{"id":513503,"date":"2026-03-09T19:06:10","date_gmt":"2026-03-09T19:06:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/513503\/"},"modified":"2026-03-09T19:06:10","modified_gmt":"2026-03-09T19:06:10","slug":"new-start-might-be-dead-but-legally-binding-arms-control-isnt","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/513503\/","title":{"rendered":"New START might be dead, but legally binding arms control isn’t"},"content":{"rendered":"

Issue Brief<\/a><\/p>\n

March 9, 2026 \u2022 1:29 pm ET<\/p>\n

Print this page<\/p>\n

\n By
\n Michael Albertson <\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\tBottom lines up front\n\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n

\t\t\tFar from obsolete, arms control remains an important tool as the US manages nuclear competition.A new arms control treaty between the US and Russia makes sense\u2014but its focus should be inspections and information sharing, not numerical limits.Agreements limiting chemical and biological weapons will be next to disappear unless the arms control community changes course quickly.\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n

The United States faces a pivotal moment in the post-New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) strategic environment. Almost fifty years of forward progress on nuclear arms control culminated with the treaty\u2019s signing in 2010. While it was largely effective in managing US-Russian strategic nuclear competition, New START expired in February 2026 after existing as a hollow shell since Russia\u2019s unilateral \u201csuspension\u201d in February 2023.\u00a0Over the past fifteen years, other\u00a0long-standing treaties have unraveled, little has taken their place, and remaining treaty frameworks face uncertainty. Experts debate whether arms control\u00a0remains\u00a0a viable approach or is dead, almost dead, or\u00a0not quite dead\u00a0yet.<\/p>\n

The central question for the United States is how to\u00a0balance cooperation and competition in this moment.\u00a0There are open debates about how the United States should change its strategic posture in the wake of new geopolitical realities. There are also deep concerns about the lack of guardrails and an unconstrained\u00a0arms race.\u00a0Despite recent erosions of the global arms control framework, the logic and purpose of formal arms control treaties remain valid, particularly\u00a0in the present moment.\u00a0Far from obsolete, formal arms control measures offer a durable and applicable\u00a0tool for US management of\u00a0great-power nuclear competition even amid deep political mistrust.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Who\u2019s to blame?<\/p>\n

Two notes of caution should be\u00a0stated\u00a0up front.\u00a0Much of the blame for\u00a0the current geopolitical situation\u00a0can and should\u00a0be\u00a0attributed to the absence of constructive partners in Moscow\u00a0and Beijing. Russia\u2019s undermining of the existing\u00a0treaty-based order, its\u00a0maximalist negotiating\u00a0posture, and its obstinate unwillingness to constructively engage\u00a0have all undermined existing arms control frameworks.\u00a0China, meanwhile, has continued to reject engagement, even as it\u00a0undertakes a rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear forces.\u00a0Over the last few decades,\u00a0Russia and China\u00a0have\u00a0also explicitly rejected US offers of\u00a0the\u00a0restraint\u00a0they\u00a0sought\u00a0on issues\u00a0such as missile defense, conventional forces in Europe, conventional long-range strike, counterspace, and cyber.<\/p>\n

But\u00a0blame\u00a0can\u00a0also be placed\u00a0on the arms control and disarmament community,\u00a0both within the\u00a0United\u00a0States\u00a0and globally,\u00a0which has sidelined itself by\u00a0tying its\u00a0approaches and proposals\u00a0to the disarmament\u00a0project\u00a0as a whole, thereby\u00a0delinking\u00a0its agenda from historical approaches\u00a0to\u00a0strategic stability\u00a0and\u00a0the\u00a0hard\u00a0realities of the security environment. Much of its institutional\u00a0knowledge\u00a0and perspective regarding practical arms control via\u00a0negotiation, ratification, implementation, and verification\u00a0has vanished. Its public proposals, meanwhile, have resulted in little follow-through.\u00a0It continues to push ideas that lack US bipartisan\u00a0understanding or consensus. It has grown unaligned with\u00a0the\u00a0needs\u00a0of the\u00a0deterrence community and the realities of the\u00a0security environment. It\u00a0has\u00a0lost\u00a0the interest\u00a0of\u00a0the other side of the negotiating table. It has\u00a0spent time and energy finalizing agreements or making statements that are quickly ignored or broken. It has searched for low-hanging fruit that does not exist. It has failed to cultivate a\u00a0strong voice in the military services or the Department of Defense.<\/p>\n

This implies the need for a new, more brass-tacks approach to arms control\u2014one grounded in security realities and one that can be pursued either in partnership with or in the absence of viable partners.<\/p>\n

Distinguishing the substantive from aspirational and performative <\/p>\n

In considering\u00a0arms control\u00a0approaches,\u00a0most\u00a0analyses\u00a0focus on format,\u00a0contrasting the pros and cons of\u00a0legally binding treaties with other\u00a0mechanisms\u00a0(e.g., politically binding agreements, transparency measures, or norms). While\u00a0these\u00a0form a natural pairing, a more helpful\u00a0contemporary\u00a0contrast\u00a0lies in distinguishing between substantive, aspirational,\u00a0and performative arms control proposals.\u00a0Loose conceptions of the three are as follows.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Substantive:\u00a0The function of substantive arms control\u00a0proposals\u00a0is to create\u00a0leverage and consensus through formal processes\u00a0such as interagency negotiations\u00a0around a proximate or impending national security goal. While\u00a0interests and\u00a0approaches\u00a0must be negotiated, there is\u00a0typically\u00a0recognition of\u00a0hard security challenges\u00a0best managed through selective cooperation amid broader competition.\u00a0Defense officials are integral to this process. Goals\u00a0are\u00a0seen as\u00a0achievable\u00a0in the short term.\u00a0Leverage is created in negotiations between internal stakeholders\u00a0in\u00a0the process. Outside the negotiations, external measures can be taken to demonstrate that negotiating is\u00a0beneficial.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Aspirational:\u00a0The function of\u00a0aspirational\u00a0arms control\u00a0proposals\u00a0is to create leverage by setting\u00a0high\u00a0standards\u00a0or goals\u00a0that other states will be pressured to meet.\u00a0Interests and approaches might differ sharply, but there are believed to be shared positions on conceptual or normative desires on overarching concepts\u00a0such as\u00a0strategic stability, transparency, or\u00a0risk reduction.\u00a0Goals are typically ambitious and longer term. Leverage is created by creating\u00a0consensus or\u00a0coalitions of the willing, which can depict non-participants as non-adherents to proper ethical\u00a0or moral standards.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Performative:\u00a0The function of\u00a0performative\u00a0arms control\u00a0proposals\u00a0is to create leverage through\u00a0virtue signaling, scoring points on the international stage, or casting blame on others.\u00a0Other actors\u2019 interests and approaches might\u00a0be\u00a0largely irrelevant,\u00a0as there is little expectation of\u00a0needing to\u00a0move toward an actual agreement via the more challenging\u00a0processes\u00a0of negotiation, verification, or enforcement.\u00a0In many cases, leverage is unnecessary; the statement or\u00a0display\u2019s\u00a0end goal\u00a0in\u00a0changing\u00a0the discourse on the topic or the social reality.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Debates\u00a0about the agreement\u2019s form,\u00a0while\u00a0interesting,\u00a0are\u00a0less important\u00a0than\u00a0those about its\u00a0function or purpose. Treaty-based arms control can be aspirational\u00a0or performative,\u00a0just as political statements\u00a0can be substantive.\u00a0Categorization can also change over time: For example, a substantive proposal made at a particular time might become more aspirational or performative as geopolitical circumstances change. Arms control\u2019s overemphasis\u00a0on form\u00a0creates major problems when it comes to articulating the function of arms control proposals in the national security space.\u00a0As former arms control negotiator Linton Brooks wrote presciently in 2020, \u201cThe commonest form of stupidity is forgetting what one is trying to accomplish.\u201d<\/p>\n

Hard security realities need practical solutions<\/p>\n

Arguments\u00a0against aspirational and performative\u00a0approaches\u00a0at this moment\u00a0are simple. Russia and China have shown\u00a0they do\u00a0not\u00a0share US aspirations\u00a0regarding\u00a0arms control and\u00a0disarmament\u00a0concepts such as risk reduction, escalation avoidance,\u00a0and strategic stability. There\u00a0are\u00a0no longer moments of shared\u00a0aspirational interests as seen in past US-Soviet\u00a0and US-Russian\u00a0statements on strategic stability. China\u00a0views\u00a0formal\u00a0arms control as a \u201ctrick\u201d and has likewise been unwilling to engage\u00a0with\u00a0US\u00a0proposals on risk reduction.\u00a0Moscow and Beijing see value in\u00a0creating risks, manipulating escalation, and fostering instabilities to further their revisionist aims in Europe and Asia. Allied or nonaligned countries\u00a0that might\u00a0share US aspirations have shown little willingness to\u00a0pressure Moscow and Beijing to engage. Also, there\u00a0is\u00a0simply\u00a0no time for\u00a0performative\u00a0approaches given geopolitical realities. Showmanship and virtue\u00a0signaling are\u00a0acceptable when\u00a0they influence internal conversations or when others are doing the concrete work of\u00a0negotiating, implementing, and maintaining substantive agreements. Absent\u00a0this\u00a0influence, and given rapid erosion, there is little value gained in appearances\u00a0for international and domestic audiences.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

In contrast, there are many\u00a0arguments\u00a0for a more substantive approach to arms control. Thought and energy in the field need to be devoted to substantive work to repair and rebuild\u00a0from the decay\u00a0of the last fifteen years. Otherwise, remaining agreements on nonproliferation, chemical weapons, biological weapons, and outer space will be next to disappear after New START\u2019s expiration.\u00a0Communities focused on arms control need to\u00a0reconnect\u00a0practical solutions and\u00a0hard\u00a0security realities. There is a need to rebuild a\u00a0US\u00a0consensus, both between the legislative and executive branches and within the US interagency (particularly in the defense and deterrence community). There is a\u00a0need to\u00a0ground proposals in\u00a0negotiability,\u00a0in terms of\u00a0what the United States wants and what it is willing to include\u00a0in talks. There is\u00a0a\u00a0need to rebuild or repair the arms control landscape in\u00a0a\u00a0stable\u00a0and\u00a0durable way to manage the\u00a0emerging challenges in the strategic nuclear landscape. Finally,\u00a0this must be done\u00a0in\u00a0a way that allows the United\u00a0States\u00a0to meet its deterrence and security requirements as they continue to evolve in a two-peer, multipolar, and multidomain environment.<\/p>\n

Key elements of a US-Russia agreement<\/p>\n

Substantive arms control has a clear function and purpose\u00a0in\u00a0managing the next decade of anticipated multipolar nuclear\u00a0modernization\u00a0after New START\u2019s expiration. The trick is\u00a0coming up with\u00a0a substantive proposal that is durable enough to withstand partisan domestic politics and international\u00a0ups and downs, flexible enough to allow for adaptation and technological surprise,\u00a0and\u00a0concrete enough to be grounds for detailed conversations.\u00a0Key boxes must\u00a0be checked in the US system regarding Russian so-called novel systems and\u00a0Russia\u2019s\u00a0nonstrategic nuclear weapons. How the boxes are\u00a0ultimately checked\u00a0will be open to negotiation between the parties. The proposal must\u00a0also\u00a0have buy-in from\u00a0the\u00a0deterrence and defense communities on both sides as well as regional offices dealing with US-Russian relations, requiring time, energy, patience, and\u00a0expertise.\u00a0Expectations should be managed accordingly. The needs\u00a0for\u00a0durability, concreteness,\u00a0and interagency buy-in\u00a0suggest a legally binding treaty approach, and\u00a0flexibility and managed expectations\u00a0suggest limited aims.\u00a0<\/p>\n

With China\u2019s participation unlikely, a\u00a0follow-on US-Russia agreement designed to manage bilateral\u00a0strategic nuclear competition\u00a0over the next five to ten years\u00a0makes sense. Such a\u00a0substantive agreement\u00a0with Russia\u00a0will require discarding many of the aspirational or performative preconditions\u00a0both sides\u00a0stated\u00a0earlier\u00a0in the verbal jockeying about what should be in\u00a0a New START follow-on agreement.\u00a0The focus should instead be\u00a0on the key challenge of managing\u00a0US-Russia nuclear competition while the United States\u00a0responds to\u00a0China\u2019s nuclear buildup. The main purpose\u00a0of\u00a0a\u00a0US-Russia agreement\u00a0would be to avoid wasteful or costly bilateral misperceptions through a legally binding mechanism\u00a0that consists of data exchanges, notifications, inspections, and implementation body meetings.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0key elements of a substantive post-New START agreement\u00a0are all realistic and achievable.<\/p>\n

With this\u00a0larger\u00a0purpose\u00a0in mind,\u00a0hard\u00a0US-Russia\u00a0central\u00a0limits\u2014the likely key negotiating stumbling block\u2014are either wholly\u00a0unnecessary or can be set safely higher than New START limits. Again, the key goal is to have the flexibility in a bilateral agreement to respond to Chinese nuclear force expansion.<\/p>\n

Regarding implementation provisions,\u00a0New START\u2019s text could be updated\u00a0to include Russian strategic-range nuclear systems alongside intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Data exchanges and notifications can be expanded to exchange information on total nuclear arsenals.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Inspections\u00a0at\u00a0warhead storage facilities\u00a0can be added to confirm the accuracy of the declared data.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The treaty could be set for five years,\u00a0with a further five-year extension, to take a bilateral treaty to a point\u00a0at which\u00a0the United\u00a0States\u00a0needs to make harder decisions about\u00a0where to go next in its strategic modernization program vis-\u00e0-vis China.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Unilateral\u00a0withdrawal clauses\u00a0could be\u00a0built into the\u00a0treaty, with the United States\u2019 clause tied to Chinese nuclear expansion and\u00a0Russia\u2019s\u00a0tied to US missile defense expansion.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The United\u00a0States\u00a0could propose\u00a0a substantive,\u00a0concrete\u00a0framework of such a treaty relatively easily.\u00a0Its purpose can be clearly articulated\u00a0to public audiences and internal US stakeholders\u00a0as a reasonable adaptation\u00a0to modern realities. It\u00a0does not\u00a0raise the stakes too high for potential Russian engagement. It would be built mainly on the legal textual foundation\u00a0of a\u00a0successful\u00a0legacy agreement. It would check the box on congressional interest in Russian nuclear systems of concern unaddressed by New START and begin gathering\u00a0information on total warhead numbers. It would\u00a0sidestep the\u00a0major potential criticism by\u00a0leaving\u00a0the United States able to respond to China.\u00a0It would set the framing and\u00a0terms of the forthcoming \u201cinterregnum debate,\u201d over where arms control is headed now that New START has formally expired.\u00a0It would serve as a useful capacity-building\u00a0exercise for both Congress and intergovernmental experts to relearn the process of treaty negotiation, ratification, implementation, and verification. It could serve as a bridge to a future point at which reductions are possible or more parties are willing to substantively engage.\u00a0<\/p>\n

To\u00a0encourage Chinese participation,\u00a0the\u00a0United States\u00a0could couple this\u00a0substantive bilateral treaty proposal with a multilateral treaty proposal\u00a0including the five permanent nations of the United Nations\u00a0(P5). Because\u00a0such a negotiation would involve states with divergent force levels and limited shared experiences, it would require a trade-off\u00a0between the depth and scope of the multilateral agreement, essentially trading\u00a0broader engagement for deeper implementation.\u00a0In this construct, the United States, the United Kingdom,\u00a0and France could jointly propose a P3 agreement to Russia and China\u00a0on\u00a0a simple premise: information sharing regarding nuclear holdings and limited reciprocal access.\u00a0Russia has already gone much further with the United States under existing frameworks and has repeatedly called for the inclusion of the United Kingdom and France\u2014conditions that this proposal would satisfy. China\u00a0would be\u00a0isolated as the remaining holdout. While China will\u00a0ultimately decide to engage\u00a0based on its own assessment of risks and benefits,\u00a0such an approach would clarify for the broader international\u00a0community where the principal obstacle to progress lies.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Former senior arms control negotiator Paul Warnke wrote in 1986,\u00a0\u201cOne of the real problems in arms control is that neither side needs a deal.\u201d Having articulated these substantive proposals clearly, the United States should proceed\u00a0with putting its own\u00a0strategic and regional deterrence houses\u00a0in order. If Russia and China do not engage, the United States should not chase them. There is no silver bullet that will magically turn Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia or Xi Jinping\u2019s China into willing negotiating partners. The United States\u00a0should\u00a0instead\u00a0focus\u00a0on the\u00a0best alternative to a negotiated agreement\u00a0(what negotiations literature calls a\u00a0BATNA), working to improve its own position\u00a0and weaken\u00a0Russia and China\u2019s positions. This\u00a0structure\u2014a bilateral proposal, a multilateral proposal, and a BATNA proposal\u2014is a more holistic negotiating approach than searching for\u00a0trade space or bargaining chips\u00a0to create and then negotiate away. \u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The merits of \u201cold school\u201d arms control\u00a0<\/p>\n

Admittedly, this is an\u00a0old school\u00a0approach to a\u00a0rapidly evolving problem set.\u00a0There is a strong reliance on past mechanisms such as negotiations, interagency implementation, and data analysis, and a historical coupling of concrete, detailed cooperative agreements with continued strategic competition.\u00a0There\u00a0are\u00a0no illusions about what these agreements can achieve\u00a0or what geopolitical trends they can stop in their tracks.\u00a0This will leave many in search of\u00a0new approaches\u00a0to arms control unsatisfied. There\u00a0are\u00a0no specific carveouts for emerging technologies like artificial intelligence or\u00a0fast-moving\u00a0issues like Golden Dome.\u00a0There is no call for new, more intrusive, or more technology-dependent verification measures.\u00a0This is because searches for new aspirational or performative approaches over the last fifteen years\u2014aimed at\u00a0going lower\u00a0in numbers of launchers or warheads, capturing a wide range of new and emerging threats,\u00a0and looping in more countries\u2014have\u00a0not proven fruitful.\u00a0In pursuing these searches, time has run out for many agreements.\u00a0The lack of results has validated that legally\u00a0binding arms control\u00a0might again\u00a0be necessary.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

As Brooks wrote in 2020, \u201cInternational agreements are only impossible until they aren\u2019t.\u201d The present moment demands an approach that is\u00a0substantive,\u00a0flexible, and\u00a0reactive\u00a0enough\u00a0to\u00a0respond to the two-peer challenge posed by\u00a0Putin\u2019s Russia\u00a0and Xi\u2019s\u00a0China.\u00a0What has been articulated here\u2014a bilateral treaty proposal\u00a0with Russia,\u00a0a multilateral P5 proposal, and a simultaneous US modernization in the absence of cooperation\u2014might\u00a0not gain near-term acceptance in Moscow and Beijing, but it offers a concrete\u00a0and\u00a0coherent US arms control strategy in the post-New START era. It also serves as a\u00a0rallying point\u00a0within the\u00a0arms control and disarmament communities\u00a0to begin thinking more substantively about which proposals and negotiating positions\u00a0meet the\u00a0present\u00a0moment, encouraging a shift from aspirational or performative rhetoric to practical negotiability. Without substantive focus, aspirational and performative proposals will continue to dominate the discourse\u00a0and\u00a0the community will continue to\u00a0lose relevance in the broader national security\u00a0debate.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\n\t\tAbout the author\n\t<\/p>\n

Michael Albertson is deputy director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.\u00a0Prior to his current position,\u00a0he\u00a0worked\u00a0in the federal government\u00a0in\u00a0a wide variety of Russia,\u00a0deterrence, and arms control-related portfolios for the\u00a0Department of Defense, the State Department, and the National Security Council staff.\u00a0His work\u00a0on Russian strategic nuclear arms control issues included implementation and compliance of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty\u00a0and New START and participation in the negotiation and\u00a0ratification\u00a0of the New START Treaty.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The views expressed here are the personal views of the author\u00a0and should not be attributed to his employer or any of its sponsors.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\n\t\tExplore the program\n\t<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

Forward Defense<\/a> leads the Atlantic Council\u2019s US and global defense programming, developing actionable recommendations for the United States and its allies and partners to compete, innovate, and navigate the rapidly evolving character of warfare. Through its work on US defense policy and force design, the military applications of advanced technology, space security, strategic deterrence, and defense industrial revitalization, it informs the strategies, policies, and capabilities that the United States will need to deter, and, if necessary, prevail in major-power conflict.<\/p>\n

Image: Airmen from the 90th Missile Maintenance Squadron prepare a reentry system for removal from a launch facility, February 2, 2018, in the F. E. Warren Air Force Base missile complex. The 90th MMXS is the only squadron on F. E. Warren allowed to transport warheads from the missile complex back to base. Missile maintenance teams perform periodic maintenance to maintain the on-alert status for launch facilities, ensuring the success of the nuclear deterrence mission. (US Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Braydon Williams)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Issue Brief March 9, 2026 \u2022 1:29 pm ET Print this page By Michael Albertson Bottom lines up…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":513504,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[23,3,21,19,22,20,25,24],"class_list":["post-513503","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-united-states","tag-america","tag-news","tag-united-states","tag-united-states-of-america","tag-unitedstates","tag-unitedstatesofamerica","tag-us","tag-usa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/513503","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=513503"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/513503\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/513504"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=513503"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=513503"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=513503"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}