How is the region reacting to the ceasefire?<\/p>\n
Amr Hamzawy: In the hours immediately following the ceasefire announcement, the Middle East was unable to catch its breath. Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon continued, claiming the lives of at least 200 people<\/a> and injuring hundreds more. The strikes fueled widespread fears regarding the persistence of hostilities in one of the region\u2019s nations most ravaged by war and violence.<\/p>\n Elsewhere, however, a sense of relief prevailed. The Gulf states\u2014along with Iraq and Jordan\u2014welcomed the truce and called for a final agreement that would permanently end the conflict and provide them with sufficient security guarantees to prevent any recurrence of Iranian aggression. Egypt and Turkey\u2014both of which, along with Pakistan, played a mediating role between the United States and Iran\u2014emphasized the imperative of upholding the truce and the necessity of safeguarding regional security interests. They also demanded that Israel immediately cease its attacks on Lebanon.<\/p>\n Beyond official government stances, Iran-aligned militias, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and various armed Shiite movements in Iraq, initially declared their support for the ceasefire. However, the continued Israeli attacks on Lebanon prompted Hezbollah to launch a limited number of rockets toward northern Israel, while Iraqi militias spoke of a potential retaliatory strike against Israel, though they ultimately took no action. The Houthi movement in Yemen had previously distanced itself from the conflict, and it maintained the same stance following the ceasefire.\u00a0<\/p>\n Eric Lob: Iran is skeptical this pause could lead to a permanent ceasefire and sustainable peace for two reasons. First, Tehran has very little trust that Donald Trump will abide by his commitments, and his ceasefire plans have fallen apart in Gaza and Lebanon. Also, Trump\u2019s two previous cycles of negotiations with Iran abruptly ended with Israeli and American airstrikes against it in June 2025 and February 2026. As a result, Tehran probably perceives the ceasefire as a pause in hostilities rather than anything permanent, and it is preparing for renewed conflict accordingly. In response, Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on any country that sells or transfers weapons to Iran.\u00a0<\/p>\n Marwan Muasher: The region in general feels that it is now left with a dual threat: a temporarily weakened but angry Iran that could rebuild its conventional military capability in a few years, and an emboldened Israel that has already stated it is not bound by the ceasefire and will continue its operations in Lebanon and the West Bank. Gulf states in particular are skeptical about a ceasefire that might leave Iran in control of the Strait of Hormuz.\u00a0<\/p>\n Andrew Leber: Building on Marwan\u2019s point, Gulf commentary has publicly welcomed the ceasefire yet doubted whether it will hold (for different reasons depending on the country). Emirati officials have stressed<\/a> the need to push Iran to abide by the terms of the ceasefire, given continued Iranian attacks on Gulf targets. Saudi official statements welcomed the ceasefire, while media commentary has worried about the daunting task<\/a> of negotiating a sustainable peace. Oman\u2019s Foreign Ministry welcomed<\/a> the ceasefire yet condemned<\/a> renewed Israeli attacks on Lebanon\u2014a position echoed in local media. \u201cA truce that excludes Lebanon is not the beginning of peace,\u201d opined<\/a> the Oman Daily Observer. (The UAE later criticized<\/a> Israeli attacks on Lebanon as well, albeit in somewhat vaguer terms). Prewar and wartime sources of divergence<\/a> within the Gulf Cooperation Council are apt to continue, making it harder to express a unified Gulf-monarchy position.<\/p>\n Lebanon is a key flashpoint. What\u2019s at stake?<\/p>\n Marwan Muasher: Those who suspected that a U.S.-Iran agreement would not be honored by Israel were correct. Since the ceasefire, Israeli military action has been the most severe since the Iran conflict began on February 28. The continued attacks also point to Israel\u2019s real intention: to occupy South Lebanon and use this as leverage to push the Lebanese government to accept a peace treaty that only serves Israel\u2019s interests.<\/p>\n Amr Hamzawy: This Israeli aggression curtails the Lebanese government\u2019s capacity to manage the critical issue of Hezbollah\u2019s weaponry\u2014an issue the government in Beirut aspires to bring under its own control. Furthermore, it hinders Lebanon\u2019s ability to redeploy the national army throughout the south and other regions to effectively end Hezbollah\u2019s military role\u2014a role through which the group has monopolized the authority to decide on matters of war and peace with Israel, to the exclusion of all other components of Lebanese society and the political establishment. This is a state of affairs that the majority of the Lebanese people now reject.<\/p>\n Ultimately, this Israeli aggression complicates matters significantly. It revitalizes Hezbollah\u2019s standing as a resistance movement opposed to Israel\u2014notwithstanding the losses in weaponry and human life it has sustained\u2014and severely limits the Lebanese government\u2019s ability to effectively manage both the Hezbollah dossier and its relationship with Israel. Indeed, it runs the risk of pushing Lebanon\u2019s entire political system toward total collapse.<\/p>\n One of the key U.S. demands was the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. How might that play out?<\/p>\n Eric Lob: As part of upcoming talks in Pakistan and in exchange for U.S. sanctions relief (something Iran temporarily received during the war), Trump has demanded that Tehran reopen the Strait of Hormuz to reduce economic pressure on the United States and other countries. Iran has indicated it would do so if it is able to retain control over the strait. For Iran, Hormuz has served not only as a source of military and strategic leverage, but also a revenue stream for its shattered economy and postwar reconstruction\u2014something for which Tehran has requested reparations from Washington.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Andrew Leber: Gulf rulers care about whether the strait is actually open to traffic<\/a>, rather than Trump claiming as such.<\/p>\n Publicly, the Gulf states will not accept an Iranian \u201ctoll\u201d on shipping that travels through the Strait of Hormuz. Privately, they are likely willing to facilitate some kind of payments to Iran so as long as shipping proceeds relatively unimpeded. Rumors already suggest that the Saudi government pays Houthi forces in Yemen considerable sums<\/a>\u2014an underappreciated reason why the armed group has largely stayed out of the conflict. While these payments may not take the form of a toll, Iranian demands include a request<\/a> for Oman to jointly administer a fee system. (Oman\u2019s minister of transport claimed<\/a> the country could not accept tolls under international agreements, but those comments were not repeated by higher-ranking officials and have been scrubbed from in-country reporting<\/a>.)<\/p>\n What role are Pakistan and other mediators playing?<\/p>\n Amr Hamzawy: Egyptian and Turkish diplomats and security officials conveyed messages between the United States and Iran, while Pakistan took a more central role immediately preceding the ceasefire. The militarization of the region serves neither Egypt\u2019s nor Turkey\u2019s interests nor their national security, and their mediation efforts will likely continue. Islamabad is expected to host<\/a> another round of talks between Washington and Tehran in the coming days.<\/p>\n Conversely, Oman and Qatar\u2014which have historically played active mediation roles between the United States and Iran\u2014have been effectively sidelined by the recent hostilities. Oman, in particular, remained an optimistic mediator regarding the imminent prospect of a diplomatic resolution between Washington and Tehran, right up until a few hours before Operation Epic Fury began. Indeed, the Omani foreign minister had spoken from Washington of an impending diplomatic agreement just prior to the launch of the U.S. and Israeli strikes on February 28. Both countries have since been targeted by Iranian strikes.<\/p>\n These Iranian aggressions against the Gulf states have eroded their confidence in the feasibility of rapprochement with Iran and the prospects for long-term de-escalation. The repercussions of these attacks mean that Ankara, Cairo, and Islamabad are likely to continue to conduct mediation efforts without the active participation of others in the region.<\/p>\n The ceasefire\u2014and the region\u2019s future\u2014feel extremely fragile. How might Iran and its neighbors move forward?<\/p>\n Eric Lob: Trump continues to demand zero enrichment of uranium from Iran. This has been a nonstarter for Tehran, which insists it has the right to do so at civilian or peaceful levels as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran also maintains a stockpile of highly enriched uranium that it may be incentivized to weaponize as a deterrent against future American and Israeli attacks. Such steps would be unacceptable to the United States and Israel, and, if detected, would likely prompt more airstrikes.<\/p>\n Iran has demanded the ceasefire apply not only to itself, but also its Lebanese proxy and partner Hezbollah. Whether Trump can pressure Israel and Hezbollah to abide by the tenuous ceasefire will likely be a pivotal component of the next round of talks.<\/p>\n