{"id":513296,"date":"2026-03-09T16:45:08","date_gmt":"2026-03-09T16:45:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/513296\/"},"modified":"2026-03-09T16:45:08","modified_gmt":"2026-03-09T16:45:08","slug":"from-infrastructure-investment-to-expanded-market-access-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-in-africa-and-the-implications-for-u-s-trade-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/513296\/","title":{"rendered":"From Infrastructure Investment to Expanded Market Access: China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative in Africa and the Implications for U.S. Trade Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>China\u2019s economic relationship with Africa has expanded greatly since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. After becoming Africa\u2019s largest trading partner in 2009, China\u2019s total trade with Africa rose from $198.5 billion in 2012 to $295.6 billion in 2024 (see <a href=\"https:\/\/za.china-embassy.gov.cn\/eng\/jbwzlm\/zfgxss\/gk\/201412\/t20141230_7682360.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation Report, August 2013<\/a>; Communiqu\u00e9, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/zy\/gb\/202506\/t20250611_11646041.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People\u2019s Republic of China, June 2025<\/a>). By comparison, total U.S. trade with Africa amounted to $104.9 billion in 2024 (see <a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/countries-regions\/africa\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Africa<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>In 2025, total trade between China and Africa rose by 17.7% to $348.05 billion, primarily driven by a 25.8% increase in exports from China, while imports from Africa rose by 5.4% (see <a href=\"https:\/\/chinaglobalsouth.com\/infographic\/top-20-african-exporters-to-china\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">China Global South Project<\/a>). However, this trade expansion coincided with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order requiring U.S. foreign assistance to be reevaluated and realigned with his administration\u2019s priorities, and on January 27, 2025, the Office of Management and Budget directed agencies to pause and review a broad set of financial-assistance programs (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/01\/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid<\/a>; see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/M-25-13-Temporary-Pause-to-Review-Agency-Grant-Loan-and-Other-Financial-Assistance-Programs.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">OMB Memorandum M-25-13<\/a>). By March 2025, roughly 83 percent of programs funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had been canceled, sharply reducing the institutional footprint of U.S. development engagement abroad, including in Africa (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-administration-scraps-over-80-usaid-programs-top-diplomat-rubio-says-2025-03-10\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Reuters, March 10, 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>In today\u2019s farmdoc daily article, we examine how China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative has expanded Beijing\u2019s economic presence in Africa through infrastructure and related investments. However, the U.S. has an initiative of its own, known as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which provides eligible sub-Saharan African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market for more than 1,800 products. Although President Trump signed legislation on February 3, 2026, reauthorizing AGOA (with retroactive effect to September 30, 2025), the program is scheduled to expire at the end of this year, leaving its longer-term future uncertain (see <a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/about\/policy-offices\/press-office\/press-releases\/2026\/february\/statement-ambassador-jamieson-greer-reauthorization-african-growth-and-opportunity-act\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Statement from Ambassador Jamieson Greer<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>\u201cIf you build it, [they] will come\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Much of the financing associated with China\u2019s overseas engagement is loan-based and heavily concentrated in infrastructure development. According to AidData, Chinese official financing across twenty low- and middle-income countries totaled about $320 billion between 2000 and 2022, with 94% provided as loans and only 6% as grants. Additionally, more than two-thirds of that financing was directed toward infrastructure projects. By improving roads, railways, ports, power systems, and irrigation, these investments can generate tangible economic benefits for both China and recipient countries through lower transport frictions, reduced trade costs, expanded market access, and deeper diplomatic and economic ties (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aiddata.org\/blog\/new-in-depth-profiles-on-chinas-grants-and-loans-to-20-countries\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">AidData, October 2025<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>China\u2019s agricultural engagement in Africa has also extended beyond large infrastructure projects to include smaller-scale efforts in technology transfer and skills development. One example is the FAO\u2013China South-South Cooperation project in Uganda. The second phase of the project aimed to raise production and productivity, build farmer and staff capacity, and strengthen already-established trade and investment linkages. According to the FAO, the project trained more than 3,000 farmers and 80 extension staff, established seven agricultural technology demonstration hubs, facilitated $220 million in Chinese investment for the Kehong China-Uganda Agricultural Industrial Park, and supported joint ventures in hybrid rice, foxtail millet, and sweet-potato processing (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fao.org\/sstc-gateway\/node\/510\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">FAO South\u2013South Cooperation Gateway<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>More recently, China has paired infrastructure finance and technical cooperation with expanded market access. For example, China reported that it had signed 22 agricultural export protocols with 18 African countries at the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2024 (see Communiqu\u00e9, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/zy\/gb\/202506\/t20250611_11646041.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People\u2019s Republic of China, June 2025<\/a>). Additionally, effective December 1, 2024, Beijing granted zero-tariff treatment for 100% of tariff lines to all least-developed countries with diplomatic relations with China, including 33 African countries (see <a href=\"https:\/\/english.www.gov.cn\/news\/202409\/05\/content_WS66d966fcc6d0868f4e8eaa09.html?\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">The State Council, September 2024<\/a>).<a href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\">[1]<\/a> This policy will now be extended to all 53 African countries with diplomatic relations with China beginning May 1, 2026 (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/china-implement-zero-tariffs-imports-53-african-countries-2026-02-14\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Reuters, February 2026<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>AGOA\u2019s impact across Africa<\/p>\n<p>AGOA is only one part of a broader set of trade arrangements between the United States and many African countries. For eligible African exporters, however, its importance lies in the duty-free access it provides to the U.S. market. Moreover, that value is not fully captured by aggregate trade totals. For example, U.S. goods trade with Africa totaled $72 billion in 2024. Imports for goods from Africa were $39.6 billion, of which $8.0 billion entered under AGOA, indicating that the program accounts for only a modest share of overall U.S.\u2013Africa trade (see <a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/countries-regions\/africa?\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Office of the U.S. Trade Representative<\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/IF10149\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">IF10149<\/a>). Even so, AGOA\u2019s design still offers opportunities to strengthen economic ties between Africa and the United States over time, especially as China broadens its tariff-free access across the continent.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/03092026_fig1.png\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone wp-image-41609\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/03092026_fig1.png\" alt=\"Line chart titled \u201cGoods Trade between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa,\u201d showing values in billions of U.S. dollars from 2002 to 2022. Three lines are displayed: total U.S. goods imports from sub-Saharan Africa (orange), AGOA imports including the Generalized System of Preferences (green), and AGOA non-oil imports including the Generalized System of Preferences (blue).\" width=\"750\" height=\"545\"  \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>For South Africa, AGOA is particularly important for for a subset of agricultural producers. The United States accounts for only about 4 percent of South Africa\u2019s total agricultural exports, but that share is concentrated in higher-value products such as citrus, grapes, wine, fruit juices, and nuts (see <a href=\"https:\/\/wandile.substack.com\/p\/the-value-of-pushing-for-agoa-renewal\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Wandile Sihlobo, February 2026<\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/apps.fas.usda.gov\/newgainapi\/api\/Report\/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Agricultural%20Economic%20Fact%20Sheet_Pretoria_South%20Africa%20-%20Republic%20of_SF2023-0012.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Agricultural Economic Fact Sheet, South Africa, May 2023<\/a>). Beyond South Africa, AGOA has also supported agricultural exports from countries such as C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal. Outside of agriculture, Kenya and Lesotho highlight the program\u2019s importance for manufacturing and employment. According to KEPSA, Kenya\u2019s apparel exports to the United States totaled about $470 million in 2024 and directly supported 66,800 jobs through AGOA (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tralac.org\/documents\/resources\/external-relations\/us-agoa\/6121-kepsa-calls-for-agoa-s-renewal-25-september-2025\/file.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">KEPSA, September 2025<\/a>). Lesotho exported $237.3 million in apparel, while its manufacturing sector supported about 30,991 workers that year (see <a href=\"https:\/\/www.trade.gov\/country-commercial-guides\/lesotho-manufacturing\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Lesotho Country Commercial Guide<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>Conclusion<\/p>\n<p>China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative has evolved from a strategy centered on infrastructure and economic development into one that increasingly combines investment with broader access to the Chinese market. The clearest recent example is the extension of zero-tariff treatment from 33 least-developed African countries to all 53 African countries with diplomatic ties to China beginning May 1, 2026. The United States, by contrast, is at an inflection point in its trade policy with Africa. AGOA has been reauthorized only through the end of 2026, and the Trump administration has indicated that any successor arrangement would place greater emphasis on expanding market access for U.S. businesses, farmers, and ranchers, potentially with more reciprocal terms. At the same time, the broader U.S. development footprint in Africa has contracted sharply following the cancellation of more than 80 percent of USAID-funded programs in early 2025.<\/p>\n<p>For U.S. agricultural trade, the longer-run stakes are worth keeping in mind. Africa\u2019s population, and incomes are expected to rise substantially over the coming decades, and rising incomes tend to shift food demand toward higher-value products, including grains, protein, and processed foods, in which U.S. agriculture is competitive. Whether the United States retains a meaningful economic presence on the continent will depend in part on the policy choices it makes now, while China is actively working to deepen its own.<\/p>\n<p>Note<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\">[1]<\/a> Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) is excluded because it maintains formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.<\/p>\n<p>References<\/p>\n<p>AidData. October 2025. New In-Depth Profiles on China&#8217;s Grants and Loans to 20 Countries. AidData at William &amp; Mary. Williamsburg, VA. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aiddata.org\/blog\/new-in-depth-profiles-on-chinas-grants-and-loans-to-20-countries\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.aiddata.org\/blog\/new-in-depth-profiles-on-chinas-grants-and-loans-to-20-countries<\/a><\/p>\n<p>China Global South Project. Top 20 African Exporters to China. <a href=\"https:\/\/chinaglobalsouth.com\/infographic\/top-20-african-exporters-to-china\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/chinaglobalsouth.com\/infographic\/top-20-african-exporters-to-china\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p>China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation Report. August 2013. Embassy of the People&#8217;s Republic of China in South Africa. <a href=\"https:\/\/za.china-embassy.gov.cn\/eng\/jbwzlm\/zfgxss\/gk\/201412\/t20141230_7682360.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/za.china-embassy.gov.cn\/eng\/jbwzlm\/zfgxss\/gk\/201412\/t20141230_7682360.htm<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People&#8217;s Republic of China. June 2025. Communiqu\u00e9, List of the Outcomes of the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions\u2002of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/zy\/gb\/202506\/t20250611_11646041.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.mfa.gov.cn\/eng\/zy\/gb\/202506\/t20250611_11646041.html<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Congressional Research Service. IF10149: African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/IF10149\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/crs-product\/IF10149<\/a><\/p>\n<p>FAO South\u2013South and Triangular Cooperation Gateway. Technical Assistance under the South-South Cooperation with the People&#8217;s Republic of China in Support of Agricultural Sector Strategy Plan in the Republic of Uganda \u2013 Phase 2. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.fao.org\/sstc-gateway\/node\/510\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.fao.org\/sstc-gateway\/node\/510<\/a><\/p>\n<p>KEPSA (Kenya Private Sector Alliance). September 25, 2025. KEPSA calls for AGOA\u2019s renewal; if not, a two-year transition window to allow for a trade deal between Kenya and the U.S.. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.tralac.org\/documents\/resources\/external-relations\/us-agoa\/6121-kepsa-calls-for-agoa-s-renewal-25-september-2025\/file.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.tralac.org\/documents\/resources\/external-relations\/us-agoa\/6121-kepsa-calls-for-agoa-s-renewal-25-september-2025\/file.html<\/a><\/p>\n<p>U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration. Lesotho Country Commercial Guide \u2014 Manufacturing. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.trade.gov\/country-commercial-guides\/lesotho-manufacturing\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.trade.gov\/country-commercial-guides\/lesotho-manufacturing<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Office of Management and Budget. January 27, 2025. OMB Memorandum M-25-13: Temporary Pause of Agency Grant, Loan, and Other Financial Assistance Programs. Washington, DC. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/M-25-13-Temporary-Pause-to-Review-Agency-Grant-Loan-and-Other-Financial-Assistance-Programs.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/03\/M-25-13-Temporary-Pause-to-Review-Agency-Grant-Loan-and-Other-Financial-Assistance-Programs.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Africa: Trade Summary. <a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/countries-regions\/africa\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/ustr.gov\/countries-regions\/africa<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Reuters. March 10, 2025. Trump Administration Scraps Over 80% of USAID Programs, top diplomat Rubio says. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-administration-scraps-over-80-usaid-programs-top-diplomat-rubio-says-2025-03-10\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/us\/trump-administration-scraps-over-80-usaid-programs-top-diplomat-rubio-says-2025-03-10\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Reuters. February 14, 2026. China to Implement Zero Tariffs on Imports from 53 African Countries. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/china-implement-zero-tariffs-imports-53-african-countries-2026-02-14\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/china-implement-zero-tariffs-imports-53-african-countries-2026-02-14\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Sihlobo, W. February 2026. The Value of Pushing for AGOA Renewal in South Africa\u2019s agriculture. AgriView (Substack). <a href=\"https:\/\/wandile.substack.com\/p\/the-value-of-pushing-for-agoa-renewal\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/wandile.substack.com\/p\/the-value-of-pushing-for-agoa-renewal<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Statement from Ambassador Jamieson Greer on the Reauthorization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act. February 3, 2026. Washington, DC. <a href=\"https:\/\/ustr.gov\/about\/policy-offices\/press-office\/press-releases\/2026\/february\/statement-ambassador-jamieson-greer-reauthorization-african-growth-and-opportunity-act\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/ustr.gov\/about\/policy-offices\/press-office\/press-releases\/2026\/february\/statement-ambassador-jamieson-greer-reauthorization-african-growth-and-opportunity-act<\/a><\/p>\n<p>The State Council, People&#8217;s Republic of China. September 2024. Xi proposes partnership actions to jointly advance modernization with Africa. <a href=\"https:\/\/english.www.gov.cn\/news\/202409\/05\/content_WS66d966fcc6d0868f4e8eaa09.html\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/english.www.gov.cn\/news\/202409\/05\/content_WS66d966fcc6d0868f4e8eaa09.html<\/a><\/p>\n<p>The White House. January 20, 2025. Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid. Executive Order 14169. The White House. Washington, DC. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/01\/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/01\/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p>USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. May 2023. Agricultural Economic Fact Sheet: South Africa. Washington, DC. <a href=\"https:\/\/apps.fas.usda.gov\/newgainapi\/api\/Report\/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Agricultural%20Economic%20Fact%20Sheet_Pretoria_South%20Africa%20-%20Republic%20of_SF2023-0012.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">https:\/\/apps.fas.usda.gov\/newgainapi\/api\/Report\/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Agricultural%20Economic%20Fact%20Sheet_Pretoria_South%20Africa%20-%20Republic%20of_SF2023-0012.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"China\u2019s economic relationship with Africa has expanded greatly since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":513297,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[23,3,21,19,22,20,25,24],"class_list":["post-513296","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-united-states","tag-america","tag-news","tag-united-states","tag-united-states-of-america","tag-unitedstates","tag-unitedstatesofamerica","tag-us","tag-usa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/513296","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=513296"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/513296\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/513297"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=513296"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=513296"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=513296"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}