broader dependency issues rather than building technological and industrial capabilities.
Mexico’s mining reforms have increasingly tightened state control since 2023, when the López Obrador administration nationalised lithium and sought to prioritise community rights and sustainable development in mining operations. Critics believe that the Plan may lead to deregulation of the sector and to mining extractivism that would dispossess Indigenous communities.
Even proponents have raised structural concerns about the Plan’s implementation. Mexico has seen a persistent gap between announced nearshoring projects and actual investments. Stability concerns and regulatory frameworks do not make for the most conducive investment environment. Moreover, the Mexican Geological Survey lacks the resources to fulfil the mapping mandate at the required scale, and exploration authority for lithium has been centralised within state entities with limited capacity. This affects Mexico’s ability to effectively realise the promise of the agreement.
The asymmetry of the Plan can be seen by contrast with the two other Action Plans that followed the Ministerial. The US–Japan Action Plan for Critical Mineral Supply Chain Resilience, announced on 19 March 2026, overlaps significantly with the Mexico Plan in its provisions for a coordinated price floor and the second and third pillars of the US–Mexico Plan. However, Japan’s existing domestic processing and refining industry, combined with its decades of experience in minerals procurement and stockpiling, shifted the Plan’s emphasis towards strengthening midstream and downstream competitiveness rather than upstream supply alone.
The US–European Union (EU) Action Plan for Critical Mineral Supply Chain Resilience, formalised on 24 April 2026, diverged even further by including the possibility of price-gap subsidies and offtake agreements. The design of each cooperation framework reflects the partners’ existing capabilities and the nature of their bilateral relationship. Without similar capabilities, India will have to make its case based on processing ambition, multilateral reach, and market scale rather than on existing capability.
Takeaways for India
On the sidelines of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 26 May 2026, India and the US signed a framework on “Securing Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths”. The agreement, the specifics of which have not been announced, is aimed at deepening cooperation across the critical minerals and rare earths supply chain, including mining, processing, recycling, and related investments.
As India develops its critical minerals cooperation with the US, the Mexico precedent offers instructive parallels and divergences. India shares several features of Mexico’s context. Both are large emerging economies with significant mineral resources that remain underdeveloped relative to their full potential. Despite India’s reserves, it has near-total import dependence for several critical minerals, mirroring Mexico’s underdeveloped processing ecosystem. Both countries’ heavy reliance on China has created vulnerabilities to supply chain weaponisation. In recognition of this, both countries have recently accelerated domestic policy frameworks to boost capacity across the value chain, creating significant scope for international collaboration to bridge domestic gaps. However, unlike Mexico, India does not enjoy the proximity to the US or a United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA)-equivalent highly integrated preferential trade agreement. Reliability, autonomy, and strategic interest concerns are also emphasised in the context of the recent turbulence in the India–US trade relationship.
India needs to balance its domestic interests with a landscape where countries are increasingly expected to align with trade blocs or face exclusion.
As this relationship progresses, India needs to balance its domestic interests with a landscape where countries are increasingly expected to align with trade blocs or face exclusion. All three Action Plans discuss the use of price floors that could eventually be embedded in plurilateral agreements on critical minerals trade. This suggests that the framework could be extended to like-minded partners in the future, pointing to the possible emergence of a new “mineral club” for trade cooperation. Participation in such a framework could provide New Delhi with another avenue for access and cooperation. This aligns with the vision of the National Critical Mineral Mission and complements international engagements such as FORGE and Pax Silica. More broadly, joining such a network would anchor India more deeply within trusted mineral supply chains and reduce its vulnerability to supply disruptions.
However, India needs to consider the implications of price floors for its domestic ecosystem. As a consumer, price floors have the potential to increase costs for industries, including defence and clean energy. India’s manufacturing costs for green energy components already significantly exceed those of China. Price floors could lock India into prices above current market rates and compound this cost disadvantage. However, for minerals that India produces, a price floor could make domestic production more commercially viable. Careful selection of the minerals covered under the deal will be key to striking this balance.
India’s manufacturing costs for green energy components already significantly exceed those of China. Price floors could lock India into prices above current market rates and compound this cost disadvantage.
India needs to insist on value-chain integration through reciprocal investment and trade. India’s active mineral diplomacy across Africa, Latin America, and Australia gives it more diversified upstream sources than Mexico’s predominantly North American orientation. This gives it leverage to negotiate a deal that offers specific and substantive industrial value.
Conclusion
The emerging US-led critical minerals architecture presents India with an opportunity to improve access to inputs, mobilise investment, and integrate itself deeper into trusted supply chains. The experiences of Mexico, Japan, and the EU have demonstrated that the capabilities and bargaining power of the partner will shape the next step. India will have to leverage its ambition, market scale, and active mineral diplomacy to negotiate a framework that supports domestic industrialisation rather than merely secure upstream resources for others.
Amoha Basrur is a Junior Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.
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