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This article is part of a series published by the Atlantic Council\u2019s Africa Center and the GeoStrategy Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security exploring the nexus between US security and economic interests across Africa. The previous edition can be read here<\/a>.<\/p>\n Fourteen years after the 2011 uprising and NATO-led military intervention that toppled Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains divided. While the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) rules the northwest, the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by military leader Khalifa Haftar, controls most of eastern Libya\u2014with both factions backed by competing foreign militaries.<\/p>\n For years, the situation on the ground seemed frozen. Yet two recent developments mark a shift: Oil majors are returning<\/a> to the country, and the United States is stepping up its military engagement. The visits by the top leadership from US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in October and December last year and the announcement that Libya will join<\/a> Exercise Flintlock\u2014AFRICOM\u2019s largest annual special operations exercise historically focused on West Africa\u2014signal that the US administration now views Libya\u2019s trajectory as inseparable from broader regional stability.<\/p>\n Against this backdrop, the United States has a narrow\u2014but real\u2014opportunity to reset conditions in Libya by combining carefully calibrated security engagement with strategic investment. Taking this opportunity is urgent, especially as Russia and other foreign powers seek to cement their influence over the southern Mediterranean\u2019s political future.<\/p>\n Libya\u2019s geostrategic significance for energy, Europe, and the Sahel<\/p>\n Libya straddles Europe and Africa. While its coastline faces Italy, its southern expanse feeds directly into the Sahel, where al-Qaeda-aligned groups such as Jama\u2019a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State (IS) affiliates operate. What happens in Libya affects US and European energy security, regional counterterrorism efforts, and global migration flows. Moreover, the country produces<\/a> between 1.2 and 1.4 million barrels of oil per day and aims to reach two million by 2030. With Western sanctions tightening on Russian energy, Europe increasingly views Libyan crude oil as a pressure-valve alternative.<\/p>\n In November, Shell, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, and Repsol*<\/a> were all pre-qualified to participate in Tripoli\u2019s first exploration auction<\/a> in eighteen years. However, instability<\/a> in southern Libya continues to amplify extremist mobility and arms flows from the Sahel, directly threatening these investments. That risk is further compounded by the expansion of Russia\u2019s Africa Corps<\/a>\u2014the successor to the paramilitary Wagner Group\u2014in the east and south. Meanwhile, the Central Mediterranean migration route remains a sensitive domestic political issue for Italy. Rome\u2019s Mattei Plan<\/a> is explicitly built around stabilizing Libya\u2019s energy production and migration management.<\/p>\n Navigating fragmentation and proxy competition to unlock investment<\/p>\n Progress in Libya\u2019s hydrocarbons sector remains contingent on a minimum threshold of stability and predictability in governance, which is still fractured between the Tripoli-based GNU\u2014backed by Turkey and Qatar\u2014and Haftar\u2019s LNA in the east, supported by Russia (via the Africa Corps), Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.<\/p>\n The signing of a 2019 maritime boundary treaty<\/a> with the GNU has given Turkey de facto veto power<\/a> over Libya\u2019s western security sector and offshore zones. Meanwhile, Russia has entrenched itself in eastern Haftar-controlled areas since 2023. Instead of relying on the Wagner Group, however, Moscow has transitioned to formal involvement via the Ministry of Defense. Russia now controls airbases, logistics hubs, and key desert routes into the Sahel, with personnel positioned near critical oil fields and terminals\u2014the same assets the Tripoli government is attempting to license to Western firms.<\/p>\n The result is that Libya has become the Mediterranean\u2019s most active proxy chessboard, with foreign powers positioning themselves to capture future revenues from hydrocarbons and reconstruction. Absent a credible US counterweight, decisions on energy access, migration management, and political transition will be made in Moscow or elsewhere\u2014but not in Washington or Brussels.<\/p>\n A new window for US reengagement<\/p>\n Two developments suggest a modest but meaningful upward trend in US reengagement. First, building on the US Navy ship visit to Libya in April (the first in fifty years), AFRICOM\u2019s deputy commander visited<\/a> GNU-controlled Tripoli and LNA-held Sirte in October. Inviting Libya to Exercise Flintlock was deliberate signaling: The US government seeks to pull Libya into a broader Western security network\u2014rather than cede the field to other countries with stronger influence, such as Russia. This trajectory continued in early December, when Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah met<\/a> AFRICOM\u2019s commander to expand cooperation on training, equipment, and force professionalization. The GNU\u2019s public request for deeper US support in professionalizing Libya\u2019s security forces marks a notable shift after years of strategic hedging between Washington, Ankara, and Doha.<\/p>\n Second, there has been a surge of activity around Libya\u2019s energy sector. Since 2023, oil output has stabilized, front lines have frozen, and neither the LNA nor the GNU has achieved decisive military or political dominance. This stalemate has created political space<\/a> for external influence. Energy-sector momentum has been reinforced by high-level diplomatic traffic in both directions. The US special envoy for Africa and Arab Affairs, Massad Boulos, traveled to Tripoli and Benghazi in July, followed by a GNU delegation visit to Washington in August. That trip signaled the GNU\u2019s intent to re-anchor Libya with Western stakeholders and request US assistance in pushing Russia out of eastern military bases to restore unified territorial control.<\/p>\n That momentum was further reinforced by a joint statement<\/a> on November 26 from the United States, major European partners, Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, and the United Kingdom. The statement backed a renewed mandate for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), endorsed a political roadmap by UNSMIL head Hanna Tetteh, and explicitly called for deeper east-west military and economic coordination\u2014a rare moment of alignment among Libya\u2019s external powerbrokers. For the US administration, this sent the strategic signal that Libya\u2019s unification is now within reach. The window of opportunity, however, is closing fast\u2014and another conflict cycle, election breakdown, or foreign miscalculation could shut it indefinitely.<\/p>\n The energy-security nexus: Why investment alone will fail<\/p>\n The return of oil majors represents the most consequential shift in Libya in a decade. But investment without security is unlikely to endure. In March last year, Libya launched its first licensing round for oil exploration in eighteen years, signaling a bid to attract Western technology, capital, and expertise. Shell, BP*<\/a>, TotalEnergies, and Eni have reopened<\/a> channels with the National Oil Corporation (NOC)\u2014and ExxonMobil*<\/a> signed<\/a> a memorandum of understanding in August for offshore exploration in the Sirte Basin.<\/p>\n Yet these developments do not change the fact that some of Libya\u2019s most valuable reserves remain under Russian influence. Western firms cannot scale operations without predictable access, enforceable contracts, and baseline security guarantees.<\/p>\n An intentional presence to protect investment<\/p>\n To consolidate recent political and economic gains\u2014and protect sizable Western energy investments\u2014the United States should deliberately expand its diplomatic, military, and economic presence in Libya, in close coordination with allies.<\/p>\n The March 2024 announcement that the United States will reopen an embassy in Libya is a critical step toward sustained engagement across military and economic channels. It will also enable closer coordination with key partners\u2014including Italy, Egypt, Turkey, and the UN\u2014whose objectives overlap with US interests.<\/p>\n As the multi-year process to open the embassy inches forward, AFRICOM and its components should pursue near-term, high-impact initiatives. US special operations forces should help build and professionalize vetted Libyan special forces units across both western and eastern factions, units that would pursue shared security interests, no matter the progress toward an eventually possible unification. Additionally, maritime partnerships should be expanded rapidly to strengthen Libyan Navy and Coast Guard capabilities, particularly in interdiction, offshore asset protection, and port security. At the same time, the United States could leverage its convening power to establish a technical deconfliction cell in Sirte, allowing GNU and LNA representatives to coordinate security around oil infrastructure and prevent escalation. Such mechanisms could also support counterterrorism cooperation, including targeting IS remnants and blocking spillover from the Sahel.<\/p>\n Layered US engagement can unlock stability<\/p>\n However, military engagement alone will not be sustainable without economic development. Given the complex legacy of US involvement\u2014from the economically devastating sanctions of the 1980s to the 2011 NATO intervention and the overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi regime\u2014the United States must work through partners to advance both economic and counterterrorism objectives. The US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank could prioritize export credits for pipelines, gas processing, and power generation, explicitly linking financing to transparency and anti-corruption benchmarks.<\/p>\n US and partner foreign assistance could also support long-overdue reforms at the NOC, including modern contracting practices, environmental standards, and shared revenue frameworks. These efforts should extend beyond governments: Western energy companies involved in Libya should participate in coordinated infrastructure planning, rather than simply launching isolated investments.<\/p>\n Layering diplomatic, military, and economic tools would allow the United States to establish a modest but coherent posture capable of unlocking outsized stabilization effects\u2014and preventing any country that works against US interests from having dominance over Libya\u2019s future. For the United States, Libya offers a proving ground for a new model of engagement\u2014one built on security assistance that enables Western investment instead of substituting for it. AFRICOM\u2019s renewed presence and the surge of Western energy interest create a rare opportunity to reintegrate Libya into a Western orbit. If the United States seeks stability in the Mediterranean, resilience in the Sahel, and credible alternatives to Russian energy, now is the time to make coordinated security and economic investments in Libya.<\/p>\n Rose Lopez Keravuori is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council\u2019s Africa Center, an associate director at Strategia Worldwide, and chair of the board of advisors of GCR Group. She previously served as the director of intelligence at the US Africa Command. Note: Several companies mentioned in this article\u2014Shell, BP, Chevron, Eni, TotalEnergies, Repsol, and ExxonMobil\u2014are donors to the Atlantic Council but not to this article series.<\/p>\n The Africa Center<\/a> works to promote dynamic geopolitical partnerships with African states and to redirect US and European policy priorities toward strengthening security and bolstering economic growth and prosperity on the continent.<\/p>\n
Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council\u2019s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council.<\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/08\/Africa-logo-color-1024x287.png\"){kind=logo}
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