Introduction
Europe today stands at a paradoxical juncture. Militarily, economically, and politically, it has never been more integrated with that great power an ocean away, the United States. Due to this level of integration, the continent has never been more unsure of itself and its own sense of purpose as a civilisation. The reconfiguration of Europe’s political structure, sense of self, and direction is an ongoing historical process. It manifests in various inflection points in our history. From the Great Schism of 1054 to the introduction of the Westphalian state system in 1648 to the end of the Second World War in 1945, which divided the continent into American and Soviet spheres of influence, the history of Europe is – in many ways – a history of ideological and structural cataclysms.
The United States, or the ‘empire that dare not speak its name’ (as historian Niall Fergusson quipped), has underwritten European security since the end of the Second World War. Never before in our continent’s history have we been more dependent on a nation which lies a continent away for our security, prosperity, and energy needs. While we have had our share of aspiring regional hegemons, from Caesar to Charlemagne to Napoleon to Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler, we have never been more subservient to the interests of a foreign continental power and impotent to assert ourselves in relation to it.
During the Cold War, Europe was a central front in the superpower competition whereas more recently the United States has demanded the Europeans to fall in line behind its doctrinal shift to contain China and has used its leadership position to ensure this outcome. Even those institutions sympathetic to the post-war liberal paradigm are now talking about ‘vassalisation.’ Vassalisation is not mere dependency on the United States for our security, economic growth, and energy although this is a pitiful situation; it is the transformation of Europe from a centre of power all its own, a force of civilisation into a subordinate theatre, or sphere of influence, within the game of great power politics. The ongoing war in Ukraine, energy disruptions, and the ideological polarisation of Western societies are crises threatening the stability and future of European nations. They have also accelerated Europe’s vassalisation. Unless Europeans can agree on crucial strategic questions, we will look elsewhere for leadership. Europe is still without its own head.
The New Europe: Within America’s Sphere of Influence
The world is being divided. Thanks to the death of the unipolar moment and the birth of the multipolar world order, we are observing the return of great power competition. Thus, of global power blocs. During the Cold War, the Soviets had their Warsaw Pact, Comecon, and World Peace Council. In the new Cold War, the Chinese now have their Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative to name a few. Conversely, the Americans spearheaded institutions such as NATO, the World Trade Organisation, and the European Economic Community (now the European Union). These institutions were and are often still spoke about as constituting the free world, a liberal order and a rules-based system. Unironically, the U.S. president is still called “the leader of the free world.”
From a realist perspective, however, these institutions served the global balance of power between the Soviets and Americans in the latter’s favour. These institutions cemented the dollar as the world’s reserve currency thus pegging all currencies to it, integrated the security of – at the time – western Europe (now, most of Europe) to American power (as General Ismay said, the purpose of NATO is to keep the Americans in, Germans down, and Russians out), and secured American access to the European market. This is not to say that the American-led institutions did not stabilise the continent after the most destructive conflict in world history. However, the end of the Cold War, which should have marked Europe’s coming of age, inaugurated a deepening dependency as a result of America’s pursuit of enlargement. That being enlargement of the number of market democracies under the American security and economic umbrella.
This has resulted in the U.S., from the 1990s to the present moment, interfere in the internal politics of European nations and peoples to advance their strategic interests. This has included waging war against Europeans. For example, although the 1999 NATO war in Kosovo was justified on humanitarian grounds, and there were crimes being committed against certain ethnic groups, Strobe Talbott – then Bill Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of State – wrote that “it was Yugoslavia’s resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reform – not the plight of Kosovar Albanians – that best explains NATO’s war.” The current conflict in Ukraine also has its roots in the U.S. supported 2014 coup as part of the American objective to expand its broader economic and military structure further east. During the 2014 crisis, Victoria Nuland, then Under-Secretary of State for East European Affairs, was discussing with her colleague which Ukrainian opposition figures should be placed in which positions and finished with: “I think, to help glue this thing and to have the UN help glue it and, you know, F**k the EU.” This has been the mentality of some of the people over whom Europeans have depend upon for their security, energy, and growth.
Today, Trump has advanced discussions on European strategic autonomy. This is part of a broader U.S. doctrinal shift to focus its hard power resources on the Indo-Pacific to contain China while making the Europeans take on the burden of paying for their own defence. Admittedly, this has led to Europeans acting with more agency. In fact, we are seeing a trend of European countries making security agreements outside of the institutional frameworks of NATO and the European Union. At the same time, the E.U.’s attempts to build common defence capacities have accelerated but they have been outpaced by both the expansion of NATO’s remit and the dominance of U.S. doctrine in determining the direction of European security strategy. The rules of the game are no longer defined by Europeans. Those that do try to shape their own destiny and assert their sovereignty, such as Hungary, are often criticised in American liberal outlets for their intransigence on matters ranging from culture to security.
Nevertheless, vassalisation is not confined to matters of security. The July 2025 trade deal between the United States and the E.U. led to a 15% tariff on the latter’s exports; nearly a triple increase from what they were previously. This ordeal was not only a reflection of European leaders’ subpar diplomacy, but a reflection of a more broader common diplomatic theme: how susceptible Europeans now are to bend the knee to American demands and interests. The cutting of Europe’s energy umbilical cord to Russia has not led to greater autonomy. Instead, it has replaced one dependency with another. Liquefied natural gas imports from the United States, sold at premium prices, have become the new lifeline of European industry.
This is all to say that despite the rhetoric and trends reflecting a more autonomous security architecture, Europe’s defence, economic, and energy policies remain fundamentally tethered to American power. The continent may speak of sovereignty, but it acts within the parameters set by Washington. The European Union’s “strategic compass” or talk of “European sovereignty” often amount to little more than diplomatic theatre when, in practice, Europe’s major decisions – from sanctions and technology transfers to energy diversification and military posture – follow American cues.
If Europe wishes to reclaim a sense of self and direction, it must first rediscover what it means to act as a civilisational pole rather than a subordinate province of a wider American imperium. It must have a sense of self. True autonomy will require not only new institutions and defence capabilities, but a renewal of Europe’s intellectual confidence: a belief that the Old Continent can still generate ideas, strategies, and purposes independent of Washington. Without that, Europe’s fate will remain that of the loyal vassal.
Conclusion: A Return to Responsibility
To speak of vassalisation is not to call for anti-Americanism, nor for an impossible autarky. The transatlantic bond remains vital to global stability. But partnership cannot endure where one side has lost the capacity for independent thought and initiative. The moral of Europe’s predicament is not rebellion, but renewal. Europe must rediscover its will to act — to defend its borders, to define its interests, and to articulate a vision of order rooted in its own civilisational inheritance. Strategic autonomy should not mean hostility to America, but maturity within the alliance. Economic independence should not mean isolationism, but the capacity to chart a course consistent with Europe’s long-term security and social cohesion. Above all, Europe must recover its faith in itself — as a civilisation, not just a collection of markets and institutions.
The historian Christopher Dawson once wrote that Europe is a “spiritual organism” — a unity born not of empire, but of faith and culture. To become merely a functional appendage of another power, however friendly, is to abandon that inheritance. If Europe continues along its present path, it risks ceasing to be a subject of history and becoming its object. But decline is not destiny. The first act of resistance is intellectual: to name dependency for what it is, and to will freedom and sovereignty once again. Europe’s crisis is not one of power alone. It is one of purpose. The task before us is not to sever our alliances, but to restore our soul.