{"id":238797,"date":"2025-10-20T14:51:07","date_gmt":"2025-10-20T14:51:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/238797\/"},"modified":"2025-10-20T14:51:07","modified_gmt":"2025-10-20T14:51:07","slug":"a-decisive-moment-concerning-individual-rights-and-the-law-of-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/238797\/","title":{"rendered":"A Decisive Moment Concerning Individual Rights and the Law of War?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The question of whether individuals can hold rights under international law has hovered at the edges of international jurisprudence for a century. From the Permanent Court of International Justice\u2019s 1928 Opinion on\u00a0Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig<\/a>, through the International Court of Justice\u2019s (ICJ) 2001\u00a0LaGrand\u00a0<\/a>decision and the 2012\u00a0Jurisdictional Immunities of the State\u00a0<\/a>case, the Court has confronted, in various contexts, the issue of whether individuals may possess rights directly\u2014rather than being mere incidental beneficiaries of State obligations\u2014in multiple arenas of international law.<\/p>\n

On various occasions, the Court has either strengthened or mitigated individual claims, not least because all areas of international law operate on different planes. Some predominantly concern a horizontal (State-to-State) relationship, whereas others are inherently vertical in nature (State-to-individual). For instance, while in human rights law the notion of and need for individual claims is self-evident, other fields of international law\u2014such as the law of the sea\u2014arguably provide less obvious frictional surface in connection with individuals. Concerning the horizontal category, the Court has been more cautious in asserting individual standing. This reticence extends to the law of armed conflict (LOAC). Even in its politically bolder pronouncements\u2014such as the 2004\u00a0Advisory Opinion<\/a>\u00a0on\u00a0Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory\u2014the Court has carefully referred to obligations of States, rather than affirming that individuals may bear normative claims under LOAC itself.<\/p>\n

In its\u00a0forthcoming\u00a0<\/a>Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of Israel in relation to the Presence and Activities of the United Nations, Other International Organizations and Third States in and in relation to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Court faces another opportunity to engage this question. Among material tensions concerning siege, occupation, obligations toward third States and international organizations, the request may move the Court toward a deeper theoretical inquiry such as how and when does the law of war require humanitarian assistance? And may it confer a right to assistance on individuals in situations of occupation or siege?<\/p>\n

This post sets out the context of the request and considers how the Court might approach the law governing humanitarian relief in addressing the question put before it. Its aim is not to predict outcomes suggested by the ongoing proceedings but rather to explore possible paths the judges may take in interpreting the relevant law. To that end, it examines competing conceptual approaches and considers what finding a right to humanitarian assistance might entail, should the Court adopt a rights-oriented interpretation to LOAC on October 22.<\/p>\n

A Primer on the Requested Opinion<\/p>\n

To readers unfamiliar with the requested opinion, it may appear slightly repetitive, given the Court has only recently addressed issues at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in its 2024\u00a0Advisory Opinion<\/a>\u00a0on the\u00a0Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem(hereinafter:\u00a0Legal Consequences). Moreover, in the contentious case on the\u00a0Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip\u00a0(South Africa v. Israel<\/a>), the Court has already issued three orders on provisional measures, urging Israel to allow and facilitate humanitarian relief into the Gaza Strip (see\u00a0here<\/a>,\u00a0here<\/a>, and\u00a0here<\/a>). It may seem as though the issues of humanitarian law connected with the war have been addressed thoroughly already.<\/p>\n

The present proceedings are not redundant, however. They arise from UN General Assembly\u00a0Resolution 79\/232<\/a>, which invited the Court to clarify Israel\u2019s concrete international obligations to \u201censure and facilitate the unhindered provision of urgently needed supplies essential to the survival of the Palestinian civilian population,\u201d as well as its obligations in relation to the United Nations, other relief organizations, and third States. The requested Advisory Opinion therefore covers a broad, rather theoretical scope of potential queries the Court may turn to, compared with the occasions preceding it.<\/p>\n

Between April 28 and May 2, 2025, the Court held\u00a0public hearings<\/a>\u00a0during which various States and the United Nations presented arguments. The UN legal counsel and the Palestinian representative each\u00a0advanced\u00a0<\/a>emphases on the facilitation of humanitarian relief and the requirement to allow United Nations entities to assist. Numerous States (e.g.,\u00a0Mexico<\/a>,\u00a0Pakistan<\/a>, the\u00a0United Kingdom<\/a>, and\u00a0France<\/a>) likewise insisted on Israel\u2019s obligations to facilitate such consignments. Conversely, Israel\u2019s written\u00a0statement<\/a>\u00a0and remarks made by the\u00a0United States<\/a>\u00a0stress States\u2019 rights to inspection, minimize diversion risk, and military necessity as grounds for restricting them.<\/p>\n

As one of many contested issues that have surfaced over the past two years of war (see\u00a0here<\/a>,\u00a0here<\/a>,\u00a0here<\/a>, and\u00a0here<\/a>), the Court may deliver its view on how LOAC governs humanitarian relief and binds an occupying or besieging armed force. Crucially, it may also consider the extent of\u00a0discretion<\/a>\u00a0an occupying or besieging power may claim in restricting aid for security reasons. Already an uneasy task, this advisory opinion may require the Court to bridge the\u00a0gap<\/a>\u00a0between operational realities and normative protection. Above that, however, it may also mark a turning point for how the Court conceives of the individual in LOAC.<\/p>\n

Rights under LOAC and Why Does it Matter?<\/p>\n

LOAC is traditionally\u00a0framed<\/a>\u00a0within a State-centric paradigm. States are the principal subjects of its treaties, the makers of its rules, and the bearers of its responsibilities. Individuals\u2014be they civilians, detainees, or prisoners of war\u2014are conceived as affected groups, recipients of protections, rather than independent claimants. On a plain reading, the\u00a0Geneva Conventions<\/a>\u00a0reflect this architecture: obligations are\u00a0addressed<\/a>\u00a0to States and parties to conflicts rather than termed \u201crights\u201d for individuals.<\/p>\n

On this conventional interpretation, if a civilian is denied relief, the resulting legal question is whether a State has breached a treaty or customary duty. The corresponding remedy lies in State responsibility and inter-State claims, not in any form of direct individual standing. In\u00a0Jurisdictional Immunities of the State<\/a>\u00a0(2012), the ICJ, too, leaned towards this traditional, State-centric architecture. The Court held that even serious LOAC violations (e.g., war crimes committed by German forces in Italy during World War II) did not strip Germany of its immunity from foreign civil jurisdiction (paras. 107-8). The ICJ reasoned that the rules of State immunity and the rules of humanitarian law operate absent the individual, in that the former regulates inter-State relations, and the latter governs conduct in war (paras. 94-95). In doing so, the Court implicitly rejected the argument that grave breaches could create a right to reparation for individuals in domestic courts.<\/p>\n

The decision illustrates the practical relevance of the underlying theoretical question: if LOAC does not itself confer an individual right, then individuals cannot use it to pierce the veil of State immunity, compel remedies, or assert claims in their own name. Protection is mediated solely through States, international organizations, or criminal tribunals, deciding on their behalf. In his\u00a0dissenting opinion<\/a>, Judge Can\u00e7ado Trindade disagreed with the Court\u2019s reasoning, rebutting, \u201cThe rights of victims of grave violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law subsist, their vindication cannot be waived by their States, or by States\u00a0inter se, on their behalf\u201c (para. 71).<\/p>\n

Recent analyses of LOAC also\u00a0question<\/a>\u00a0the impermeability between the horizontal and the vertical planes. Scholars such as\u00a0Theodor Meron<\/a>,\u00a0Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne<\/a>, and\u00a0Anne Peters<\/a>\u00a0have each argued that the concept of \u201crights\u201d in LOAC has evolved towards individuals. And not just that. Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne even\u00a0traces<\/a>\u00a0how the notion of individual rights intermittently appears in treaty drafting and State practice (p. 1196-1200). While he agrees that the drafters prioritized belligerent rights, he submits that \u201cwhat is sometimes still presented as the orthodox legal position, that is, that IHL was not intended to confer rights on individuals (whether speaking of substantive rights of treatment or rights of reparation for violations), is in fact a more contentious claim\u201d (p. 1200). Each of these scholars outlines that more recent practice also reveals a growing recognition that LOAC norms may confer rights on individuals, for instance, the right to humane treatment, medical care, or, possibly, relief.<\/p>\n

For the Court to conceptualize LOAC in this sense would be progressive, but not entirely \u201cout of the box.\u201d In its 2001\u00a0LaGrand<\/a>\u00a0case, the ICJ had taken a\u00a0significant<\/a>\u00a0step in recognizing that individuals\u2014foreign nationals facing the death penalty\u2014hold individual rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Despite the inter-State nature of the underlying provision (emphasized in the proceedings by the\u00a0United States<\/a>, para. 97), the Court\u2019s reasoning was explicit. It explained that certain horizontal treaty provisions create individual rights, which, by virtue of the treaty, States must respect (in the\u00a0words<\/a>\u00a0of the Court), \u201cThe clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of no doubt\u201d (para. 77).<\/p>\n

The ICJ has never applied that same reasoning to LOAC.\u00a0If it did, this could transform the conceptual map of accountability. Individuals could be understood as right-holders, with conceivable claims to,\u00a0inter alia,\u00a0humane treatment, or due process. Such recognition would also undoubtedly shape the interpretation of obligations under occupation, siege, and relief operations, precisely the question before the Court now.<\/p>\n

In short, if LOAC confers individual rights, the breach of those rights would not only engage State responsibility\u00a0inter se but also open a door to potential procedural claims of individuals themselves. The latter step would bring it closer to international human rights law in structure and ethos. The distinction determines whether the individual is to be seen as a genuine legal actor within LOAC or simply as the object of States\u2019 legal duties.<\/p>\n

Theodor Meron\u2014one of the leading proponents of the \u201chumanization\u201d of international humanitarian law (IHL)\u2014has also\u00a0argued<\/a>\u00a0that the evolution of LOAC and human rights law reveals a movement from inter-State obligation to individual protection. For Professor Meron, recognizing individual rights in IHL is not merely semantic, either; it transforms the moral and legal character of the law, anchoring humanitarian norms in human dignity rather than reciprocity or\u00a0comitas gentium. It also opens conceptual space for mechanisms of accountability and redress, even if the procedural channels remain limited. The recognition of individual rights would recast IHL as a law for\u00a0persons, not merely a law about State behavior.<\/p>\n

In the present proceedings, the contours of humanitarian relief will be highly difficult to establish.\u00a0More<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0less<\/a>\u00a0recent private commentary on the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocols of 1977 interpret certain provisions and customary rules (like the prohibition on starvation) as imposing positive obligations, especially in occupation, extending beyond mere non-injury. These\u00a0supposedly<\/a>\u00a0extend to the facilitation of relief. In this sense, the UN General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions have also urged parties to armed conflicts to honor relief obligations in numerous armed conflicts (for example\u00a0here<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0here<\/a>). Custom may also reinforce such a view. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)\u2019s 2005\u00a0Study of Customary IHL\u00a0claims that consent to relief consignments may not be refused on arbitrary grounds (see\u00a0Rule 55<\/a>; in the present proceedings, however, only a few States have picked up on the threshold of arbitrariness, see for instance the written statement by\u00a0Qatar<\/a>, para. 81). These strands may yet suggest that the gap between protective norms and individual entitlements is narrower than once thought.<\/p>\n

The forthcoming advisory opinion provides the Court an opportunity to clarify. Are individuals incidental beneficiaries of LOAC, or does the law recognize them as direct rights holders, in theory capable of invoking obligations and claims? Or might it (in a less dramatic, but no less significant posture) expand on how State obligations towards civilians need to be interpreted? And, at the bottom line, is the obligation to provide humanitarian assistance one of effort, or result?<\/p>\n

These are a few conceivable outcomes.<\/p>\n

Option I \u2014 States Have Obligations, Individuals Do Not Have Rights<\/p>\n

One interpretive path is for the Court to reaffirm a traditional \u201cobjective\u201d view that only States possess rights or standing under LOAC, while individuals remain its indirect beneficiaries. On this reading, the Court could confirm and sharpen Israel\u2019s obligations<\/a> to facilitate relief while rejecting the existence of an individual right (to humanitarian assistance).<\/p>\n

This reasoning might echo positions of scholars such as Professor Ren\u00e9 Provost (see International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law<\/a>, 2009, p.16-56) and Kate Parlett. Kate Parlett has advanced<\/a> three arguments against a rights-based, or \u201csubjectivist,\u201d view. First, an objective interpretation of IHL coheres with non-renunciation clauses and the prohibition of special agreements found in the Geneva Conventions, since these provisions make clear that the humanitarian guarantees established by the Conventions are non-waivable and non-negotiable (p. 184-88). These bar both States and individuals from abandoning the minimum protections of the law of war, reflecting the idea that such norms constitute fixed, community-wide (i.e., horizontal) obligations (p. 187). Second, in Parlett\u2019s view, such a reading would be compatible with a framework in which individuals lack any legal or practical means of enforcement. Third, an \u201cobjective\u201d construction is not necessarily less effective for individual protection, given States\u2019 national jurisdictions are obliged to provide legal remedies for grave breaches (p. 224\u201328). Above that, Professor Provost has noted<\/a> that a lack of derivative rights to enforcement of a would-be-right refute the very existence of said right (p. 42-54).<\/p>\n

Under this posture, the Court would confine itself to elucidating State obligations. It could, for instance, confirm the prohibition of arbitrary<\/a> impediments to relief (advanced particularly by the Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to Relief Operations in Situations of Armed Conflict<\/a>, 2016; but contested here<\/a>), or require coordination with UN organs, and demand adequate justification for any interference, without recognizing civilians as direct rights-holders. Such restraint would preserve an \u201cobjective,\u201d inter-State character of LOAC and relieve the Court from engaging with questions of individual standing or remedies. Crucially, this outcome would sanction a State\u2019s ultimate authority in the facilitation of humanitarian relief, for it would imply that the decision to permit or deny assistance ultimately lies with the discretion of the State concerned.<\/p>\n

Option II \u2014 Individuals Hold Rights, Including to Humanitarian Assistance<\/p>\n

While such reasoning would likely appeal to certain States, the first option may risk attracting criticism from others for being inadequate in contexts of acute humanitarian crisis, arguably exemplified by Israel\u2019s conduct of the war in Gaza. A horizontal LOAC may be perceived as insufficient to shield its victims in the vertical. Scholars advancing a \u201csubjectivist\u201d view, notably Anne Peters, have also challenged<\/a> the orthodoxy, moving the law of war further towards individual protection. Peters argues that the non-renunciation clauses (invoked by Parlett, see above) instead imply the withdrawal of certain guarantees from State control (p. 194-232). E contrario, if States are not the obligees of duties of protection, individuals must be. The absence of procedural mechanisms for individuals to enforce these rights, Professor Peters notes, does also not diminish their substantive legal existence (p. 200). In this sense, she quotes the Permanent Court of International Justice, which had also held it \u201cscarcely necessary to point out that the capacity to possess civil rights does not necessarily imply the capacity to exercise those rights oneself\u201d (Judgment<\/a>, Peter P\u00e0zm\u00e0ny University Case, Ser. A\/B, No. 61 (1935), p. 231).<\/p>\n

As a groundbreaking second option, therefore, the Court could find that individuals are indeed rights holders under LOAC, encompassing a right to humanitarian assistance. The Court would thus declare that civilians in occupied or besieged territories hold a right to receive relief consignments, possibly subject only to justified limitations. This view may align with an arguably growing convergence between LOAC and human rights, advanced in soft-law fora (notably within the UN system<\/a>, including OHCHR<\/a> and the UN General Assembly<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Under this approach, LOAC could cease to be understood as a purely State-centric legal regime. The Court need not anchor such a right in LOAC exclusively; instead, it may turn to human rights law, further<\/a> removing <\/a>itself from a prior lex specialis interpretation (see the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, para. 25). Pursuant to the European Court of Human Rights\u2019 recent decision in Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia<\/a>, the Court, too, could emphasize the intersection of international human rights and LOAC, and find<\/p>\n

a positive obligation \u2026 to protect civilian lives and well-being \u2026 in order to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population. This [includes] an obligation to ensure adequate supplies of water, food and heat for settlements under siege as well as access to medical assistance and humanitarian corridors for the safe evacuation of the civilian population (para. 764).<\/p>\n

Textually, such an approach may also be anchored in the Fourth Geneva Convention\u2019s unconditional obligation to permit relief in conditions of belligerent occupation (see art. 59<\/a>, holding that \u201cthe Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of [an inadequately supplied civilian population], and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal\u201d). By contrast, however, both the Fourth Geneva Convention (art. 23<\/a>) and the Additional Protocols (AP I and AP II) (AP I, art. 70<\/a> and AP II, art. 18<\/a>) subject relief action to the agreement of the parties concerned. In siege, at least, a (human) right to humanitarian assistance appears doubtful<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Option III \u2014 Relief Organizations as Rights Holders<\/p>\n

A middle ground might be to recognize humanitarian relief organizations as the holders of relevant entitlements <\/a>under LOAC, rather than individuals themselves. Under this model, a legal claim would lie with the relief actor seeking access to civilians.<\/p>\n

The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols provide reasons to support an interpretation that impartial humanitarian bodies have a right to offer their services. And while the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 contemplates facilitation of relief consignments as subject to conditions under certain circumstances (art. 23), the protective, singular role of impartial humanitarian bodies is recognized beyond a doubt (GCs I-IV, arts. 9\/9\/9\/10<\/a>; AP I, art. 81<\/a>; AP II, art. 18). The ICRC\u2019s updated Commentaries also interpret<\/a> these provisions as affording a right to offer services, protection to relief entities, subject only to requirements of legitimacy, non-diversion, and control. In that sense, Additional Protocol I, Article 70 (1) clarifies that offers of relief (meeting the requirements of the provision) are not to be regarded as interference in the armed conflict or unfriendly acts.<\/p>\n

However, having the right to offer services is entirely abstract from a right to demand a population be given access to one\u2019s services. A right to impose assistance without the consent of the parties concerned would clearly exceed the wording of the treaties referenced above (i.e., that humanitarian activities remain \u201csubject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned;\u201d see also GC I-IV, arts. 9\/9\/9\/10). That is why scholars such as Heike Spieker have also concluded<\/a> that an organization\u2019s \u201cright to access\u201d has not crystallized as a matter of customary international law (p. 31\u201336).<\/p>\n

On this outcome, the Court could affirm that relief actors have a right to offer services. In a bolder stance, the Court may even ascertain a legal entitlement to unimpeded access to civilians (possibly when certain criteria, like impartiality, are met), such that interference would constitute a violation of their rights rather than the recipients\u2019 rights directly.<\/p>\n

Option IV \u2014 The Court Dodges the Question<\/p>\n

Finally, the Court may give no unequivocal determination as to whether individuals hold direct rights under IHL, and it may deliver no clear view of how the law governing humanitarian assistance attaches to the international legal personalities of actors involved. Such judicial restraint would be consistent with the ICJ\u2019s cautious practice in politically charged or legally unsettled areas. Historically, the Court has at times articulated State duties without taking a hard line.<\/p>\n

By choosing this course, the Court might confirm Israel\u2019s general obligation to facilitate humanitarian assistance under the Fourth Geneva Convention, customary law, and human rights, while restricting its findings to the very particular circumstances of this conflict. It may leave the specifics of its reasoning open to interpretation.<\/p>\n

On the one hand, this approach would be cautious enough to preserve institutional legitimacy, avoiding fracturing consensus on the Court\u2019s advisory mandate, while also providing some additional guidance on how LOAC applies in the Israeli-Palestinian context. On the other, this outcome would be most likely to perpetuate the existing legal and factual uncertainties of humanitarian imperatives and the individual in LOAC itself.<\/p>\n

Outlook: What Else Might the Advisory Opinion Entail?<\/p>\n

Unquestionably, all options could foster follow-up issues. If the Court endorses the radical second option sketched above\u2014finding an individual right to humanitarian assistance in LOAC\u2014it would hopefully also delineate its contours. If the Court relies on the first option, it could clarify how an obligation to allow civilians access to relief is shaped. In that case, it may also have to opine on whether Israel bears a burden to prove it was justified in restricting relief in cooperating with relief organizations, third States, or even the public. Conversely, there is little reason to assume<\/a> a general LOAC obligation to transparency exists if security imperatives or military necessities are implicated, even when apparent violations occur.<\/p>\n

Many of the Court\u2019s substantive legal findings of the Court may hinge on its assessment of the commensurate obligations from the law of occupation that Israel has retained due to the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip (Legal Consequences, para. 94). As outlined above, the provisions governing relief under occupation exclusively are worded with less discretion to deny access than those applying only to siege situations. Under this pretext, viewing the present case as one of siege or encirclement where civilians coexist with combatants could prove particularly thorny. Here, the Court would hopefully also address whether evacuation offers may lower (or even extinguish) relief obligations, and whether civilians who cannot evacuate for physical or coercive reasons must still be provided with it. Adjunctly, the Court may have to indicate whether foreseeable deprivation leading to starvation should, in any case, engage the prohibition<\/a> to starve civilians as a method of warfare (and, possibly, the required threshold of intent<\/a>).<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/p>\n

No matter the concrete outcome, this advisory opinion should prove engaging in many respects. It may recognize a right to humanitarian assistance, thus transforming relief into a legal entitlement, and thus more or less announcing civilians\u2019 normative subjectivity under the law of war. Even if no such right is identified, clarity on State obligations will undoubtedly bring some invaluable guidance for all actors involved. If the Court adheres to a path of sharpening State obligations without recognizing individual entitlements, it will serve a \u201ctraditional\u201d architecture, potentially perpetuating dependence on State discretion. The Court\u2019s reasoning on October 22 will thus be closely scrutinized, not only for its doctrinal resonance, but for its practical meaning in conflicts where access to aid may decide the boundary between survival and catastrophe.<\/p>\n

***<\/p>\n

Rosa-Lena Lauterbach<\/a> is a PhD Candidate at the University of Cologne and a former Visiting Researcher at the Lieber Institute and Columbia Law School and a thematic editor for\u00a0Articles of War.<\/p>\n

The views expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Articles of War\u00a0is a forum for professionals to share opinions and cultivate ideas.\u00a0Articles of War\u00a0does not screen articles to fit a particular editorial agenda, nor endorse or advocate material that is published.<\/p>\n

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Photo credit: U.S. Air Force, Staff Sgt. Christian Sullivan<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"The question of whether individuals can hold rights under international law has hovered at the edges of international…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":238798,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[131999,23,71691,132000,4779,5618,5619,71694,132001,132002,71695,132003,132004,803,132005,132006,3,2485,132007,132008,21,19,22,20,25,24],"class_list":["post-238797","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-united-states","tag-advisory-opinion","tag-america","tag-ap-i","tag-ap-ii","tag-development","tag-gaza","tag-gaza-strip","tag-geneva-conventions","tag-humanitarian-assistance","tag-icj","tag-ihl","tag-individual-rights","tag-interpretation","tag-israel","tag-law-of-war","tag-loac","tag-news","tag-palestine","tag-rosa-lena-lauterbach","tag-siege","tag-united-states","tag-united-states-of-america","tag-unitedstates","tag-unitedstatesofamerica","tag-us","tag-usa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/238797","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=238797"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/238797\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/238798"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=238797"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=238797"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=238797"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}