Science diplomacy—conceptual issuesDefinition and coverage of science diplomacy

Science diplomacy is an emerging field of study at the intersection of international relations and science policy, which has received only limited attention from scholars in the Central European region despite its increasing importance. It is a concept that involves the use of science as a means of fostering cooperation and improving relations between nations. Its paramount relevance to addressing global challenges was emphasized at the Madrid Conference in 2018. It was further agreed that science diplomacy is often not exploited to its full potential (Science for Diplomacy for Addressing Global Challenges 2019).

The available literature investigates the concept of science diplomacy from various perspectives. Some authors analyze science diplomacy in a regional cluster, while others attempt to conceptualize it. Other authors focus exclusively on the science diplomacy of a particular country.

Diplomacy and its individual dimensions are subject to geo-political developments (Goda and Čiefová 2019), responding to the dynamics of the world. As a result, new branches of diplomacy can emerge, requiring conceptualization. Despite the long history of the relationship between science and diplomacy, the term ‘science diplomacy’ is a phenomenon of the 21st century. Since then, there have been numerous efforts to define science diplomacy, which have produced different typologies of operations and motivations associated with it (Turekian 2018).

Perhaps the most well-known and cited categorization is the one proposed by the Royal Society of London and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). They define science diplomacy in three ways: (1) “science in diplomacy”, where scientific advice is used to inform foreign policy; (2) “diplomacy for science”, in which political capital is used to advance scientific research; and (3) “science for diplomacy”, whereby scientific cooperation is used to improve international relations (The Royal Society 2010; American Association for the Advancement of Science 2009).

Within the framework of the Madrid Declaration on Science Diplomacy, science diplomacy is viewed as “practices at the intersection of science, technology and foreign policy” (Science for Diplomacy for Addressing Global Challenges 2019). According to Su and Mayer (2018), science diplomacy can be defined “as a set of practices that open up sustained channels of communication and cooperation for the main purpose of producing objective knowledge.” The authors emphasize its importance for trust-building in international relations.

Turchetti and Lalli (2020) propose an advanced concept of science diplomacy, termed “Science Diplomacy 2.0,” which emphasizes a stronger focus on addressing societal and global challenges. This approach involves creating tools to assist policy-makers in making informed decisions among various collaborative research options. A key tool in this framework is the responsible innovation observatory, which gathers and integrates data from diverse disciplines using a linked-data, multi-layered method. The objective is to analyze and prioritize research areas either regionally, based on local societal needs, or globally, in response to broader challenges (Turchetti and Lalli 2020).

Ruffini (2020) describes science diplomacy as a set of practices where international relations and foreign policy intersect with science and technology. This field is intricate and multifaceted, characterized by its dual nature, which intertwines scientific pursuits with diplomatic objectives. Equally significant is the characterization of science diplomacy as a scientific discipline situated at the intersection of international relations and science (Arnaldi et al. 2021). Science diplomacy is also viewed as a subfield of public diplomacy and a source of soft power (Copeland 2011). Navigating this complexity requires a subtle understanding of its potential challenges.

One of the core characteristics of science diplomacy is its capacity to create a neutral space for dialogue and cooperation. The scientific community operates according to widely accepted social rules and values, prioritizing knowledge and understanding above political or ethnic considerations. This enables collaboration regardless of broader political tensions. However, science is not immune to drawbacks, including chauvinism, intense competition, and reputation-driven rivalries. Instances of misconduct or involvement with dubious political or business interests further underscore its complexity (Flink 2020).

Building on these critiques, a growing body of scholarship has begun to challenge the normative assumptions underpinning science diplomacy. Hussein and Awad (2024), for example, critique Western-led initiatives for perpetuating structural inequalities and implicit biases, particularly in their engagement with smaller or less powerful states. They argue that despite promoting mutual benefit, science diplomacy can reproduce hierarchical relationships and constrain the agency of recipient countries. This critique is particularly relevant in assessing Slovakia’s position within global science diplomacy networks and highlights the need to examine both the intended and unintended consequences of external engagement.

Science diplomacy is often conflated with international scientific cooperation, a mistake that has caused confusion (Copeland 2016). Unlike international science cooperation, science diplomacy explicitly involves state interests, exhibiting a dual nature of cooperation and competition. This competition extends not only to global players but also among European Union member states (Flink and Schreiterer 2010).

A similar ambiguity surrounds the role of student mobility. While often treated as part of cultural or educational diplomacy, mobility programs may fall within the scope of science diplomacy when they are used to foster bilateral research collaboration, scientific training, or foreign policy objectives—as is the case with initiatives such as Fulbright, Erasmus+, or Chinese government scholarships.

Flink (2020) raises two key criticisms of science diplomacy. First, there is uncertainty about how science benefits if it becomes an instrument of foreign policy. Second, it questions whether foreign policy truly benefits from science diplomacy if an overly idealized view of science is adopted.

International scientific relations often operate within one of two paradigms: positive-sum game diplomacy, which seeks shared global benefits through cooperation; or zero-sum game diplomacy, which yields economic or reputational advantages for one side at the expense of another. It is essential, therefore, to distinguish between using science as a collaborative foreign policy objective and using it as a strategic tool for geopolitical competition (Penca 2018).

Science diplomacy can be implemented in several ways. One approach involves promoting a nation’s scientific research and culture to build relationships and cooperation with other countries. This includes supporting the international mobility of scientists, fostering research and innovation, and collaborating with foreign institutions on projects. Another approach uses science to address global challenges and promote international cooperation, such as participating in discussions on climate change or sustainability.

The approach to science diplomacy of the countries in focus of this study involves “science for diplomacy” and “diplomacy in science.” The French government, for instance, supports the international mobility of French scientists, promotes research and innovation abroad, and collaborates with foreign institutions. France also addresses global challenges through science diplomacy by participating in international negotiations, such as those on climate change.

Science diplomacy plays a vital role not only in addressing critical global issues but also in easing international political tensions, particularly when standard diplomatic avenues are ineffective or unavailable. As highlighted by Copeland, the impartial and non-partisan nature of scientific language significantly contributes to this process. An example of this was observed during the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Cold War era, where, despite heightened tensions, Soviet and American scientists continued their joint efforts in various research fields such as polar studies, atmospheric science, healthcare, deep-sea exploration, and the management of radioactive waste. More recently, amidst the disputes over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, collaboration between U.S. and Russian scientists persisted, especially in Arctic research, operations on the International Space Station, and in crucial international negotiations like the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and the 2013 Syrian chemical weapons disarmament. (Copeland 2016) Yet, it is easier to confirm the notion that good diplomatic relations between countries facilitate effective research cooperation, it’s more challenging to demonstrate that international research and innovation collaboration has significantly improved relations between rival countries (Penca 2018).

Governments worldwide pursue similar science diplomacy agendas, such as Japan’s “Science and Technology Diplomacy” program (2007), Germany’s “Außenwissenschaftspolitik” (2008), and Denmark’s “Techplomacy” (2017) (Kunkel 2021).

A survey conducted within the Central European Initiative (CEI), including Slovakia, identified motivations for investing in science diplomacy. These include:

influencing decision-makers, economic leaders, and public opinion in other countries;

accessing research findings, researchers, and resources abroad to enhance national innovation capacity;

promoting national R&D achievements as part of global marketing strategies.

In most countries involved in the study, training of both diplomats and scientists is critical, as is networking between the diplomatic and scientific communities (Arnaldi and Tessarolo 2019).

Similarly, science diplomacy of the region of Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe was investigated, categorizing scientific cooperation into two clusters: Southern and South-eastern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. Slovakia falls into the latter, alongside Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Moldova, and Poland (Arnaldi et al. 2021).

Fikkers and Horvat (2014) identify reasons for bilateral Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) agreements, dividing them into narrow and broad paradigms. The Broad paradigm aligns with science diplomacy, including objectives such as public diplomacy, transforming diplomatic relationships, and addressing security concerns.

In relation to security concerns, another aspect of science diplomacy emerges—the increasing role of artificial intelligence (AI). Not surprisingly, AI has already started altering science diplomacy practices, motivating a number of scholars to analyze these impacts, challenges and possible threats. For example, not only the ethical implications of AI have been explored, but also its capacity to enhance diplomatic efforts, thereby improving responses to global challenges (Varela 2024). Konovalova’s investigation is twofold, as she considers both directions—AI for diplomacy and diplomacy for AI. She concludes that digital skills and the integration of AI can strengthen diplomatic personnel and improve the effectiveness of diplomatic tools (Konovalova 2023). Furthermore, the potential of AI as a valuable instrument in science diplomacy is highlighted, particularly for addressing shared global challenges and fostering international cooperation (Baig et al. 2024).

Actors of science diplomacy

Science diplomacy can be considered to be a specific field of diplomacy and foreign policy. Since it often intersects with goals in other domains, the roles and backgrounds of science diplomacy actors may be diverse. It is frequently distinguished between states and non-state actors (Reinhardt 2021). Hence, science diplomacy can, for instance, be a task of career diplomats, scientists, or politicians, as well as science counselors, advisors or experts (Szkarłat 2020; Reinhardt 2021). It may also involve funding agencies, civil society organizations, the media, or the private sector (Sabzalieva et al., 2021).

Some authors focus primarily on states as the primary actors in science diplomacy, though they do not underestimate the role of non-state actors. Bertelsen (2024) considers the state to be a key actor due to its ability to utilise science for foreign policy purposes. Szkarłat (2020) adds that the most advanced countries in terms of their experience and implementation of science diplomacy are rich, industrialized states. While states are perceived as powerful actors, many non-state actors also possess significant financial resources and intellectual capacities. States and non-state actors can both compete and cooperate. Moreover, non-state actors’ activities are often materially supported by states, utilised as tools, or tolerated within diplomatic frameworks (Bertelsen 2024). This distinction is relevant to our research, as it predominantly involves states but also incorporates stakeholders such as the U.S. Fulbright Program.

Moomaw (2018) addresses the question of whether successful science diplomacy requires professional diplomats to acquire specific scientific knowledge, thus becoming scientist-diplomats, or whether scientists should refocus on diplomacy, becoming diplomat-scientists. His research highlights important policy implications, concluding that successful science diplomacy “requires negotiators to have a sound understanding of underlying science” and “input from scientists who understand and can contribute to the policy process”. Therefore, diplomacy should not ignore scientific input, while science alone is unlikely to create a significant policy impact (Moomaw 2018).

Countries can also conduct science diplomacy through their membership in international organizations or fora. Overlapping science-, health-, or environment-related objectives may lead to joint approaches for tackling shared challenges. An example is the emergence of the All-Atlantic Ocean Research Alliance. Another example is the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has a long history of integrating diplomatic activities into its scientific initiatives (Adamson 2021).

Another type of science diplomacy actor is research institutes, particularly those focusing on international relations or the economy of specific geographical areas. These institutes aim to facilitate or strengthen diplomatic ties with countries in their focus regions. Other actors include universities, non-profit partnerships (Reinhardt 2021), and even foundations. Charities, especially in the U.S., often fund research collaborations and educational exchanges, enhancing science diplomacy efforts (Bertelsen 2024).

Science diplomacy of the U.S., France, and China

Prior to the beginning of the new millennium, not many countries were prepared to purposefully address and engage with S&T issues in their foreign policy or to compete for global talent. Since then, there has been a surge in international scientific strategies, which have had a significant impact on international relations (Flink and Schreiterer 2010). While most large countries since the 2000s have formally institutionalized science and technology diplomacy initiatives, their objectives differ considerably. Flink and Schreiterer (2010) developed a typology of national approaches towards science diplomacy. They found that for the U.S.’s science diplomacy, political influence plays a central role, while countries like France, Switzerland, Germany, and Japan mainly focus on gaining access to promising markets and developments in R&D, as well as promoting their science, technology, research, and higher education in the global marketplace.

As Copeland recalls, the capacity for science diplomacy varies significantly among countries, primarily influenced by their size, wealth, and level of development. Major powers like the U.S., the UK, and France have the resources and infrastructure to engage in a broad range of science diplomacy activities. In contrast, smaller nations tend to specialize in areas that align with their specific strengths and needs. For instance, Switzerland focuses on commercial technological innovation, while New Zealand concentrates on issues related to agricultural greenhouse gas emissions, biosecurity, and phytosanitation. Generally, less developed countries face challenges in engaging effectively in science diplomacy due to their limited S&T capacities (Copeland 2016).

According to the Secretary of the Indian Department of Biotechnology, the Western countries “have seen science and education as instruments of foreign policy, of income and of brain-gain” (UNESCO 2015). This perception represents a significant challenge for emerging economies, which often struggle with brain drain. Consequently, there is an inherent tension between developed countries using science diplomacy to enhance their international competitiveness and those that serve as traditional exporters of scientific talent.

In the world’s leading scientific power, the U.S., various institutions address different aspects of S&T policy, coordinated by the White House Office for S&T Policy, which has no dedicated budget for science diplomacy. According to Flink and Schreiterer (2010), the institutional setting makes the U.S. international S&T policy “highly fragmented, imponderable and inward-looking”. Knudsen (2021) attributes the relatively limited official science diplomacy initiatives of the U.S., incommensurate with its economic and geopolitical clout, to the natural appeal of the U.S. research ecosystem. However, the U.S. runs one of the most widely recognized and prestigious scholarship programs in the world, established in 1946. The Fulbright Scholar Program annually enables 800 U.S. scholars to go abroad and 900 foreign scholars to come to the United States, contributing to mutual understanding and addressing common societal challenges.

France is another major player in science diplomacy, operating one of the largest science diplomacy networks, with 160 embassies and substantial resources. In 2009, France adopted a National Strategy for Research and Innovation, enshrined in 2013 and presented every five years by the government to Parliament. The French approach to science diplomacy was officially laid out in the 2013 Science Diplomacy for France report.

Science diplomacy is seen as an important tool for stimulating development, maintaining France’s leadership, driving innovation, and mobilizing global networks for French (and European) interests. The government aims to increase interaction between France’s scientific community and its diplomatic network to:

Support the status of French researchers and companies in international competition;

Align scientific efforts with foreign policy objectives;

Raise awareness among researchers of development issues and build the Global South’s scientific capabilities (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France 2013).

To increase France’s attractiveness in research and innovation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the Ministry for Higher Education and Research, identified five priorities:

1. Enhance the perception of the French research system abroad;

2. Improve admission conditions and facilities for foreign researchers in France;

3. Enhance France’s science and technology image in the general public’s eyes by promoting a culture of science and technology;

4. Encourage large-scale research facilities to be established in France and access by French researchers to such facilities abroad;

5. Contribute to internationalizing the French social sciences and humanities sector.

Responsibilities for science diplomacy are shared between the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, individual institutes and universities, and French National Research Agency (Flink and Schreiterer 2010). An important tool is the network of French Research Institutes Abroad (UMIFRE), active in 34 countries, focusing primarily on the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Knudsen 2021).

Flink and Schreiterer (2010) describe France’s science diplomacy as a matrix with three dimensions, where different world regions or countries are represented on one axis, and agencies and their respective programs are represented on the other two. French science attachés are seconded from different institutional stakeholders and administer significant funds through a variety of programs. Most of the funds are allocated for scholarships for postgraduate studies or research stays in France. Except for agri-food and health security in Sub-Saharan Africa, France does not set as an objective of its science diplomacy the addressing of global challenges.

Science and technology have traditionally been central to Chinese foreign policy, particularly in its interactions with the West, with the primary aim of modernizing China’s economy. In the late 20th century, China was a knowledge importer with weak domestic scientific capabilities and was unable to engage in science diplomacy as developed nations did. However, market reforms introduced in the late 1970s spurred decades of unprecedented economic growth and technological advancement. Today, China has reached or exceeded technological parity with developed countries in certain areas, enabling it to engage in science diplomacy as a key global actor.

Following the Western example, in the same way as with the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy, China has recently adopted the idea of science diplomacy and tried to integrate it into its own policy approaches to international relations. While China already possesses the capability to pursue science diplomacy as a means of projecting soft power, it has not yet turned it into a policy action. However, the importance of science diplomacy is explicitly recognized in official policy documents. In the National 13th Five-Year Plan for S&T Innovation the need for fostering the systemic design of national science and technology diplomacy and cooperation is stated, outlining its goals – to “deepen intergovernmental scientific and technological cooperation, classify and formulate country-specific strategies, enrich the scientific and technological content of new great power relationships, promote the establishment of innovative strategic partnerships with developed countries in science and technology, build an innovative community of mutually beneficial cooperation with neighboring countries, and extending the framework of the Science and Technology Partnership Program for developing countries” (PRC State Council, 2016).

According to Freeman (2019), China’s science diplomacy is essentially an extension of its international science cooperation policies, and it is questionable whether science diplomacy has been fully developed as a coherent policy. Even its flagship developmental strategy—the Belt and Road Initiative—incorporates science and technology but has not explicitly framed science diplomacy as a policy tool. Fedasiuk et al. (2021) posit that Chinese S&T diplomats, stationed across 52 countries, primarily focus on monitoring technological developments, identifying investment opportunities for Chinese firms, and supporting the Made in China 2025 strategy. Their efforts often prioritize biotechnology and artificial intelligence and focus on technologically advanced countries like the U.S., Russia, the UK, and Japan.

China’s commitment to science diplomacy was further institutionalized with the adoption of a Science and Technology Progress Law in March 2023 (Mok 2023). This law forms part of a broader policy effort to increase international scientific cooperation and enhance China’s global influence through science and technology. China’s diplomatic missions are central to implementing this agenda. Reflecting this national strategy, the Chinese Embassy in Slovakia promotes technological collaboration and innovation as part of its science diplomacy outreach.

China’s approach to science diplomacy is also linked to activities in the Arctic and Antarctica, particularly through the Polar Silk Road. Such ambitions have been incorporated into the 14th Five-Year Plan (Lanteigne 2021). China’s presence in the Arctic region is often considered suspicious. Nevertheless, Chinese scientists have managed to establish considerable networks and develop collaborations (Su and Mayer 2018). Furthermore, Confucius Institutes, have faced scrutiny for their potential role in espionage and influence operations, raising questions about the broader implications of Chinese science diplomacy.

The selection of the United States, France, and China as case studies reflects their contrasting approaches to science diplomacy and distinctive roles in global and regional contexts. The U.S. uses a “science for diplomacy” model, leveraging scientific collaboration to achieve broader foreign policy aims. France exemplifies a “diplomacy for science” approach, promoting its institutions and influence in the European research landscape. China, as an emerging science diplomacy actor, combines technology access initiatives with strategic partnerships in Central and Eastern Europe, offering a unique perspective.