However, Europe has leverage it can exercise to its advantage. Its dense web of military bases and logistics centers is a critical facilitator of U.S. operations, and Ukraine\u2018s drone expertise is proving crucial to air defense in the Gulf. European countries should use these pressure points more consistently to protect their interests. Doing so could provide them room to mitigate the negative effects of the war and avoid a hugely unpopular entanglement while limiting the damage to Ukraine, NATO, and transatlantic relations.<\/p>\n
The Iran war\u2019s fallout for Europe was immediate. Perhaps the most urgent threat has come from the continent\u2019s insecure energy supply. Soaring gas prices caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have renewed inflation concerns, threatening to harm Europe\u2018s already struggling industry and consumer demand. The European Union (EU) is again \u00a0discussing emergency measures first introduced after Russia\u2018s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, including taxing energy firms\u2018 profits and a bloc-wide price cap.<\/p>\n
The problems created by this conflict will continue to grow. Temporary U.S. waivers on sanctions for Russian oil already loaded onto vessels, and the reorientation of U.S. weapon supplies to the Gulf, represent a lasting setback for Europe\u2019s defense and support for Ukraine. Higher oil profits and the easing of U.S. sanctions have reportedly allowed<\/a> the Kremlin to shelve planned budget cuts. Moreover, the heavy use of Patriot missile defense interceptors in the Gulf will likely tighten supply for Ukraine and European allies.<\/p>\n Although no European countries are direct parties to the conflict, their military infrastructure forms the logistical foundation of U.S. operations. Airbases like Ramstein in Germany refuel aircraft, transport munitions, and support command and control. Ukrainian drone expertise has positioned Kyiv as a leading player in countering cheap Iranian Shahed drones, as illustrated by defense agreements<\/a> it signed with several Gulf countries in March. This may not be decisive, but it is leverage. The question remains whether Europe will use it.<\/p>\n So far, the continent has not used this influence to consistently advance European interests. Instead, domestic skepticism has driven some European countries to unilaterally close their airspaces, deny U.S. landing rights, or prohibit the use of jointly operated air bases. While understandable, such moves have failed to meaningfully advance European interests and have fueled dangerous U.S. discussions of a NATO withdrawal.<\/p>\n This is a poor use of its influence. Europe should prioritize pushing for a quick cessation to the conflict. The Europeans need at least a partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to bring down energy prices; the reimposition of sanctions and further diplomatic pressure on Russia over its support for Iran; and the prevention of an expanding conflict that would exacerbate shortages of essential military technology for Europe and Ukraine.<\/p>\n