{"id":476081,"date":"2026-02-18T15:50:07","date_gmt":"2026-02-18T15:50:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/476081\/"},"modified":"2026-02-18T15:50:07","modified_gmt":"2026-02-18T15:50:07","slug":"the-anticipated-criminal-law-decisions-and-arguments-for-the-rest-of-this-term","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/476081\/","title":{"rendered":"The anticipated criminal law decisions and arguments for the rest of this term"},"content":{"rendered":"

ScotusCrim <\/a>is a recurring series by Rory Little focusing on intersections between the Supreme Court and criminal law.<\/p>\n

Today\u2019s column is my busman\u2019s holiday<\/a> project: providing nerd-like numbers and information focused solely on Supreme Court cases that address criminal law issues.<\/p>\n

This is especially relevant given that the court has now posted<\/a> its calendar for the final argument session of the 2025-26 term, with oral arguments to take place from April 20-29<\/a>. And the court will also begin issuing more \u201cheadline\u201d opinions this coming Friday<\/a>. Aside from boring civil cases like birthright citizenship<\/a> or firing a governor of the Federal Reserve \ud83d\ude00, we are awaiting some big criminal law decisions. And some hugely significant criminal law cases still have oral arguments upcoming (there will be three two-week oral argument sessions at the end of February<\/a>, March<\/a>, and April<\/a>).<\/p>\n

By my count, of the 23 cases set for argument over the next two months, five of the cases (22%) are \u201cpure\u201d criminal law, while another six cases are what I categorize<\/a> as related to criminal law. This is about average: as I summarize for the American Bar Association every August<\/a>, a substantial percentage of cases that the court hears every term are CLAR (\u201ccriminal law and related\u201d). This year it will be over 50%; by my characterization, about 29 of the 57 cases that will be argued this term (34 already argued<\/a> and 23 still to come) are CLAR.<\/p>\n

Argued criminal law cases whose decisions we are now awaiting<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court\u2019s published decisions tend to come out \u2013 but not always<\/a> \u2013 roughly in the order they have been argued. That is, published decisions in cases argued earliest in the term tend to come sooner (even if still months after their fall arguments \u2013 remember, the term officially starts in October and by tradition all argued cases are decided by the end of June or early July). Cases argued last fall were briefly summarized in my argument previews for October<\/a>, November<\/a> and December<\/a>.<\/p>\n

By this uncertain measure, a decision in Villareal v. Texas<\/a> could be coming this Friday. The case was argued back on Oct. 6 and was the first criminal law case argued this term. The question is how far a trial judge can go in ordering a defendant who is in the middle of testifying not to discuss his testimony during an overnight recess, without infringing the defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Although it is not common for criminal defendants to take the stand \u2013 and the Fifth Amendment states they do not have to \u2013 this decision will have significant implications for criminal litigators at every level.<\/p>\n

Three criminal law sentencing cases that were argued last fall also await decision. Fernandez v. United States<\/a>\u00a0and Rutherford v. United States<\/a> present important, and slightly different, questions<\/a> for application of the federal First Step Act<\/a>, \u00a0a statute<\/a> permitting an early \u201ccompassionate release\u201d for inmates in some cases, enacted under the first Trump administration. I\u2019d expect these decisions to be issued at the same time. Meanwhile, Rico v. United States<\/a> presents an interesting question about whether time periods should be excluded from statutory limitations periods when a defendant has \u201cabsconded\u201d from parole or other non-prison supervision. These three sentencing cases also seem like good candidates for this Friday\u2019s opinion session<\/a>.<\/p>\n

But perhaps the most significant criminal case still awaiting decision from last fall is Hamm v. Smith<\/a>, argued on Dec. 10. The issue there is how lower courts should evaluate whether a defendant sentenced to death has a mental disability that immunizes him, under the Eighth Amendment and Atkins v. Virginia<\/a>, from execution.\u00a0Changes in the court\u2019s membership since Atkins was decided in 2002 could signal, as Jordan Steiker<\/a> has explained on SCOTUSblog,<\/a> \u201ca major inflection point in the court\u2019s death penalty jurisprudence,\u201d even as death sentence verdicts (but not executions<\/a>) appear to be declining<\/a>. This decision could be issued soon, but might also be the kind of hotly disputed \u201cblockbuster\u201d decision that the court seems to hold<\/a> (without saying so) until near the end of the term.<\/p>\n

(There are other significant criminal-law-and-related cases argued more recently and still awaiting decision, such as the \u201cfear of persecution<\/a>\u201d immigration case of Urias-Orellana v. Bondi<\/a>. Those cases will have to await a future column.)<\/p>\n

Upcoming spring arguments in criminal cases<\/p>\n

Now I will give brief previews of five \u201cpure\u201d criminal law cases scheduled for argument over the next two months. Another six cases are related to criminal law \u2013 such as two cases that will be important, as Kelsey Dallas has explained<\/a>, for the current deportation \u201csurges\u201d against undocumented immigrants \u2013 but space requires that I hold off more than a brief mention of them here. (For those interested, those two immigration cases are Noem v. Al Otro Lado<\/a>, scheduled for argument<\/a> on March 24, and Bondi v. Lau<\/a>, scheduled for argument<\/a> on April 22.)<\/p>\n

We begin with United States v. Hemani<\/a>, which will be argued on March 2, and is an important Second Amendment case. Hemani requires analysis of a long-standing federal statute<\/a> that criminalizes, among many other things, firearm possession by anyone \u201cwho is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.\u201d As I explained in my mid-term update<\/a> last month, the parties still appear to dispute whether Hemani\u2019s prosecution (and this case) under that specific statutory provision applies only to his regular marijuana use, or to all controlled substances. The government also seeks to have the court interpret the statute, non-textually, as limited in application to only \u201chabitual\u201d users. Oral argument will likely involve a broad-ranging discussion of how the court\u2019s recent Second Amendment<\/a> \u201chistory and tradition\u201d theory should play out<\/a> in this case-specific context. And Hemani is one of two important Second Amendment cases pending this term, the other being Wolford v. Lopez<\/a>, addressing a Hawaii state law, that was argued<\/a> last month.<\/p>\n

Hunter v. United States<\/a> is scheduled for argument the next day, March 3. As professors Nancy King and Michael O\u2019Neill explained two decades ago<\/a>, appellate review of criminal sentences has become common over the past 50 years, as \u201cthe glue\u201d to hold together determinate (that is, largely non-discretionary) criminal<\/a> sentencing \u201cguidelines\u201d systems<\/a>. In other words, appellate review of criminal sentences expanded to help ensure consistency between different judges and jurisdictions for sentences imposed on similar criminal offenders.<\/p>\n

However, given the largely unequal bargaining power<\/a> between prosecutors and charged defendants, prosecutors soon began to require broad \u201cappeal waivers\u201d from defendants in plea bargains; that is, defendants are now commonly required to agree that they will not file an appeal of their conviction, saving the government resources in exchange for less severe charges or sentences. Hunter presents questions<\/a> of how to interpret and apply such waivers. (In 2017, the American Bar Association adopted some detailed guidelines for prosectors<\/a> and defense attorneys<\/a> on the subject.)\u00a0<\/p>\n

In Hunter, the government seeks<\/a> a \u201cno exceptions whatsoever\u201d interpretation, even when the sentencing judge later says \u201cyou have a right to appeal\u201d (as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(j)(1)<\/a> is often read \u2013 or misread? \u2013 to require judges to do). In contrast, Hunter argues<\/a> that standard contract-interpretation doctrine supports exceptions to such waivers in unanticipated situations, and that in any case if the prosecutor does not object to a \u201cyou have a right to appeal\u201d judicial statement then the government has waived reliance on the prior appeal waiver. Lisa Blatt, representing Hunter, argues<\/a> with characteristic flourish<\/a> that \u201cmaking even the most egregious punishments categorically unreviewable does our legal system a disservice.\u201d<\/p>\n

This case is especially pertinent because a multitude of \u201csplits\u201d about how to interpret and apply criminal appeal waivers have developed among the various federal circuit courts. A divided Supreme Court has previously noted the practice of appeal waivers in the 2019 case of Garza v. Idaho<\/a>, but split 6-3 as to the meaning of broad appeal waivers. Specifically, the majority wrote that \u201cno appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims\u201d \u2013 though Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch vehemently disagreed. Hunter thus presents yet another instance of deciding whether recent changes in the court\u2019s membership will shift the meaning of precedent<\/a>. I expect this oral argument to be full of heat \u2013 and hopefully some light. \u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Abouammo v. United States<\/a> is scheduled for argument on March 30. Section 2 of\u00a0Article III<\/a>\u00a0of the Constitution provides that \u201c[t]he Trial of all Crimes \u2026 shall be held in the State where the said Crimes have been committed.\u201d Similarly, the Sixth Amendment\u2019s \u201cvicinage clause<\/a>\u201d says that \u201cin all criminal prosecutions,\u201d the \u201ctrial\u201d shall be by a jury \u201cof the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.\u201d<\/p>\n

In this case, Amhad Abouammo emailed false documents from his home in Washington state to FBI agents he knew were from San Francisco. Although Abouammo\u2019s conduct occurred in the district of Washington, he was tried in a California federal court. In affirming Abouammo\u2019s conviction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit said<\/a> that the place where the \u201ccontemplate[d] \u2026 effect\u201d of a crime will be felt suffices to establish constitutional venue.<\/p>\n

This case may seem relatively technical, but it appears to invoke substantial questions of constitutional interpretation. Abouammo argues<\/a> that the text, the Framers\u2019 understanding, and the history of the Constitutional provisions at issue all require that federal criminal venue be restricted to one\u2019s physical location. The solicitor general has not yet filed its responsive brief, but in opposing review argued<\/a> that it is well-settled that \u201ccontinuing offenses\u201d can be \u201ccommitted\u201d in more than one district, and that this doctrine should apply to the contemplated effects of the specific obstruction of justice statute here<\/a>. Perhaps minds in 1790 contemplated only physical locations, but the court has had to deal with technology<\/a> stretching physical boundaries<\/a> in the past (and will again, see Chatrie discussed below). A more detailed \u201chistory and tradition\u201d brief should be filed by the government soon.<\/p>\n

The day after the Abouammo argument, on March 31, the court is scheduled to hear argument in Pitchford v. Cain<\/a>. In the 1986 case of Batson v. Kentucky<\/a>, the court ruled that striking potential jurors based on their race is unconstitutional. Pitchford involves a complex and \u201cfact intensive<\/a>\u201d application of that doctrine, under the highly deferential layer of federal court deference to state court criminal judgments required by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act<\/a> (commonly referred to as AEDPA<\/a>, pronounced \u201ced-pah\u201d or \u201cah-dee-pah\u201d). The court has reduced the questions presented in this case to one<\/a>: was the Mississippi Supreme Court\u2019s decision that Terry Pitchford waived his right to challenge the prosecutor\u2019s reasons for striking four black jurors unreasonable?<\/p>\n

Pitchford is a black man<\/a> on Mississippi\u2019s death row. The state trial prosecutor was the same prosecutor found responsible in the 2019 case of Flowers v. Mississippi<\/a> for \u201ca blatant pattern of striking potential back jurors,\u201d a fact that Pitchford\u2019s brief highlights<\/a>. The Flowers case, however, came to the court directly from the Mississippi Supreme Court. By contrast, Pitchford\u2019s case is before the court on review of a federal court decision on Pitchford\u2019s habeas corpus petition after the Mississippi state courts all denied Pitchford\u2019s Batson claim. In that context, AEDPA requires more deference to the Mississippi ruling than was true in Flowers: habeas corpus relief \u201cshall not be granted \u2026 unless<\/a>\u201d the applicable caselaw was \u201cclearly established\u201d and the Mississippi court\u2019s decision was so \u201cunreasonable\u201d that \u201cfairminded jurists\u201d could not disagree. (The non-textual \u201cfairminded jurist\u201d interpretation for AEDPA deference was announced in the 2011 case of Harrington v. Richter<\/a> in 2011 and has been the subject of much attention<\/a> and criticism<\/a>). Another difference from Flowers may be that the \u201claw\u201d that initially must be applied here may be the law of \u201cwaiver,\u201d rather than the Batson standards directly. On the other hand, the factual Batson record that Pitchford offers is disturbing. Mississippi\u2019s brief in opposition has not yet been filed; there is also a chance that the solicitor general may seek to intervene as an amicus.<\/p>\n

Also of note: The petition asking the Supreme Court to review the Pitchford case was relisted eight times<\/a> before review here was granted. The practice of multiple relistings<\/a> \u2013 that is, placing a review request on the court\u2019s private discussion agenda multiple weeks in a row<\/a> \u2013 is subject to many possible interpretations<\/a>, and has gone unexplained by the justices. The Pitchford case might have been suggested by some justices for summary reversal; that is, overturning a lower court opinion without briefing or oral argument \u2013 but who knows in which direction? The ultimate decision to review the case with full briefing and oral argument might have been a way to resolve (temporarily) deep internal disagreements. Meanwhile, among others, the late Judge Stephen Reinhardt (once called<\/a> \u201cthe liberal lion of the 9th Circuit\u201d) suggested in 2015<\/a> that Harrington deference \u201ctaken literally \u2026 would mean that a federal court could never grant habeas relief.\u201d The Pitchford argument, and the court\u2019s resulting decision, will likely demonstrate various justices\u2019 thinking and stark disagreements about that claim.<\/p>\n

Finally, on the penultimate argument day of this term, April 27, Chatrie v. United States<\/a> is scheduled for oral argument. Chatrie presents what could be a hugely important Fourth Amendment case. The issue is how to apply that 1790 provision of the amendment to a modern technological development called \u201cgeofence\u201d warrants. Specifically, these are judicially approved orders issued at the request of law enforcement to companies that store cellphone records (in this case, Google), asking them to review the location data records they maintain for millions of customers and, ultimately, identify by name (\u201cdeanonymized\u201d is the government\u2019s euphemism<\/a>) those customers who were present in a particular location on a particular day and time. Such specific location data can then be used \u2013 along with other information \u2013 to find persons possibly involved in a crime where the day, time, and location are known but the criminal perpetrator is not. Indeed, that is what happened to Okello Chatrie, who after being identified and then further investigated, was convicted of federal armed robbery and firearm brandishing and sentenced to over 11 years in prison.<\/p>\n

The further we live from the time of the Constitution\u2019s framers, the more challenging becomes applying their words to unforeseen changes. But as Chief Justice John Marshall explained two centuries ago in McCullough v. Maryland<\/a>, the constitutional authors intended that the document \u201cendure for ages to come\u201d and \u201cbe adapted\u201d to address unforeseen situations. Thus (as I suggest to my students every year), original intent requires an adaptive Constitution. In Chatrie, the court has granted review over the solicitor general\u2019s opposition<\/a>, and expressly limited<\/a> the question to be argued<\/a> solely to the Fourth Amendment<\/a>, which succinctly protects \u201c[t]he right of \u2026 people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.\u201d The question is how these words can be applied to people\u2019s electronically-compiled cellphone location data.<\/p>\n

The court has previously ruled on Fourth Amendment limitations for telephone wiretaps<\/a>, surveillance by airplanes<\/a>, and thermal heat imagers<\/a> (despite the Framers failure to mention them). In 2018, in Carpenter v. United States<\/a>, the court recognized the privacy-threatening implications of \u201cpervasive\u201d cellphone use and ruled that government acquisition of cellphone location data was a \u201csearch.\u201d But technology continues to evolve at lightning speed and lower courts have now taken different positions regarding geofence searches. The court granted review here over the solicitor general\u2019s opposition<\/a> \u2013 apparently the justices have decided to try to keep up with things. \u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

As Adam Unikowsky<\/a> wrote in a brief<\/a> requesting review for Chatrie, \u201c[t]he law enforcement benefits of geofence warrants are obvious, but so too are the privacy implications and potential for abuse.\u201d Is an \u201canonymized\u201d search of millions of people records a \u201cgeneral warrant<\/a>\u201d of the type that the Framers clearly opposed? Do such warrants lack the sort of \u201cparticularity\u201d that the Fourt Amendment requires? Do other types of mass searches of electronic databanks require warrants at all, and if so, what rules apply?<\/p>\n

The parties have not yet filed their briefs on the merits, but this seems like an oral argument that not just criminal law groupies, but also technology company executives at the highest level, will not want to miss.<\/p>\n

The court is beginning to fill its docket for next term<\/p>\n

In closing, it should also be noted that the court has granted review in two more cases, without scheduling them for oral argument this term. It is very likely<\/a> that these cases will be scheduled for argument at the beginning of the 2026-27 term next October. Fortunately for me, neither<\/a> case<\/a> appears to involve criminal law issues (although the Video Privacy Protection Act case<\/a> \u2013 which is at the heart of one of them \u2013 might well be described as criminal law adjacent). The Supreme Court\u2019s docket, like a river, keeps on flowing \u2013 I\u2019ll keep reporting on it as long as I can swim.<\/p>\n

Cases: Wolford v. Lopez<\/a>, Rico v. United States<\/a>, Hunter v. United States<\/a>, United States v. Hemani<\/a>, Fernandez v. United States<\/a>, Villarreal v. Texas<\/a>, Pitchford v. Cain<\/a>, Urias-Orellana v. Bondi<\/a>, Rutherford v. United States<\/a>, Hamm v. Smith (Capital Punishment)<\/a>, Chatrie v. United States<\/a>, Bondi v. Lau<\/a>, Noem v. Al Otro Lado<\/a>, Abouammo v. United States<\/a><\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRecommended Citation:
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tRory Little,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tThe anticipated criminal law decisions and arguments for the rest of this term,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSCOTUSblog (Feb. 18, 2026, 10:00 AM),
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thttps:\/\/www.scotusblog.com\/2026\/02\/the-anticipated-criminal-law-decisions-and-arguments-for-the-rest-of-this-term\/\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"ScotusCrim is a recurring series by Rory Little focusing on intersections between the Supreme Court and criminal law.…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":476082,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[23,3,21,19,22,20,25,24],"class_list":{"0":"post-476081","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-united-states","8":"tag-america","9":"tag-news","10":"tag-united-states","11":"tag-united-states-of-america","12":"tag-unitedstates","13":"tag-unitedstatesofamerica","14":"tag-us","15":"tag-usa"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/476081","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=476081"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/476081\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/476082"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=476081"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=476081"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=476081"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}