The arrest of a drug kingpin in Mexico has reignited debate over how active U.S. military and intelligence forces are in Mexico and where they might be headed.<\/p>\n
FBI Director Kash Patel\u2019s\u00a0announcement on January 23<\/a>\u00a0regarding the arrest of Canadian drug trafficker Ryan Wedding in Mexico led to immediate diplomatic tension between Washington and Mexico. Wedding, a former Olympic snowboarder turned international drug trafficker, was taken into custody in Mexico City before being flown to the United States in what U.S. officials described as a joint operation.<\/p>\n Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum instead declared that Wedding had\u00a0voluntarily surrendered<\/a>\u00a0at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, adding that this information had been provided to her government by the United States. Wedding\u2019s lawyer disputed this, saying his client was arrested\u00a0and handcuffed by U.S. personnel<\/a>, which was a\u00a0violation of Mexican law<\/a>prohibiting foreign officers from participating in law enforcement operations on the country\u2019s soil.<\/p>\n The conflicting narratives reveal much more than just a simple disagreement over procedure. Patel\u2019s framing reflects Washington\u2019s increasingly assertive approach to security operations in the Americas and a willingness to carry out unilateral military action. Weeks before, on January 3, U.S. forces carried out a\u00a0high-profile operation<\/a>\u00a0to abduct Venezuelan President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro from a Venezuelan military base.<\/p>\n The trajectory is worrying for Mexico, which last faced direct U.S. military intervention during the\u00a01916-1917 Punitive Expedition<\/a>\u00a0against Mexican revolutionary leader Pancho Villa. The country has long\u00a0prohibited<\/a>\u00a0the establishment of U.S. military bases but shares a 2,000-mile border with the U.S. and is home to some of the world\u2019s most\u00a0powerful criminal networks<\/a>that Washington is eager to target.<\/p>\n Days before Wedding\u2019s arrest became public, President Sheinbaum sought to calm domestic concerns after the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration warned airlines to \u201cexercise caution\u201d over airspace near Mexico, as well as parts of Central and South America, \u201cciting military activities,\u201d\u00a0according<\/a>\u00a0to the Associated Press.\u00a0Viral images<\/a>\u00a0of a U.S. military transport plane on a Mexican runway fueled further speculation of U.S. military action.<\/p>\n President Trump\u2019s\u00a0threat<\/a>, on January 29, to impose \u201cnew tariffs\u201d on any country importing oil to Cuba, which Mexico does, added to the anxieties over escalating U.S. pressure. \u201cSheinbaum is in a particularly tough spot\u2026 She has to appease Trump but also keep the peace within her left-wing party Morena, which has historically aligned with Cuba\u2019s communist regime,\u201d\u00a0stated<\/a>\u00a0the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.<\/p>\n U.S.-Mexico security ties have traditionally been quiet and cooperative\u00a0since the mid-20th century<\/a>, first in the context of the Cold War and later to combat drug trafficking. After Mexico formally declared war on the cartels\u00a0in 2006<\/a>, cooperation intensified with the 2007\u00a0M\u00e9rida Initiative<\/a>, a multibillion-dollar security partnership involving training, intelligence sharing, and institutional reform. U.S. agencies helped professionalize select Mexican units while creating long-term dependency on U.S. logistics and intelligence.<\/p>\n Over time, Washington began\u00a0applying lessons<\/a>\u00a0from the war on terror to Mexico\u2019s drug war. Private military and security contractors were incorporated into M\u00e9rida-related programs,\u00a0expanding notably after 2011<\/a>. That same year,\u00a0Operation Lowrider<\/a>\u00a0began using aerial surveillance techniques refined in Iraq and Afghanistan to track cartel movements.<\/p>\n Concerns about cartel evolution quickly grew. Groups such as Los Zetas, whose members included former Mexican \u201celite military troops\u201d\u00a0trained in the U.S.<\/a>, became notorious due to their brutality as well as growing\u00a0connections with Hezbollah<\/a>. Despite these dangers, U.S. involvement in Mexico\u00a0continued to deepen<\/a>\u00a0through new deployments.<\/p>\n Cooperation between agencies in the U.S. and Mexico<\/p>\n The U.S. has forged strong ties with agencies in Mexico to combat the flow of arms, weapons, and illegal immigrants. The FBI has traditionally focused on fugitives, kidnappings, and transnational criminal cases, particularly those involving U.S. citizens. Its Hostage Rescue Team\u00a0was responsible<\/a>\u00a0for capturing Wedding in January. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) is also active in Mexico. Having developed a strong relationship\u00a0with the Mexican Army and Navy special forces<\/a>, it participates in arrests and raids alongside them.<\/p>\n The CIA is generally considered the\u00a0primary U.S. agency<\/a>\u00a0operating in Mexico. It concentrates on signals intelligence, aerial surveillance, and liaison with vetted Mexican units that are trained and equipped by the U.S., according to former U.S. and Mexican officials.<\/p>\n Other agencies like\u00a0Customs and Border Protection<\/a>\u00a0(CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the\u00a0Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives<\/a>\u00a0(ATF), and\u00a0local police departments<\/a>\u00a0maintain extensive cooperation with Mexican counterparts on smuggling routes, weapons flows, and financial crimes.<\/p>\n Corruption has complicated efforts to reduce the power of organized crime networks. Mexican\u00a0political and security institutions<\/a>\u00a0have been deeply infiltrated by cartels, but there is no shortage of\u00a0U.S. complicity<\/a>\u00a0in intelligence, political, and law enforcement circles for decades. Corruption on both sides has made it essential to rely on tightly vetted special units and to strictly compartmentalize sensitive operations so that only a small number of trusted officials know the full details.<\/p>\n A Harder American Stand on Drugs Could Spell Trouble for Mexico<\/p>\n Operations like Fast and Furious (2009-2011), run by the ATF, meanwhile, allowed weapons to pass into cartel hands in a\u00a0failed tracking effort<\/a>, resulting in civilian deaths and those of government officials in both countries.<\/p>\n Even scandals of this magnitude were not enough to disrupt bilateral cooperation until the Trump administration. Rising cartel violence and fentanyl deaths were deemed national security issues and have prompted a more aggressive American approach aimed at reducing U.S. drug fatalities but have often come at the cost of greater instability in Mexico.<\/p>\n As pointed out in a January\u00a0article<\/a>\u00a0in the Americas Quarterly, \u201cOver the past year, Washington has increased pressure on Mexico to take decisive action against drug cartels, including proposals that could involve some form of U.S. military presence on Mexican territory. These demands have been paired with repeated warnings from the White House that the status quo is no longer acceptable. The question isn\u2019t whether U.S. pressure will intensify, but how far it might go\u2014and whether Mexico is ready for the scenarios now being openly discussed.\u201d<\/p>\n When former Mexican President Andr\u00e9s Manuel L\u00f3pez Obrador took office in 2018, he pledged to de-escalate the drug war and\u00a0reduced<\/a>\u00a0DEA-Mexican Navy cooperation. In October 2019, a CIA-vetted Mexican army unit called GAIN captured major trafficker Ovidio Guzm\u00e1n, but after cartel gunmen threatened mass violence and\u00a0an assault on a housing complex<\/a>\u00a0where soldiers\u2019 families were located, L\u00f3pez Obrador made the\u00a0controversial<\/a>decision to release Guzm\u00e1n<\/a>\u00a0to avoid casualties.<\/p>\n By then, the M\u00e9rida Initiative was largely\u00a0unraveling<\/a>\u00a0and was replaced with the\u00a0Bicentennial Framework<\/a>\u00a0under President Biden to preserve and reorient cooperation. Trump\u2019s return has turned U.S. policy back toward a more aggressive stance, this time now backed by broader Republican consensus. Project 2025 explicitly called for a \u201ccreative and aggressive approach<\/a>\u201d to combat cartels, including the use of active-duty military personnel and National Guard units at the border.<\/p>\n Operations in Mexico are a central part of the Trump administration\u2019s\u00a0strategy to refocus on the Americas<\/a>, justified by the threat of drug and cartel invasions. The administration declared a national emergency at the southern\u00a0border on day one<\/a>, and secret drone surveillance flights over Mexico\u00a0also increased<\/a>, while several cartels were designated as foreign terrorist organizations\u00a0in February 2025<\/a>.<\/p>\n In April, a national security memorandum titled \u201cMilitary Mission for Sealing the Southern Border of the United States and Repelling Invasions<\/a>\u201d put active-duty and reserve forces on border patrol, and border crossings were treated as threatening U.S. sovereignty under it.<\/p>\n In November, the administration\u00a0began formal planning<\/a>\u00a0to send U.S. troops and intelligence officers into Mexico to combat cartel leadership, according to multiple serving and former American officials. The following month, the administration\u00a0classified fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction<\/a>, significantly broadening the legal authorities available for use. Parallel proposals circulated to place certain missions\u00a0under Title 50 authority<\/a>, bringing military personnel under intelligence community oversight to expand operational flexibility.<\/p>\n Plans appeared to stall briefly, but after the Maduro raid in January 2026, the administration\u00a0began renewing its efforts<\/a>, the New York Times reported. This could allow for a substantial military buildup along the border, similar to how there was an\u00a0increased presence of U.S. forces<\/a>\u00a0in the Caribbean in the weeks before the Venezuela operation.<\/p>\n Despite clear political sensitivities, Mexico has attempted to continue cooperating. Since Trump\u2019s second inauguration, more than 50 cartel members\u00a0have been extradited<\/a>\u00a0to the U.S., including Rafael Caro Quintero, responsible for the death of a DEA agent in 1985, satisfying a decades-long demand from Washington. And while President Sheinbaum strikes a firm public tone about defending Mexican sovereignty, she has\u00a0quietly accommodated<\/a>\u00a0many U.S. requests to keep bilateral relations stable.<\/p>\n Whether she can prevent a turn toward overt, unilateral U.S. military action remains in doubt. Even without full intervention, the diplomatic risks are rising, not least due to entrenched corruption. Washington\u00a0revoked visas for dozens<\/a>\u00a0of Mexican officials over alleged cartel ties in October 2025, while corruption cases in the U.S., including the\u00a0arrest<\/a>\u00a0of more than a dozen Mississippi law enforcement officers in a drug sting that same month, show how deeply institutions are corrupted on both sides of the border.<\/p>\n There is also the serious danger of reigniting full-scale conflict with the cartels. The current uneasy equilibrium rests on a rough restraint by both state and criminal actors, keeping violence relatively contained. Expanded U.S. involvement, including direct strikes, could push Mexico back into widespread instability, especially since there is no guarantee that Washington intends to sustain the kind of long campaign such a strategy would require.<\/p>\n