{"id":565929,"date":"2026-04-05T11:47:10","date_gmt":"2026-04-05T11:47:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/565929\/"},"modified":"2026-04-05T11:47:10","modified_gmt":"2026-04-05T11:47:10","slug":"gulf-security-beyond-guarantees-middle-east-council-on-global-affairs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/565929\/","title":{"rendered":"Gulf Security Beyond Guarantees – Middle East Council on Global Affairs"},"content":{"rendered":"

Since late February, when the United States and Israel launched joint strikes against Iran under Operation Epic Fury and Operation Rising Lion, respectively, the Gulf states have been drawn into a war not of their making and not in their interests. For years, the Gulf states carefully diversified<\/a>\u00a0their security strategies, deepening ties with the U.S.,\u00a0expanding\u00a0diplomatic engagement with Iran and Israel\u00a0to varying degrees,\u00a0and cultivating a wider network of regional and global partnerships.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Yet these efforts did not prevent Iran from subjecting them to unprecedented attacks\u2014in both scale and intensity. Nor did they trigger direct intervention from key partners. Instead, the Gulf states have relied primarily on local defense capabilities developed over decades with external support. The war has highlighted a critical lesson: partners are most valuable when they enhance strategic autonomy, preparedness, and combat effectiveness rather than when they promise external protection.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Beyond Security Guarantees\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

Uncertainty over Washington\u2019s long-term commitment to regional security\u00a0had\u00a0already pushed the Gulf states to diversify their partners in recent years. A U.S. emphasis on greater burden sharing, articulated extensively in the latest U.S.\u00a0National Defense<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0National Security<\/a>\u00a0Strategies, accelerated this shift, encouraging deeper ties with other powers, such as Pakistan, India, and T\u00fcrkiye\u2014all of whom are, notably, U.S. allies.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Gulf approach has therefore been carefully calibrated to avoid friction with the United States, broadening security ties without undermining their core strategic relationship. This strategy has produced tangible outcomes, including the 2025 Pakistan-Saudi mutual defense agreement, expanding<\/a>\u00a0UAE-India security coordination, and deepening Gulf-T\u00fcrkiye security cooperation.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The current war, however, has revealed a fundamental tension in the assumptions underlying this strategy. Alliances do not necessarily translate into direct support during crises. The expectation of intervention, long embedded in regional security thinking, has ultimately proven unreliable and unsustainable. \u00a0<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Strategic Constraints\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Gulf\u2019s\u00a0key\u00a0security partners have\u00a0stopped short of directly managing the spillover\u00a0from\u00a0Iran\u2019s retaliatory strikes across the region,\u00a0constrained\u00a0by their own strategic priorities and national considerations.\u00a0Two examples, the U.S. and Pakistan, exemplify these dynamics.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

The United States\u00a0<\/p>\n

The United States\u00a0remains\u00a0the Gulf\u2019s most\u00a0deeply\u00a0embedded security partner. Its\u00a0systems have been central to\u00a0regional\u00a0air\u00a0defenses,\u00a0enabling\u00a0interception rates exceeding\u00a090 percent<\/a>. This success is the product of decades of Gulf investment in U.S.\u00a0military armaments and infrastructure,\u00a0extensive training of Gulf personnel, and the deep integration of\u00a0American systems\u00a0in regional security architectures.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Despite\u00a0reports<\/a>\u00a0indicating\u00a0that the war has significantly strained U.S. stockpiles, Washington continues to support regional security capacities. On March 19, the U.S. Department of State\u00a0announced<\/a> a $16.5 billion arms package to the region, covering the UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. This support, however, has clear limits. The Gulf states\u2019 repeated appeals for Washington to avoid targeting Iranian civilian infrastructure were not heeded, leaving them vulnerable to continued retaliatory strikes.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

This epitomizes the dual role the U.S. is playing in this war. While its military systems have been indispensable to Gulf defense, Washington\u2019s instigation of the war and its reluctance to manage its regional consequences have contributed to the crisis the Gulf now faces.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Pakistan\u00a0<\/p>\n

For Pakistan, the war has served as the first real test of its landmark 2025\u00a0mutual\u00a0defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. The pact\u2019s use of explicitly binding language\u2014rare in regional security partnerships\u2014created some expectation of direct Pakistani involvement, which has not materialized.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Islamabad\u2019s restraint reflects a complex strategic calculus,\u00a0shaped<\/a>\u00a0by domestic political and economic pressures, the need to carefully manage its relationship with Iran, and ongoing security challenges along its borders. As a result, Pakistan\u2019s role is likely to remain\u00a0diplomatic<\/a>\u00a0rather than military, aligning with actors such as Egypt and T\u00fcrkiye.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

This underscores\u00a0the\u00a0broader point\u00a0that\u00a0even formal mutual defense alliances are constrained by national interests.\u00a0A state\u2019s\u00a0commitments alone do not\u00a0determine\u00a0its\u00a0behavior in high-intensity conflicts.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Gulf Adapts to New Strategic Realities\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

The war with Iran has reinforced a shift already underway in Gulf strategic thinking. The true value of alliances lies less in the promise of security guarantees than in their ability to equip partner\u00a0states with the resources, technology, and training needed\u00a0to\u00a0defend themselves. The Gulf\u00a0states\u00a0should therefore prioritize partnerships that can enhance their preparedness and adaptability.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The war has also revealed key trends likely to define the future of warfare, particularly the growing reliance on cheap drone technology. The appeal of these drones stems primarily from their low cost and ease of mass production. Tehran\u2019s Shahed drones have figured prominently in the conflict, with over 4,000 <\/a>launched\u00a0against the Gulf states since late February.\u00a0<\/p>\n

While the Gulf states have had some prior experience dealing with drones, they have not previously faced the scale or intensity of Iran\u2019s current attacks. This escalation has necessitated a greater focus on leveraging diverse technologies and operational experience in drone warfare. \u00a0<\/p>\n

In this context, Ukraine has emerged as a significant actor, given its experience countering the Russian Geran variant of the Iranian Shahed. The Gulf states are already seeking to leverage Ukraine\u2019s experience, as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE all signed defense agreements with Kiev in late March. These deals could potentially enable the integration of low-cost Ukrainian systems such as the Sting<\/a>\u00a0interceptor into Gulf defense capabilities.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n

These dynamics illustrate what will\u00a0likely emerge\u00a0as a defining lesson of this war. In an increasingly fragmented\u00a0and unpredictable\u00a0international environment,\u00a0Gulf\u00a0states must\u00a0continue to\u00a0strengthen their domestic capabilities to effectively counter evolving threats. This requires prioritizing resilient supply chains, capacity building, and the development of indigenous capabilities. Alliances will remain critical, but their value will increasingly be measured by their ability to enhance partners\u2019 capabilities rather than guarantee direct intervention.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

\nThe opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs.\n<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIssue: Iran War, U.S. Foreign Policy
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tCountry: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Since late February, when the United States and Israel launched joint strikes against Iran under Operation Epic Fury…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":565930,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[18],"tags":[23,3,21,19,22,20,25,24],"class_list":["post-565929","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-united-states","tag-america","tag-news","tag-united-states","tag-united-states-of-america","tag-unitedstates","tag-unitedstatesofamerica","tag-us","tag-usa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/565929","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=565929"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/565929\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/565930"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=565929"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=565929"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=565929"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}