In March 2026, the government is expected to publish<\/a> a series of energy and climate targets for 2030 as part of its 15th five-year plan<\/a>.<\/p>\n These targets could boost \u2013 or moderate \u2013 the pace of its energy transition.<\/p>\n A number<\/a> of policy<\/a> mechanisms<\/a> that are already due to fully come into effect this year \u2013\u00a0 such as non-binding total emissions targets and the expansion of carbon market coverage to more sectors \u2013 could also help decarbonise the country\u2019s economy.\u00a0<\/p>\n Meanwhile, the rise in extreme weather events<\/a> intensified by human-caused climate change makes adaptation as important as ever, while also adding to the challenge of advancing clean energy.<\/p>\n Finally, as the US turns<\/a> even further away from climate action and towards fossil-fuel expansion in 2026 \u2013 notably with Venezuelan oil<\/a> \u2013 China\u2019s climate diplomacy could send a strong signal for sustained global climate action.<\/p>\n Carbon Brief asked 11 leading experts on China what energy and climate developments they are watching for in 2026. Their responses have been edited for length and clarity.<\/p>\n Director of the China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute<\/a><\/p>\n After decades of the rapid growth that made China the world\u2019s largest greenhouse gas emitter, independent analyses suggest<\/a> China\u2019s CO2 emissions may have plateaued or even begun to decline in 2025.\u00a0<\/p>\n Strong growth in renewable power has, for the first time outside economic contraction, outpaced rising electricity demand, pushing power-sector emissions down and contributing to an overall modest drop in total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. This latest trend was picked up by China\u2019s National Development and Reform Commission<\/a> (NDRC), as something that should continue<\/a> over the next five years, marking an official nod to a peak in energy-related CO2 emissions years ahead of the 2030 timeline Beijing previously set<\/a>.<\/p>\n The transition from emissions growth to stabilisation and early decline will be the key watch point for 2026 and will be shaped by the forthcoming 15th five-year plan<\/a>. [This plan will set key economic goals, including energy and climate targets, for 2030.] Early policy signals suggest that the plan will introduce more explicit controls<\/a> on total emissions alongside China\u2019s traditional reliance on intensity-based targets.\u00a0<\/p>\n However, the precise timing, scale and enforceability of these absolute emissions control measures remain under active debate. Chinese experts broadly agree that if the 2021-2025 period was characterised by continued emissions growth, and 2031-2035 is expected to deliver a clear decline, then 2026-2030 will serve as a critical \u201cbridge\u201d between the two.\u00a0<\/p>\n The central questions are what this transitional period will look like in practice, how it will lay the groundwork for a sustained and timely emissions decline and whether meaningful reductions can be achieved before the end of the decade.<\/p>\n China team lead and researcher, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air<\/a><\/p>\n In 2026, I\u2019ll be closely watching whether China moves beyond high-level industrial decarbonisation targets and begins to address the domestic, structural constraints that have slowed progress so far.\u00a0<\/p>\n In heavy industry, particularly steel, the main barriers are not technological readiness, but persistent blast furnace overcapacity<\/a> and the lack of clear economic incentives for low-carbon production pathways, which continue to lock in emissions-intensive assets.\u00a0<\/p>\n Against this backdrop, carbon-related trade measures, such as the EU\u2019s carbon border adjustment mechanism<\/a> (CBAM), will make 2026 an important test of how China balances export competitiveness with climate commitments. In addition, we will see whether growing international scrutiny accelerates more substantive demand-side and policy reform in industry, rather than prolonging a reliance on incremental efficiency gains.<\/p>\n Director and co-founder, Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress<\/a><\/p>\n Of course, I\u2019ll be tracking all the critical energy and climate targets under the 15th five-year plan<\/a>.<\/p>\n More importantly, I\u2019m watching whether a coherent package of measures can truly take hold to unlock green electricity on the demand side<\/a> \u2013 not just expand renewable capacity \u2013 and translate policy intent into a genuine market pull for renewable electricity, especially from the manufacturing sector.<\/p>\n Given the challenge of balancing rapidly growing electricity demand with the pace of grid decarbonisation, progress on this front will be decisive for the long-term trajectory of emissions.<\/p>\n I\u2019m also watching how provincial<\/a> and municipal<\/a> governments translate the dual-carbon goals<\/a> into concrete targets and sectoral implementation. Subnational action<\/a> \u2013 through overarching dual-carbon plans and sector-specific measures \u2013 will be fundamental to achieving national objectives. It will be critical to ensure that the subnational momentum around zero-emission industrial parks<\/a> and clean-tech manufacturing competition<\/a> results in measurable, additional emissions reductions.<\/p>\n Energy Analyst for Asia, Ember<\/a><\/p>\n 2026 marks the first year of China\u2019s 15th five-year plan<\/a>, the planning cycle that ends with China\u2019s target year of 2030 for carbon peaking. China\u2019s fossil-fuel use in power generation is seeing an early sign of peaking<\/a> and the upcoming years will be crucial in driving the plateau into an absolute decline.\u00a0<\/p>\n As renewables expand, system flexibility and stability will increasingly become the priorities. By 2027, China aims to retrofit<\/a> its existing coal-power fleet \u201cas much as possible\u201d and deploy<\/a> more than 180 gigawatts (GW) of battery energy storage<\/a>. Development in coal retrofit and further policies to support battery development will both be important to watch in 2026.\u00a0<\/p>\n On the other hand, maximising flexibility potential will rely on continued reforms<\/a> in the power market and system operations, following the milestone year of 2025, which saw substantial policy development in China\u2019s ambition to establish<\/a> a unified national power market.<\/p>\n Principal analyst, ClearBlue Markets<\/a><\/p>\n In 2026, I am monitoring three pivotal developments in China.<\/p>\n First, the 15th five-year plan inaugurates the \u201cdual control of carbon<\/a>\u201d system. This year marks the first time industries and local governments face binding caps on total emissions, not just intensity. Watching how these national constraints cascade down to the local level will be critical.<\/p>\n Second, the national carbon market<\/a> is aggressively tightening. With the inclusion<\/a> of steel, cement and aluminum this year, regulators are executing a \u201cmarket reset\u201d \u2013 de-weighting older [emissions] allowances and enforcing stricter benchmarks to bolster prices ahead of the EU CBAM\u2019s full rollout.<\/p>\n Finally, expect a surge in zero-carbon industrial parks<\/a>. Following the NDRC\u2019s announcement of 52 pilot sites, new guidelines<\/a> now mandate 60% on-site renewable consumption. These \u201cgreen microgrids\u201d are becoming the primary vehicle for reducing grid reliance and certifying low-carbon exports.<\/p>\n Senior China counsel, Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development<\/a><\/p>\n 2026 marks China\u2019s first year of advancing a comprehensive shift<\/a> from \u201cdual control\u201d of energy consumption to \u201cdual control\u201d of carbon emissions. At the policy level, it will be essential to track how this transition strengthens the governance architecture for controlling non-CO2 greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly methane<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n Key developments to watch for may include efforts to strengthen measurement, monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems that enable facility- and company-level accountability.\u00a0<\/p>\n It will also be essential to monitor progress on the voluntary GHG emission trading scheme<\/a>, and the extent to which methane and other non-CO2 GHG controls are embedded in broader policy frameworks, including the environmental impact assessment system.\u00a0<\/p>\n Finally, it will be critical to understand how non-CO2 GHG data collection and management requirements are incorporated into industry policy developments, including those addressing supply chains and product carbon-footprint initiatives.<\/p>\n Managing director, Sino Auto Insights<\/a><\/p>\n China\u2019s electric vehicle (EV) industry has been the primary force pushing the global passenger vehicle market toward clean energy. Its domestic market has already crossed a more than 50% new-energy vehicle<\/a> (NEV) retail take rate, while exports surged 86% year-on-year to around 2.4m units [in 2025]. That momentum should continue \u2013 especially as US legacy automakers pull back from EV investment in 2026.<\/p>\n As China\u2019s domestic demand cools this year, export pressure will intensify. But a growing headwind has emerged: tariffs<\/a>. Mexico, Brazil, Europe and the US are just a few of the countries raising barriers, complicating the next phase of global NEV expansion.<\/p>\n At the same time, 2026 looks like a prove-it year for next-generation battery technologies. Longer life, lower volatility and new chemistries could unlock more range, broader use cases and wider adoption \u2013 including in tougher markets like the US.<\/p>\n One new wildcard: the US now effectively controls Venezuelan oil. If that meaningfully impacts global oil prices, it could either slow \u2013 or unexpectedly accelerate \u2013 the shift toward clean-energy vehicles.<\/p>\n Climate and energy program manager, Greenovation Hub<\/a><\/p>\n In 2026, a key focus will be how China translates its 2035 \u201cclimate-adaptive society<\/a>\u201d goal into inclusive action. Finance for adaptation is a critical enabler, requiring both policy guidance and scalable financing models. As climate risks increase<\/a>, financing resilience in sectors such as energy, transportation, infrastructure and public health is paramount. While China\u2019s green finance taxonomy<\/a> already includes some climate-adaptive activities, clear labeling and expanded coverage are important next steps.\u00a0<\/p>\n Additionally, the global goal on adaptation<\/a> (GGA) indicators can help measure project impact and inform policy. We have observed good practices already in motion, such as integrating meteorological technology with finance to enhance agricultural resilience.\u00a0<\/p>\n Looking forward, expanding these innovative models to other sectors and regions is a key step, as these pilots can enhance policymaking and be replicated. In this process, identifying and managing risks for vulnerable groups, such as women and children, in public health and education is essential for an inclusive transition.<\/p>\n Practice professor of political science and director of China Programs and Strategic Initiatives, University of Pennsylvania<\/a><\/p>\n First and foremost, I\u2019ll be looking for details on climate and energy targets in China\u2019s next five-year plan cycle, which we expect to be approved as usual in March. This will essentially operationalise China\u2019s recent nationally determined contribution<\/a> and its longstanding commitment to peak emissions before 2030.<\/p>\n It will also give us a sign of the tempo we can expect for non-fossil energy capacity growth and whether China will be aiming for the high end of its stated emissions-reduction range. One area I\u2019m especially focused on is the promised expansion<\/a> of China\u2019s emissions trading system<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n Second, given my particular interest in and focus on geopolitics, I\u2019m looking for signs of how the geopolitical disruption we\u2019ve seen in Venezuela, Iran and other regions might affect China\u2019s energy policy \u2013 in particular, in terms of long-term contracts for liquified natural gas<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n Finally, I\u2019m looking for signs of changes to China\u2019s climate diplomacy following the US withdrawal<\/a> from both the Paris Agreement and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. This leaves a big hole in global climate governance and many countries will be looking increasingly to China for leadership \u2013\u00a0and funding\u00a0\u2013 in this area.<\/p>\n Senior policy advisor for industry and trade, ECCO<\/a><\/p>\n China\u2019s solar manufacturing overcapacity<\/a> is prompting Beijing\u2019s first serious consolidation<\/a> efforts. The government is introducing stricter licensing requirements and tighter energy-consumption caps for polysilicon<\/a> facilities, while export-tax rebates for solar products will be abolished.<\/p>\n At the same time, China\u2019s offshore wind technology is advancing rapidly. In early 2026, China installed the world\u2019s first<\/a> 20 megawatt (MW) offshore wind turbine and plans mass production of 50MW dual-rotor designs, with deployment expected from 2027-2028. MingYang\u2019s \u00a31.5bn announced<\/a> investment in Scotland signals that Chinese wind companies are pursuing entry into European markets through local production, mirroring strategies adopted by battery<\/a> manufacturers.<\/p>\n Together, these dynamics suggest that the next phase of cleantech competition will be shaped less by trade defense alone and more by the interaction between Chinese supply-side reforms and global market-absorption capacity.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, following a first wave<\/a> of rare-earth restrictions in April 2025, Beijing announced<\/a> controls in October that extended licensing requirements to additional rare earths and introduced unprecedented extraterritorial provisions. While China suspended<\/a> the October controls for one year, the April controls on seven heavy rare earths remain fully operational.\u00a0<\/p>\n This creates persistent procurement risk for European cleantech supply chains reliant on Chinese-processed rare earths, although China has begun issuing<\/a> general export licenses, providing some operational predictability.<\/p>\n Senior lecturer in international development, University of Bath<\/a><\/p>\n The biggest question is obviously the emission peak<\/a>, because it\u2019s essential to confirm if China\u2019s carbon and greenhouse gas emissions are actually flattening or even falling. I really hope China has already reached its peak and the net-zero transition is underway.<\/p>\n![\"Shuo](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/li-shuo.png\")
<\/a>Shuo Li<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Xinyi](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/xinyi-shen.png\")
<\/a>Xinyi Shen<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Min](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/hu-min.png\")
<\/a>Min Hu<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Biqing](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/biqing-yang.png\")
<\/a>Biqing Yang<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Yan](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/yan-qin.png\")
<\/a>Yan Qin<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Xiaopu](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/sun-xiaopu.png\")
<\/a>Xiaopu Sun<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Tu](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/tu-le.png\")
<\/a>Tu Le<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Yingjie](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/yingjie-chen.png\")
<\/a>Yingjie Chen<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Prof](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/scott-moore.png\")
<\/a>Prof Scott Moore<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Cecilia](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/cecilia-trasi.png\")
<\/a>Cecilia Trasi<\/a><\/p>\n![\"Yixian](\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/sun-yixian.png\")
<\/a>Yixian Sun<\/a><\/p>\n