For Iraq, the Iran war is not simply another regional crisis spilling across its borders. It is foregrounding fundamental questions about the country\u2019s post-2003 political order itself: the extent of Iranian influence, the future of relations with the Arab Gulf and the United States, and the role of Iran-aligned factions within the state-sanctioned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). \u00a0<\/p>\n
Yet\u00a0changes on\u00a0these\u00a0fronts are not a result of the war alone. They\u00a0were already\u00a0underway\u00a0during a transformative period\u00a0in\u00a0Iraq\u2019s political environment\u00a0that preceded\u00a0the\u202fassassination<\/a>\u202fof\u00a0Iran\u2019s\u00a0Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28,\u00a0and the conflict that\u00a0has\u00a0followed.\u00a0Over the past several years, Iran\u2019s position inside Iraq had become more contested, Gulf states were recalibrating their approach to Baghdad, and Iraqi leaders were grappling with how to manage powerful armed factions that operate both within and beyond the state.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Thus, rather than\u00a0creating an entirely\u00a0new\u00a0political reality, the war\u00a0has accelerated existing trends and exposed unresolved tensions. It has also\u00a0sharpened\u00a0U.S.\u00a0and the GCC expectations,\u00a0as\u00a0Baghdad\u00a0is forced to\u00a0navigate\u00a0long-standing questions of sovereignty, security, and regional alignment under far greater pressure.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The Pre-War Evolving Iranian Influence in Iraq\u00a0<\/p>\n Iran proved to be the principal beneficiary<\/a>\u202fof the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The collapse of the Ba\u2019athist state created a power vacuum that Tehran was uniquely positioned to exploit, embedding itself within the Iraqi political order through a dual strategy of armed patronage and the cultivation of political proxy networks. Iran-aligned factions secured representation in parliament and ministerial cabinets, ensuring Tehran retained institutional leverage over Baghdad\u2019s decision-making. \u00a0<\/p>\n This foothold deepened further with the establishment of the PMF in 2014\u2014an umbrella coalition of predominantly Shia armed factions mobilized in response to the Islamic State\u2019s sweeping advance across northern and western Iraq. Iran moved swiftly to shape the PMF from within, positioning its most loyal factions\u2014Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, and al-Nujaba\u2014at the helm of its leadership structure and securing their access to state\u00a0funding. In so doing,\u00a0Tehran helped transform parts of\u00a0a nationally sanctioned defense body into\u00a0instruments\u00a0of\u00a0its\u00a0regional strategy.\u00a0<\/p>\n Yet Tehran\u2019s role in Iraq has always been more contested than conventional narratives suggest. Much of the scholarship on post-2003 Iraq situates the primary resistance to Iranian influence within Sunni and Kurdish political blocs\u2014a framing that obscures a more consequential dynamic. It is within the Shia political landscape itself that the most persistent and structurally significant challenges to Tehran have emerged, reflecting the ideological diversity of Iraq\u2019s Shia community rather than the monolithic bloc it is often portrayed to be. \u00a0<\/p>\n The Sadrist Movement carved out a distinctly Iraqi Shia identity\u202fresistant<\/a>\u202fto Iranian tutelage, while prominent Shia leader Ammar al-Hakim\u2019s break from the Iran-aligned Badr Organization to found al-Hikma represented a deliberate repositioning toward a more balanced engagement with both Washington and the Arab Gulf. The sharpest rupture, however, emerged not from elite realignment but from the streets. The Tishreen protest movement, which\u202fswept<\/a>\u202facross Shia-majority provinces beginning in October 2019, constituted the most consequential grassroots challenge to the post-2003 order.\u00a0Young Shia Iraqis turned their anger on their own political class, and\u00a0especially\u00a0on those operating within Iran\u2019s sphere of influence. The protests made clear that limiting\u00a0Tehran\u2019s reach\u00a0had become\u2014in the public imagination\u2014inseparable from the broader reform agenda:\u00a0fighting\u00a0corruption,\u00a0ending\u00a0political impunity, and\u00a0finally\u00a0improving\u00a0economic conditions and public services.\u00a0<\/p>\n These various stances within Iraq\u2019s Shia political elite reflect its ideological diversity. The Shia political community is far more heterogeneous than Iraq\u2019s consociational \u201cMuhasasa\u201d system suggests\u2014a political framework that artificially flattens these divisions by simply allocating the prime ministership to Shia Arabs, the presidency to Kurds, and the parliamentary speakership to Sunni Arabs.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Reviving Unresolved Issues Amid the War\u00a0<\/p>\n It was not long before the ongoing\u00a0war rapidly drew Iraq into its orbit.\u00a0Iran-aligned PMF factions launched attacks against U.S.\u00a0interests in Iraq and neighboring countries, while Baghdad simultaneously found itself a target of U.S.\u00a0military strikes,\u00a0cementing its position as a battleground for competing foreign agendas.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n The economic fallout has been equally severe. Disruption to oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz has dealt a\u00a0critical blow<\/a>\u202fto Iraqi oil revenues, which account for more than 90 percent of the national budget. This threatens the government\u2019s ability to fund public services and sustain its already fragile social contract with its citizens.\u00a0<\/p>\n