{"id":461417,"date":"2026-02-11T03:52:10","date_gmt":"2026-02-11T03:52:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/461417\/"},"modified":"2026-02-11T03:52:10","modified_gmt":"2026-02-11T03:52:10","slug":"whats-in-trumps-new-national-defense-strategy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/461417\/","title":{"rendered":"What\u2019s in Trump\u2019s new National Defense Strategy?"},"content":{"rendered":"

In January 2026, the second Donald Trump administration released its National Defense Strategy<\/a>, a month after the release of its 2025 National Security Strategy<\/a>. Though it breaks with the blueprints of the first Trump administration (2017-2020) and the Joe Biden administration (2021-2024) in notable ways, the 2026 document also exhibits considerable \u2014 if more subtle \u2014 continuity in other areas. This explainer looks back on the 2018 and 2022 NDS to contextualise this most recent document, before unpacking what the 2026 strategy says about the administration\u2019s global defence priorities, its approach to China, and its expectations of alliances and partnerships.<\/p>\n

What is the National Defense Strategy?<\/p>\n

Every four years, the US Office of the Secretary of Defense is required by law<\/a> to issue a new National Defense Strategy (NDS). A derivative of the incumbent administration\u2019s National Security Strategy (NSS) published by the White House, the NDS explains how the Pentagon will contribute to fulfilling the President\u2019s national security objectives. As mandated<\/a> by Congress, the NDS articulates the priorities and objectives of the Department of Defense (DoD) and assesses the state of US force posture, situating this within the Pentagon\u2019s assessment of the global strategic environment. The NDS serves multiple purposes \u2014 it provides broad strategic guidance to defence and military officials, outlines the DoD\u2019s approach to US alliances and partnerships, and serves as a key reference point for subsequent resourcing requests to the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress. There are usually two versions of this document: a public-facing summary document that captures the key contours of the strategy, and a more detailed classified version that informs Department and Congressional action on resourcing and execution.<\/p>\n

What did Trump\u2019s first NDS say?<\/p>\n

Interpreting the second Trump administration\u2019s NDS requires looking at its first. The 2018 NDS<\/a> marked a departure from previous strategy documents in its characterisation of the global security environment and the US force planning construct required to address it. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, this document argued that \u201cinter-state strategic competition, not terrorism,\u201d was now the Pentagon\u2019s primary occupation. Chinese and Russian economic and military modernisation and their shared intention \u201cto shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model\u201d posed the greatest threat to US national security interests around the world. These challenges were compounded by a weakening of the rules-based international order, and a relative decline in US military power to the extent that it no longer enjoyed \u201cuncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain.\u201d<\/p>\n

While the underlying concept of \u2018Great Power Competition\u2019 drew criticism for its lack of operational clarity and its conflation of the threats posed by China and Russia, the 2018 NDS was broadly well received for its sober assessment of major changes in the global strategic environment and, by extension, the equally significant changes required to US alliance management and force structure to meet those challenges.<\/p>\n

This assessment informed a major reappraisal of US force structure and global posture priorities. As explained by Elbridge Colby<\/a>, the principal author of both Trump administration\u2019s strategies and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Strategy and Force Development in 2018, reorienting the Pentagon for great power competition would require \u201ca fundamental shift\u201d in Pentagon planning and investment priorities, including deprioritising persistent but lower-level threats from non-state actors (terrorist groups and insurgencies) and \u2018rogue\u2019 regimes like Iran and North Korea, and assuming that the United States would be capable of sustaining war with only a single major power (i.e. China or Russia) in one theatre at a time. To meet these challenges, the NDS posited allies and partners as the United States\u2019 \u201cdurable, asymmetric\u2026 advantage,\u201d though it also called for efforts to empower these countries to contribute to collective security and to better manage their own interests through arms sales, technology transfer and information-sharing. While the underlying concept of \u2018Great Power Competition\u2019 drew criticism for its lack of operational clarity<\/a> and its conflation<\/a> of the threats posed by China and Russia, the 2018 NDS was broadly well received<\/a> for its sober assessment of major changes in the global strategic environment and, by extension, the equally significant changes required to US alliance management and force structure to meet those challenges.<\/p>\n

Did Biden\u2019s 2022 NDS change course?<\/p>\n

Despite the political transition in the White House, the 2022 NDS<\/a> explicitly continued with the direction of the 2018 NDS in its adoption of great power competition as its chief organising principle. However, it further narrowed the Pentagon\u2019s threat prioritisation, identifying China as the United States\u2019 \u201cmost consequential strategic competitor\u201d and the Indo-Pacific as the DoD\u2019s \u201cpriority theater<\/a>.\u201d This distinction between the long-term \u201cpacing challenge\u201d of Beijing and the \u201cacute threat<\/a>\u201d of Moscow\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, which had delayed<\/a> the publication of both the 2022 NSS<\/a> and NDS by several months, marked a shift from the 2018 NDS, which seemingly equated both powers. The Pentagon reflected this prioritisation by pursuing a smaller force structure<\/a> focused on deterring great power competitors and reducing forward deployments to secondary theatres, pledging to ensure that small-scale crises would not undermine \u201chigh-end warfighting readiness.\u201d<\/p>\n

This distinction between the long-term \u201cpacing challenge\u201d of Beijing and the \u201cacute threat\u201d of Moscow\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, which had delayed the publication of both the 2022 NSS and NDS by several months, marked a shift from the 2018 NDS, which seemingly equated both powers. <\/p>\n

At the same time, the Biden administration\u2019s NDS also broadened the DoD\u2019s threat aperture beyond military threats alone. Alongside second-tier threats from North Korea, Iran and violent non-state actors, the 2022 NDS also listed climate change, global pandemics and technological diffusion as among a host of multi-domain, interconnected global threats that would threaten US security over the coming \u201cdecisive decade.\u201d It proposed to address these challenges through an \u2018Integrated Deterrence<\/a>\u2019 framework, \u201cweaving together all instruments of national power\u201d and situating the Pentagon as part of an interagency approach to deterring the United States\u2019 adversaries and meeting its national security objectives. Though this concept was criticised by some experts as vague<\/a> and ill-suited for a defence planning construct, alliances and partnerships were nevertheless considered the \u201ccenter of gravity\u201d for this strategy \u2014 indeed, the strategy was reportedly drafted in consultation<\/a> with many of these countries. As in 2018, the 2022 document emphasised alliance modernisation over burden-sharing, pledging deeper cooperation with allies on warfighting concepts, military technologies and intelligence sharing, with the objective of creating a \u201clatticework<\/a>\u201d security architecture of mutually reinforcing regional and global partnerships.<\/p>\n

So how does the 2026 NDS depart from those trends?<\/p>\n

The 2026 NDS actively seeks to distinguish itself from the \u201cgrandiose strategies of the past post-Cold War administrations,\u201d including Trump\u2019s 2018 NDS. Absent is any mention of ideological or strategic competition between great powers or the prevalence of interrelated global threats. These are replaced by an emphasis on economic interests, homeland security and immigration, and geographical rather than global challenges. The document denounces the \u201ccloud-castle abstraction\u201d of the international rules-based order as actively detrimental to US interests, generally treats alliances and partnerships as burdens to be shifted<\/a> rather than as inherent advantages, and declares an end to US interventionism abroad despite early operations against Cuba<\/a>, Iran<\/a> and Venezuela<\/a>. The 2026 NDS also takes unusually strong cues from the 2025 National Security Strategy, reflecting the degree to which the White House dominates<\/a> the interagency foreign policy process \u2014 President Trump is mentioned 47 times<\/a> in 2026, compared to 0 times in 2018. Strangely, it often offers far less insight into the Pentagon\u2019s implementation plans for its own strategy than the NSS does, particularly with respect to the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s with the focus on the Western Hemisphere? Is the Indo-Pacific still a priority?<\/p>\n

As with every previous US defence strategy, the first priority of the 2026 NDS is the defence of the homeland, including through missile defence, nuclear modernisation, cyber defences and countering violent extremist threats. However, this document adopts an expanded concept of the homeland that is inclusive of the entire \u2018Western Hemisphere\u2019, a region stretching from the Arctic to Argentina. To deliver the \u201cTrump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine<\/a>,\u201d the NDS says that the Pentagon will simultaneously protect the homeland and \u201crestore American military dominance in the Western Hemisphere\u201d through prioritising border security missions, counter-narcotics operations, securing key land and sea lanes, and denying non-Hemispheric competitors access to key commercial assets or strategic positions across the region. In that respect, the NDS is as descriptive as it is proscriptive, coming in the context of a prolonged strike campaign<\/a> against alleged \u201cnarco-terrorist\u201d vessels; an extensive build-up<\/a> of US combat forces in the Caribbean (including reassignments<\/a> from the Indo-Pacific); the ousting<\/a> of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro; and contentious diplomacy over Greenland<\/a> and the Panama Canal<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\"TheThe US Navy warship USS Sampson docks at the Amador International Cruise Terminal in Panama City, August 2025.Source: Getty<\/p>\n

What this means for the Indo-Pacific is unclear. On the one hand, the document frames the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere as equal priorities when justifying posture reductions in Europe, and casts preeminence at home as a precondition for projecting military force across the globe from the continental United States, including into Asia. Yet the administration\u2019s NSS also warns of a \u201creadjustment of our global military presence\u201d that favours addressing hemispheric threats over other theatres, suggesting a clearer hierarchy of priorities. This marks a shift from the DoD\u2019s March 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance<\/a>, which reportedly linked \u201cdefending the U.S. homeland\u201d in the traditional sense with the \u201csole pacing scenario\u201d of preventing Chinese military action against Taiwan. Several<\/a> experts<\/a> have noted that the Pentagon\u2019s objectives of achieving denial in the Indo-Pacific, dominance in the Western Hemisphere and sustainment of a US-based global strike force<\/a> each necessitate very different force structures<\/a> that come with their own posture and budgetary trade-offs. Ultimately, the NDS fails to answer the question of how these concurrent force structure goals will be achieved.<\/p>\n

How does the NDS characterise China?<\/p>\n

The 2026 NDS differs markedly from its predecessors in its characterisation of the US-China relationship, not so much in terms of whether China matters as to why it matters. The language of a global multi-domain \u201cstrategic competition\u201d is replaced by a greater emphasis on preserving US economic interests in Asia and on providing the \u201cundergirding strength\u201d for the President\u2019s diplomatic engagement with Beijing to that end, ahead of an expected summit with Xi Jinping in April 2026. It endeavours to reassure Beijing that the Administration does not seek regime change nor to dominate or humiliate China, but rather a balance of power \u201con terms favourable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under.\u201d To that end, it says the United States will pursue \u201cstrategic stability\u201d through expanded dialogue with the People\u2019s Liberation Army focused on \u201cdeconfliction and de-escalation.\u201d The document also seems to hint that the Trump administration sees a \u201clegitimate<\/a>\u201d role for China in a changing regional order, though it provides little detail on what that should look like. Regardless, these framing changes have led former senior Asia officials to worry that the Trump administration may be softening<\/a> its China policy settings across a range of indicators in pursuit<\/a> of limited economic gains.<\/p>\n

The NDS endeavours to reassure Beijing that the Administration does not seek regime change nor to dominate or humiliate China, but rather a balance of power \u201con terms favourable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under.\u201d<\/p>\n

The 2026 NDS similarly assesses the Chinese military threat and required response through an economic lens, yet also exhibits a high degree of continuity with its predecessors when it comes to implementation. It warns that Chinese regional military pre-eminence would allow it to \u201ceffectively veto Americans\u2019 access to the world\u2019s economic center of gravity\u201d and diminish Washington\u2019s \u201cability to trade and engage from a position of strength.\u201d It proposes to prevent that through a \u201cstrategy of denial<\/a>\u201d along the First Island Chain (FIC), a model long-championed by now-Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby. This approach is consistent with prevailing US regional military strategy across successive NDS documents, further evidenced in the broad<\/a> continuity<\/a> between Biden and Trump on alliance modernisation and military posture across the region. However, the document is notably short on the particulars of that strategy, including absent details on the force structure changes required<\/a> to implement a denial strategy in Asia while simultaneously executing Western Hemispheric dominance; the role of allies beyond hosting US forces and spending more on defence; and the lack of explicit mentions of Taiwan<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Figure 1. China\u2019s growing missile threat to US bases and regional access locations<\/p>\n

\"FigureSource: Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Heritage Foundation and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Calculations by the United States Studies Centre. All depictions on map are approximate.What does the document say about the United States\u2019 alliances?<\/p>\n

The United States\u2019 alliances occupy a central place in the 2026 NDS, though they are cast primarily in terms of obligations more so than their enduring benefits for US strategy. Indeed, while alliances are one of the document\u2019s four key lines of effort, they are addressed almost exclusively through the lens of \u2018burden-sharing\u2019, with a focus on compelling allies \u201cto assume primary responsibility for their regions\u201d and to \u201cshoulder their fair share of the burden of our collective defense.\u201d By more equitably distributing security burdens, the document says that allies and partners should help to maintain \u201cfavorable balances of power in each of the world\u2019s key regions.\u201d A primary indicator for whether or not allies are meeting these requirements is a \u201cnew global standard<\/a> of allied defense spending\u201d of 3.5% of GDP, one which now applies as much to Asia as it does to Europe<\/a>. Yet the Administration\u2019s expectations of allies in different regions appear to vary. For instance, requirements in Europe and the Middle East are couched in terms of \u201cburden-shifting\u201d with allies assuming greater leadership on conventional defence matters as Washington scales down its own commitments. By comparison, requests of allies in the Indo-Pacific are framed in terms of maximising their contributions to \u201ccollective\u201d defence objectives, suggesting an enduring US military presence along the frontlines of regional hotspots, with the glaring exception of the Korean Peninsula.<\/p>\n

In fact, strip away the America First window dressing, and it is clear that Washington continues to see alliances as essential to the United States\u2019 position in Asia as they ever have. Specifically, strong alliances and more capable allies figure as essential to achieving the \u201cfavorable balance of military power\u201d required to prevent Chinese military action across the FIC. The NDS also echoes calls made in the NSS for all of the United States\u2019 regional defence relationships \u2014 not just its treaty alliances \u2014 to be more squarely oriented towards those requirements. Though the NDS has little to say about this beyond burden-sharing and arms sales, it also says that incentivising allied contributions will require efforts to \u201cempower\u201d those countries to do so. It\u2019s unsurprising then that the Trump administration has persisted<\/a> with long-standing US alliance modernisation agendas<\/a> in Asia intended to do just that, including expanding<\/a> operational<\/a> and industrial<\/a> cooperation with priority partners across the region, such as through AUKUS. This resonates with Canberra\u2019s goal of \u201cmaintaining a favourable regional strategic balance\u201d through strengthening sovereign capabilities and increasing effective defence partnerships, as stated in Australia\u2019s own 2024 National Defence Strategy<\/a>. In that sense, allied self-strengthening measures shouldn\u2019t be read as mere responses to the Trump administration\u2019s exhortations to increase defence spending, even though these demands are undoubtedly influencing fiscal timetables in allied capitals.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In January 2026, the second Donald Trump administration released its National Defense Strategy, a month after the release…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":461418,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[23,3,21,19,22,20,25,24],"class_list":{"0":"post-461417","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-united-states","8":"tag-america","9":"tag-news","10":"tag-united-states","11":"tag-united-states-of-america","12":"tag-unitedstates","13":"tag-unitedstatesofamerica","14":"tag-us","15":"tag-usa"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/461417","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=461417"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/461417\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/461418"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=461417"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=461417"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=461417"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}