{"id":547472,"date":"2026-03-27T01:11:16","date_gmt":"2026-03-27T01:11:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/547472\/"},"modified":"2026-03-27T01:11:16","modified_gmt":"2026-03-27T01:11:16","slug":"chinas-internal-security-spending-an-assessment-of-new-data-the-china-quarterly","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/547472\/","title":{"rendered":"China\u2019s Internal Security Spending: An Assessment of New Data | The China Quarterly"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"p\"> This article provides an updated overview and analysis of internal security spending by the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) from 1992 to 2022, building on work covering 1992\u20132012 that was previously published in The China Quarterly.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn1\">Footnote 1<\/a> A new dataset, now publicly available online, covers the past three decades, including the first two terms of Xi Jinping\u2019s \u4e60\u8fd1\u5e73 tenure.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn2\">Footnote 2<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> Broadly speaking, the updated data on China\u2019s internal security spending reveal a mix of continuity and change. China\u2019s domestic security expenditure continues to increase rapidly, more than doubling from 2012 to 2022, but has risen mostly in proportion to the rest of the PRC\u2019s budget. The balance between central and local expenditure has shifted slightly more towards decentralized funding of domestic security, providing context for recent high-level expressions of concern about the revenue-generating activities of local public security bureaus (PSBs) in an era of increased local fiscal constraint. Within the internal security apparatus, the Ministry of Public Security (gong\u2019anbu \u516c\u5b89\u90e8, MPS hereafter) continues to receive the lion\u2019s share of domestic security spending, and that share has risen since 2012. By contrast, the proportion of internal security spending allocated to the People\u2019s Armed Police (wujing \u6b66\u8b66, PAP hereafter) has decreased (likely reflecting a reorganization in 2017\u20132018), although the PAP\u2019s budget has continued to rise. Internal security spending, both per capita and relative to GDP, tends to be higher in locations that are politically sensitive, including Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang.<\/p>\n<p> Overall Trends in China\u2019s Internal Security Spending<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> China\u2019s domestic security budget has been a frequent point of reference in both media and academic discourse since internal security expenditure first surpassed spending on national defence in 2011.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn3\">Footnote 3<\/a> Internal security spending generally refers to expenditure on China\u2019s political-legal system (zhengfa xitong \u653f\u6cd5\u7cfb\u7edf), which is composed of public security, the procuratorate, courts, and justice (gongjianfasi \u516c\u68c0\u6cd5\u53f8), as well as the PAP. It appears under the grouped heading of gonggong anquan zhichu \u516c\u5171\u5b89\u5168\u652f\u51fa in publications by the PRC Ministry of Finance. Understanding the PRC\u2019s domestic security spending is important for debates over the extent and nature of securitization under Xi Jinping, as well as discussions of China\u2019s overall coercive capacity and authoritarian stability.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn4\">Footnote 4<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> Such understanding is also important for ongoing discussion on how to interpret and measure China\u2019s military spending, as debates over defence spending hinge, in part, on which line-items and categories of spending should be considered part of China\u2019s military budget versus the internal security budget (for example, the gendarmerie-like PAP, discussed below), and on how to treat off-budget adjustments to official statistics. External analysts generally agree that China\u2019s defence spending is substantially larger than official figures\u00a0indicate when appropriate off-budget expenses are included, but estimates of how much larger vary widely.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn5\">Footnote 5<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> <a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig1\">Figure\u00a01<\/a> shows China\u2019s official internal security spending from 1992 to 2022, placed alongside official defence spending for comparative purposes. It reveals a continued rise in overall internal security expenditure throughout the past decade, continuing the previous two decades of spending growth. In absolute\/nominal terms, the domestic security budget more than doubled from 2012 to 2022, rising from 711.2 billion yuan to 1.44 trillion yuan in 2022.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn6\">Footnote 6<\/a> Using average market exchange rates for those years, that translates to roughly US$112.7 billion to \u223cUS$214 billion.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn7\">Footnote 7<\/a> However, internal security expenditure also shows a plateau from 2018 to 2021, which we explain at least partly with reference to a reorganization that moved parts of the PAP and MPS into a new Ministry of Emergency Management (yingji guanli bu \u5e94\u6025\u7ba1\u7406\u90e8, MEM hereafter), which is not included in the Ministry of Finance\u2019s internal security expenditure category.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig1.png\" class=\"aop-lazy-load-image\" width=\"1600\" height=\"1018\" data-original-image=\"\/binary\/version\/id\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig1.png\" data-zoomable=\"true\"\/><\/p>\n<p class=\"p\">Figure 1. China\u2019s Defence and Internal Security Expenditures, 1992\u20132022<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> Similar to defence spending, important categories of internal security expenditure do not appear in official totals. And, as with defence spending, the excluded categories could add considerably to estimates of the total expenditure if published and counted. Extrabudgetary expenditures for internal security include: the Ministry of State Security (guojia anquanbu \u56fd\u5bb6\u5b89\u5168\u90e8, MSS hereafter), which has both internal and external responsibilities; the Party political-legal commissions that lead and manage public security work at various levels of China\u2019s political system; and MEM, which as a new ministry created in 2018 absorbed some previous PAP and MPS units and has some responsibility for planning and maintaining social stability under emergency conditions.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn8\">Footnote 8<\/a> MEM, for example, would have added 68.5 billion yuan to internal security expenditure in 2022, an amount 1.4 times larger than the Ministry of Justice (48.3 billion yuan) and slightly smaller than the procuratorate (72.7 billion yuan). The MSS budget under Xi remains unknown, in a period when that ministry has taken on a much more visible role, adding an unknown amount to the total.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> <a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig2\">Figure\u00a02<\/a> shows the share of overall government expenditure devoted to internal security from 1992 to 2022. Although internal security spending has increased as a proportion of overall expenditure since 1992, its share of the budget is not significantly higher under Xi Jinping (2012\u20132022) than in the previous period (1992\u20132012). Internal security expenditure remains between 5 per cent and 7 per cent of the overall spending. In 2012, the percentage of national expenditure allocated to domestic security was 5.6 per cent; in 2022, that percentage was 5.5 per cent.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig2.png\" class=\"aop-lazy-load-image\" width=\"1600\" height=\"899\" data-original-image=\"\/binary\/version\/id\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig2.png\" data-zoomable=\"true\"\/><\/p>\n<p class=\"p\">Figure 2. Internal Security Expenditure as a Proportion of Overall Expenditure<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> How to interpret internal security as a share of overall spending is, of course, open to interpretation. One possible interpretation is that China has been able to pursue its approach to internal security without a clear budgetary trade-off: growth in domestic security spending, as a line item, has not necessarily come at the expense of other budget categories. This, however, fails to account for \u201csecuritization\u201d if other actors in the Chinese political system have been required to take security measures that are accounted for in their budgets, rather than appearing solely in the internal security expenditure category.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> There is some indication of securitization dynamics. For example, MEM does not fall under the domestic security budget, but an updated 2025 requirement for local authorities to generate \u201cemergency response plans\u201d now requires non-security actors (such as education systems) to plan for how they will address \u201csocial security emergencies,\u201d including mass incidents, meaning that emergency management has a strong domestic stability component.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn9\">Footnote 9<\/a> Moreover, for the last several years, the PRC has earmarked (by issuing a special long-term treasury bond) an additional 700\u2013800 billion yuan for \u201cimplementation of major national strategies and security capacity-building in key areas\u201d that is not included in the regular annual domestic security budget; according to the Ministry of Finance\u2019s March 2025 report, the last round of this funding appears to have been spent largely on infrastructure (railways, highways, airports, etc.) and how much of it should be considered internal security spending is subject to interpretation.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn10\">Footnote 10<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> One major difference between China\u2019s defence spending and its internal security spending is that the latter is primarily the responsibility of provincial and local governments, rather than the centre.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn11\">Footnote 11<\/a> Previous work has shown that the burden for spending on domestic security and stability has shifted over time towards localities; <a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig3\">Figure\u00a03<\/a> shows that this trend has continued. Provincial and local governments are now responsible for slightly more of the PRC\u2019s domestic security expenditure than they were a decade ago, from below 80 per cent in the pre-2000 period to 83 per cent in 2012, to 86 per cent of internal security spending in 2022.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig3.png\" class=\"aop-lazy-load-image\" width=\"1600\" height=\"886\" data-original-image=\"\/binary\/version\/id\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig3.png\" data-zoomable=\"true\"\/><\/p>\n<p class=\"p\">Figure 3. Local Spending as a Proportion of Total Internal Security Spending<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> This rising fiscal burden occurs in the context of declining local fiscal revenues and an overall budget deficit. The combination of these trends may explain (and exacerbate) apparent recent concern at senior levels of the party-state leadership that budget pressures could be pushing local PSBs to use coercive or predatory tactics to offset revenue shortfalls by imposing false or inflated fines and confiscating property illicitly.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn12\">Footnote 12<\/a> In spring 2025, the Supreme People\u2019s Procuratorate launched a campaign of targeted supervision to eradicate \u201cillegal cross-jurisdictional and profit-seeking law enforcement\u201d (weigui yidi zhifa he qulixing zhifa \u8fdd\u89c4\u5f02\u5730\u6267\u6cd5\u548c\u8d8b\u5229\u6027\u6267\u6cd5),<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn13\">Footnote 13<\/a> a phenomenon sometimes known as \u201cdistant\/deep sea fishing\u201d (yang bulao \u6d0b\u6355\u635e).<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn14\">Footnote 14<\/a> The focus in\u00a0<a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig3\">Figure\u00a03<\/a> on the domestic security expenditure burden that falls on local governments, therefore, provides a note of caution in assuming, as one might looking at\u00a0<a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig2\">Figure\u00a02<\/a>, that the party-state has faced no \u201cguns-butter\u201d trade-off when it comes to internal security spending. In China, this may take the form of a trade-off between stability maintenance and routine criminal policing, as the MPS and local PSBs are required to do both. Analyses in both Chinese and English have highlighted resource shortfalls.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn15\">Footnote 15<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p> Spending Breakdown: Categories<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> Previous scholarship has noted the utility of understanding \u201cnot only the total amount that China spends, but also how it spends these resources.\u201d<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn16\">Footnote 16<\/a><br \/>\n<a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig4\">Figures\u00a04<\/a>\u2013<a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig5\">5<\/a>, therefore, show how domestic security expenditure has been allocated to different actors within China\u2019s internal security apparatus.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig4.png\" class=\"aop-lazy-load-image\" width=\"1600\" height=\"1155\" data-original-image=\"\/binary\/version\/id\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig4.png\" data-zoomable=\"true\"\/><br \/>\nNotes: The main previous analysis of these categories, covering 1996\u20132009 (Chestnut Greitens <a class=\"xref bibr\" href=\"#ref5\">Reference Chestnut Greitens2017<\/a>) aggregated amounts from local figures, which employed different categorizations. Because this would not compare \u201clike to like,\u201d and pre-2010 national-level categorical data are not available, <a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig4\">Figures\u00a04<\/a>\u2013<a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig5\">5<\/a> cover only 2010\u20132022.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\">Figure 4. Categorical Breakdown of China\u2019s Internal Security Spending<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig5.png\" class=\"aop-lazy-load-image\" width=\"1600\" height=\"1154\" data-original-image=\"\/binary\/version\/id\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig5.png\" data-zoomable=\"true\"\/><\/p>\n<p class=\"p\">Figure 5. Categorical Breakdown of Internal Security Spending (excluding the MPS)<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> <a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig4\">Figure\u00a04<\/a> shows that the MPS continues to receive a much larger share of domestic security spending than any other actor. This share has increased over time, rising from 50 per cent in 2012 to 57 per cent in 2022. In nominal terms, this increase represents something between a doubling and tripling of the MPS budget over the course of a decade: from 361 billion yuan in 2012 to 832.7 billion yuan in 2022.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> <a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig5\">Figure\u00a05<\/a> removes the MPS so that budget\u00a0allocations across other actors can be seen more clearly. The remainder of the domestic security budget goes to actors across the political-legal system, including the procuratorate (jiancha \u68c0\u5bdf), courts (fayuan \u6cd5\u9662), Ministry of Justice (sifa \u53f8\u6cd5), customs anti-smuggling police (jisi jingcha duiwu \u7f09\u79c1\u8b66\u5bdf\u961f\u4f0d), and other unspecified expenditures, as well as a continued category of funding for the PAP.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn17\">Footnote 17<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> The biggest change apparent in the 2012\u20132022 data is what looks like a sizeable drop in the share of domestic security spending allocated to the PAP, from 17.5 per cent of the internal security budget in 2012 to \u223c10 per cent in 2022. Nominal PAP spending dropped in absolute terms, from 205.6 billion yuan in 2018 to 123.6 billion yuan in 2019, rising again to 145.5 billion yuan in 2022.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn18\">Footnote 18<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> It seems unlikely that the PRC cut spending on functions carried out by the PAP by roughly 40 per cent in a single year, especially given the relative continuity observed across other aspects of the internal security budget. In fact, the same table\u00a0that shows the PAP budget dropping from 2018 to 2019 also states that PAP spending in 2019 was 118.7 per cent of its 2018 level \u2013 clearly at odds with the reported absolute drop and suggesting that an unexplained change in categorization\/classification or measurement may be affecting the statistics provided.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn19\">Footnote 19<\/a> Moreover, the continued appearance of the PAP in the domestic security budget, rather than the defence budget, suggests that China\u2019s leaders continue to view it as having an internal security role.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn20\">Footnote 20<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> We assess that what appears as a drop in PAP spending likely reflects the reorganization in 2017\u20132018 that moved the PAP into the national defence system, placing it solely under the Central Military Commission (CMC), rather than in a dual-authority arrangement with the State Council. Two aspects of that reorganization moved specific units out of the PAP. First, the Guards and Border Defence Forces were transferred to the MPS. In\u00a0<a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig4\">Figure\u00a04<\/a>, the MPS displays a non-linear increase in its share of domestic security spending in 2018\u20132019 that offsets the drop in PAP expenditure share, suggesting that funding for these forces may have transferred from the PAP subcategory of expenditure to the MPS one. Second, the PAP\u2019s Forestry and Firefighting Forces were merged (along with some non-PAP entities) into the new Ministry of Emergency Management, and thereby removed from domestic security spending totals altogether. If included, China\u2019s new emergency management expenditures in 2019 would offset about half the drop in PAP spending from 2018 to 2019.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn21\">Footnote 21<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p> Spending Breakdown: Geography<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> Given how heavily China\u2019s internal security apparatus relies on subnational funding, it is also important to look at how such spending is borne at the provincial level. <a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig6\">Figures\u00a06<\/a>\u2013<a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig7\">7<\/a> show domestic security expenditure by province, first per capita and then relative to GDP.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig6.png\" class=\"aop-lazy-load-image\" width=\"1599\" height=\"955\" data-original-image=\"\/binary\/version\/id\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig6.png\" data-zoomable=\"true\"\/><\/p>\n<p class=\"p\">Figure 6. Domestic Security Spending per Capita over Time by Province<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig7.png\" class=\"aop-lazy-load-image\" width=\"1600\" height=\"953\" data-original-image=\"\/binary\/version\/id\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_fig7.png\" data-zoomable=\"true\"\/><\/p>\n<p class=\"p\">Figure 7. Domestic Security Spending over Time by Province Relative to GDP<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> <a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig6\">Figure 6<\/a> suggests that every province in China has spent more per capita on internal security since 1992. However, per capita spending has been particularly prone to increase in locations that are politically sensitive. This includes Beijing, as China\u2019s capital, which is consistent with a concept of \u201cpolitical security\u201d that prioritizes protecting China\u2019s socialist system, the Party leadership and Xi Jinping as the core of that leadership. It also includes the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where security crackdowns by the authorities during this time period appear to have required higher levels of spending both per capita and relative to regional GDP than China\u2019s other provincial-level units. This finding is consistent with other research showing that these particular municipalities and regions are also allocated more internal security (PAP) manpower.<a class=\"xref fn\" href=\"#fn22\">Footnote 22<\/a>\n<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> <a class=\"xref table\" href=\"#S030574102610201X_tab1\">Table 1<\/a> shows that provincial-level units that are plausibly more politically sensitive with respect to internal security (Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang) spent more on internal security per capita than other provinces in 2012, and that the gap in per capita security spending between these provincial-level units and others has widened between 2012 and 2022.\n<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\">Table 1. Per Capita Internal Security Spending in Politically Sensitive Provinces<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_tab1.png\" class=\"aop-lazy-load-image\" width=\"1655\" height=\"182\" data-original-image=\"\/binary\/version\/id\/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20260325052628946-0072:S030574102610201X:S030574102610201X_tab1.png\" data-zoomable=\"true\"\/><\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> In 2012, China spent 2.8 times as much per person on domestic security in the three most politically sensitive provinces (Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang) as it did on average in the rest of the country. By 2022, it spent over three times as much, creating a spending gap of \u223c1,840 yuan\/person each year between these provinces and the rest.<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> <a class=\"xref fig\" href=\"#fig7\">Figure 7<\/a> shows domestic security spending by province relative to GDP as an alternative way of thinking about the financial burden imposed by security on each provincial-level unit.<\/p>\n<p> Conclusion<\/p>\n<p class=\"p\"> This article presents updated data on China\u2019s internal security spending from 1992 to 2022, with a specific focus on changes during Xi Jinping\u2019s tenure. Compared to the pre-2012 period, the updated data reflect a mix of continuity and change. China\u2019s internal security expenditure has continued to rise, more than doubling from 2012 to 2022, but has risen mostly in proportion to the PRC\u2019s overall budget. The balance between central and local expenditure has shifted further towards local spending, which may increase pressure on local PSBs given rising local fiscal constraints. The MPS continues to receive the largest share of domestic security spending, with that share increasing from 2012 to 2022; meanwhile, absolute spending on the PAP has increased while its share of internal security spending has declined, which reflects its 2017\u20132018 reorganization. Domestic security spending per capita and relative to GDP continue to be higher in locations that are politically sensitive, including Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang. These data point to the continued utility of examining China\u2019s internal security spending statistics but also highlight the continued need to provide context to make them appropriate indicators that generate useful insight into China\u2019s coercive capacity, its political economy and the functioning and stability of its overall political system.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"This article provides an updated overview and analysis of internal security spending by the People\u2019s Republic of China&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":547473,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[36],"tags":[28,101],"class_list":["post-547472","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-economy","tag-business","tag-economy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/547472","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=547472"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/547472\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/547473"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=547472"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=547472"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=547472"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}