{"id":169721,"date":"2025-09-20T13:01:12","date_gmt":"2025-09-20T13:01:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/169721\/"},"modified":"2025-09-20T13:01:12","modified_gmt":"2025-09-20T13:01:12","slug":"you-dont-need-quantum-hardware-for-post-quantum-security","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/169721\/","title":{"rendered":"You don\u2019t need quantum hardware for post-quantum security"},"content":{"rendered":"

Organizations have finite resources available to combat threats, both by the adversaries of today and those in the not-so-distant future that are armed with quantum computers. In this post, we provide guidance on what to prioritize to best prepare for the future, when quantum computers become powerful enough to break the conventional cryptography that underpins the security of modern computing systems. \u00a0We describe how post-quantum cryptography (PQC)<\/a> can be deployed on your existing hardware to protect from threats posed by quantum computing<\/a>, and explain why quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum random number generation (QRNG) are neither necessary nor sufficient for security in the quantum age.<\/p>\n

\u201cQuantum\u201d is becoming one of the most heavily used buzzwords in the tech industry. What does it actually mean, and why should you care?<\/p>\n

At its core, \u201cquantum\u201d refers to technologies that harness principles of quantum mechanics to perform tasks that are not feasible with classical computers. Quantum computers have exciting potential to unlock advancements in materials science<\/a> and medicine<\/a>, but also pose a threat<\/a> to computer security systems. The term Q-day refers to the day that adversaries possess quantum computers that are large and stable enough to break the conventional public-key cryptography<\/a> that secures much of today\u2019s data and communications. Recent advances in quantum computing<\/a> have made it clear that it is no longer a question of if Q-day will arrive, but when.<\/p>\n

What does it mean, then, for your organization to be quantum ready<\/a>? At Cloudflare, our definition is simple: your systems and communications should be secure even after Q-day.\u00a0<\/p>\n

However, this definition often gets muddied by vendors insisting that products built using quantum technology are required in order to secure an organization against quantum adversaries. In this blog post we explain why quantum technologies are neither necessary nor sufficient to protect against attacks by a quantum adversary<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The good news is that there is already a solution: post-quantum cryptography (PQC)<\/a>. PQC protects against attacks by quantum adversaries, but PQC is not a quantum technology \u2014 it runs on conventional computers without specialized hardware. You can use PQC today on the computers you already have, without buying expensive new hardware.<\/p>\n

Post-quantum cryptography
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We\u2019ve written quite a few blog posts<\/a> on post-quantum cryptography already, so we will keep this section brief.<\/p>\n

The public-key cryptography<\/a> that we\u2019ve used for decades to secure our data and communications is based on math problems (like factoring large numbers<\/a>) that are believed to be computationally hard<\/a> to solve on conventional computers. If you can efficiently solve the underlying math problem, you can efficiently break the cryptography and the systems that depend on it. As it turns out, the math problems underlying much of today\u2019s public-key cryptography can be efficiently solved by specialized algorithms, like Shor\u2019s algorithm<\/a>, on large-scale quantum computers.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The solution? Pick new hard math problems (like finding \u201cshort\u201d vectors in algebraic lattices<\/a>) that are no easier to solve with a quantum computer than with a conventional computer. Then, build new cryptographic systems around them. The US National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST)<\/a> launched an international competition<\/a> in 2016 to identify and standardize such cryptographic systems, which resulted in several new standards for post-quantum cryptography being published in 2024, and several more under consideration<\/a> for future standardization.<\/p>\n

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) runs on your existing phones, laptops, and servers. PQC runs at Internet scale<\/a> and can even be more performant<\/a> than classical cryptography. Except in rare cases, like when you need additional hardware acceleration in cheap smartcards or to replace legacy systems that lack cryptographic agility<\/a>, there is no need to purchase new hardware to migrate to PQC.<\/p>\n

If you want to know how to protect your organization from security threats posed by quantum computers, you can stop reading now. Post-quantum cryptography is the solution.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Alternatively, you can read below for our perspective on hardware-based quantum security technologies that are sometimes marketed as security solutions.<\/p>\n

Quantum security technologies
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Quantum technologies capture the imagination. Quantum computers<\/a> (possibly linked together in a quantum Internet<\/a>) promise to deliver breakthroughs in drug discovery<\/a> and materials science<\/a> via advanced molecular simulation. Measurement of physical quantum processes<\/a> can be used to generate entropy<\/a> with mathematically provable properties<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This is exciting technology and fundamental scientific research. But this technology is not required to secure data and communications against quantum attackers.<\/p>\n

In this section, we\u2019ll explain why quantum security technologies do not need to be part of your quantum readiness strategy, and any decision to invest in quantum technology should not be based on a desire to defend data and communications systems against the threat of quantum adversaries. Instead, investments should be based on a desire to improve quantum technologies in their own right, for example to help with applications like chemistry<\/a>, machine learning<\/a>, and financial modeling<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Our position here is largely in agreement with the strategies towards quantum security technologies of the US National Security Agency (NSA)<\/a>, UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)<\/a>, NL Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum (NCSC)<\/a>, and DE Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)<\/a>. We\u2019ll focus on two quantum technologies widely marketed as security products: quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum random number generation (QRNG).<\/p>\n

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a hardware-based solution to secure communications across point-to-point links. Rather than relying on hard mathematical problems, QKD relies on principles of quantum physics to establish a shared symmetric secret between two parties, while ensuring that eavesdropping can be detected. QKD provides security guarantees that are based on physical properties of the communication channel. Once a shared secret is established, parties can switch to traditional symmetric-key cryptography for secure communication. QKD is the first step towards a futuristic \u201cquantum Internet.\u201d However, there are some fundamental reasons why QKD cannot be a general replacement for classical cryptography running on conventional hardware.<\/p>\n

Most importantly, QKD does not operate at Internet scale. QKD is used to establish an unauthenticated secret between pairs of parties with a direct physical link between them. The parties can then use an authentication mechanism based on conventional cryptography to bootstrap a secure communication channel over that link. While building dedicated physical links may be feasible for cross-datacenter communication or across major Internet backbones, it is not possible for most pairs of parties on the Internet. In particular, deploying QKD for the \u201clast-mile\u201d connection to end-user devices would require that each device has a direct physical connection to every server or device it needs to securely communicate with.<\/p>\n

Connectivity aside, there’s a good reason why the Internet doesn’t rely on secure point-to-point links: they do not scale (or rather, they scale exponentially). Bringing a new device online would require a change to every other device it needs to communicate with, a massive operational burden on everyone. Fortunately, there\u2019s a better way. The OSI model<\/a> for networking provides an abstraction such that two parties can communicate even if they don\u2019t share a direct physical link, so long as some chain of physical links exists between them. Public-key cryptography, invented in the seminal \u201cNew Directions in Cryptography<\/a>\u201d paper in 1976, allows two parties participating in the same public-key infrastructure<\/a> to establish a secure end-to-end encrypted<\/a> communication channel, without requiring any prior setup between them. The massive scaling enabled by these technologies is why the secure Internet exists as we know it. Secure point-to-point links are not part of the solution.<\/p>\n

Lack of scalability is enough for us to disqualify QKD outright: if a technology can\u2019t bring security to the whole Internet, we\u2019re not going to spend much time on it.<\/p>\n

The challenges with QKD don\u2019t stop there though.<\/p>\n

QKD touts theoretical security guarantees, but achieving security in practice is not so simple. QKD systems have been plagued by implementation attacks<\/a>, both classical sidechannel attacks<\/a> and new ones<\/a> specific to the technology. Further, QKD works best over a special medium: either fiber<\/a> or a vacuum<\/a>. QKD has been demonstrated over the air<\/a>, but performance and the implementation security mentioned before suffers. We still have not seen QKD work on a mobile phone or over Wi-Fi networks.<\/p>\n

Further, neither QKD nor any other quantum technologies provide authentication to prove that the party on the other end of the key exchange is who you think they are. This opens the door for a classic monster in the middle (MITM)<\/a> attack, where an adversary intercepts your connection, establishes a separate secure QKD link to you and your intended destination, and then sits in the middle reading and relaying all traffic. To prevent this, you must authenticate the identity of the party you are connecting to, using either pre-shared keys<\/a> or conventional public-key cryptography. The bottom line is, whether or not you invest in QKD, you still need a solution for authentication to protect against active attackers armed with quantum computers. Practically speaking, that means you need PQC, but PQC is already a standalone solution that provides both authentication and key agreement, which leads to questions of why use QKD in the first place.<\/p>\n

Some proponents<\/a> argue<\/a> that QKD should be integrated into existing systems as an extra security layer. The value proposition of QKD relates to the \u201charvest now, decrypt later<\/a>\u201d threat. In public-key cryptography, the key exchange messages used to set up encryption keys to secure a communication channel are exchanged in full view of a potential adversary. If an adversary records the key exchange messages, they might hope to use improved techniques in the future to solve the hard math problems upon which the security of the key exchange relies, allowing them to recover the encryption keys and decrypt the communication. If encryption keys are exchanged directly via QKD instead, the eavesdropper protections provided by QKD stop an adversary from recording messages that could later allow them to recover the encryption key (e.g. by using a quantum computer or other advances in cryptanalysis). The problem is, however, that this \u201cextra security layer\u201d is brittle, and limited to a single physical link. As soon as the data is transmitted elsewhere \u2014 for instance at an Internet exchange point or to travel to an end-user \u2014 the QKD security ends. For the rest of its journey, the data is protected by standard protocols like TLS<\/a>, making the value of the initial QKD link questionable.<\/p>\n

While we hope the technology progresses, QKD is neither necessary nor sufficient for security against a quantum adversary. PQC is sufficient for security against a quantum adversary, already runs on your existing hardware, and works everywhere.<\/p>\n

Quantum random number generators
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Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) are a type of \u201ctrue\u201d random number generator (TRNG)<\/a> that work by harnessing inherent unpredictability of quantum mechanics, for example by measuring atomic decay<\/a> or shooting photons at a beam splitter<\/a>. Other types of classical (non-quantum) TRNGs use physical phenomena that exhibit random properties, such as thermal noise<\/a> from electrical components, the motion of hot wax in lava lamps<\/a>, double pendulums<\/a>, hanging mobiles<\/a>, or water wave machines<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In cryptography and computer security, the essential property required from a random number generator is that the outputs are unpredictable and unbiased. This can be achieved by taking a small seed (say, 256 bits) of true randomness and feeding it to a cryptographically-secure pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG) to produce an essentially limitless stream of pseudorandom output indistinguishable from true randomness. The randomness used to seed the CSPRNG can be based on either classical or quantum physical processes, as long as it is not known to the adversary. Whether or not you use a QRNG to generate the seed, a CSPRNG is essential for cryptographic applications.<\/p>\n

We are the first to get excited about fun<\/a> new<\/a> sources<\/a> of randomness<\/a>. However, we\u2019d like to emphasize that randomness derived from quantum effects is not necessary to combat threats from quantum computers. Quantum computers do not enable any practical new attacks against classical TRNGs in widespread use today. Your decision to invest in QRNGs should be based on a perceived improvement in the quality of randomness they produce and not on a perceived threat to classical TRNGs from quantum computing.<\/p>\n

Post-quantum cryptography at Cloudflare
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Cloudflare has been at the forefront of developing and deploying PQC, and we are committed to making PQC available for free and by default<\/a> for all of our products. And we run it at scale \u2014 already over 40% of the human-generated traffic<\/a> to our network uses PQC.<\/p>\n

So what\u2019s in that 40%? PQC is supported for all website and API traffic<\/a> served through Cloudflare, most of Cloudflare\u2019s internal network traffic<\/a>, and traffic running over our Zero-Trust platform<\/a>. All these connections use post-quantum key agreement to protect against the \u201charvest now, decrypt later<\/a>\u201d threat, where an adversary intercepts and stores encrypted data today with the hope of decrypting with a quantum computer or other cryptanalytic advances in the future. Key agreement is an important first step, but there\u2019s still more work to be done. We\u2019re actively working<\/a> with stakeholders in the industry to prepare for the upcoming migration to post-quantum signatures to prevent active impersonation attacks from quantum adversaries (after Q-day).<\/p>\n

Quantum readiness strategy
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If purchasing quantum hardware is not necessary, how should organizations prepare for a quantum future<\/a>? The most effective strategy will depend on your organization\u2019s individual needs, but some general strategies will pay off for most organizations:<\/p>\n

Investing in basic security practices is a good start. Hire the right expertise if you don\u2019t already have it. Find vendors that support post-quantum encryption in their offerings today, and whose products are cryptographically agile so you can enjoy a seamless transition to post-quantum signatures<\/a> and certificates when the industry migrates before Q-day. Follow a tunneling strategy: routing application traffic over the Internet via secure quantum safe tunnels<\/a> allows you to reduce your attack surface area with minimal changes to existing systems. If you\u2019re already a Cloudflare customer (or want to be), our Content Distribution Network<\/a> and Zero Trust platform<\/a> makes this easy. Learn more about how we can help at our Post-Quantum Cryptography<\/a> webpage.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Organizations have finite resources available to combat threats, both by the adversaries of today and those in the…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":169722,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[46],"tags":[191,74],"class_list":{"0":"post-169721","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-computing","8":"tag-computing","9":"tag-technology"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/169721","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=169721"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/169721\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/169722"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=169721"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=169721"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=169721"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}