Shafaq
\nNews<\/p>\n
Abdul
\nHakim Bashar, a Syrian Kurdish leader, member of the People’s Assembly and
\nmember of the political bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic Party \u2013Syria, spoke
\nto Shafaq News about the first session of the new assembly, the level of
\nKurdish representation in it, the files Kurdish deputies intend to raise, and
\nthe limits of the agreements reached between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic
\nForces (SDF).<\/p>\n
The
\ninterview was conducted in Arabic. It has been translated and edited for length
\nand clarity.<\/p>\n
Q: How do
\nyou assess the first session of the People’s Assembly?<\/p>\n
A: The
\ncurrent assembly is clearly different from the assemblies formed under the previous
\nsystem, particularly with the absence of the scenes of applause for the
\npresident and the glorification slogans that used to accompany its sessions.
\nThis change is a positive development that reflects a shift in the nature of
\nthe political scene. Still, it is too early to judge the assembly and its
\nability to establish a new political and legislative phase.<\/p>\n
Q: What
\nwill determine that judgment?<\/p>\n
A: The
\nreal test will be the assembly’s performance in the coming phase, and its
\nability to respond to the aspirations of Syrians of all components and to
\ntranslate them into legislation and policies that strengthen justice,
\nparticipation, and equal citizenship.<\/p>\n
Q: How do
\nyou evaluate the Kurdish presence in that first session?<\/p>\n
A: The
\nresults were not at the hoped-for level. The Kurds are represented by 12
\nmembers belonging to different political currents and backgrounds, which means
\nthat forming a weighty and effective Kurdish bloc needs more time and
\ncoordination.<\/p>\n
Q: Why do
\nyou describe the representation as insufficient?<\/p>\n
A: It is Q: What A: Two Q: And A: It is Q: Did A: The Q: Are A: The Q: How do A: Q: What A: The Q: What A: A Q: What A: The Q: Are A: Yes, Q: And at A: Q: What A: Read more: Kurds in Syria: From marginalization to a defining political force<\/a><\/p>\n Q: Can A: Some Q: Has A: Q: How do A: In my Q: What
\nbelow the deserved level and does not correspond to the Kurdish share<\/a> of the
\npopulation, which I estimate at around 15 percent of Syria’s population, in the
\nabsence of recent and approved official statistics. Representation matching
\nthat proportion would have given the Kurds at least between 30 and 32 seats,
\ninstead of the twelve they currently hold.<\/p>\n
\nproduced this outcome?<\/p>\n
\nmain factors. The first is the absence of a clear political agreement between
\nthe Kurdish movement and the Syrian authorities on the Kurdish question, and
\nresponsibility for that is shared between the two sides. The Kurdish movement
\nhas not been politically active in Damascus to a sufficient degree, while the
\nSyrian authorities have not moved to launch a serious and comprehensive
\npolitical dialogue with it.<\/p>\n
\nthe second factor?<\/p>\n
\nlinked to the mechanism by which the assembly was formed, which did not rely on
\nfree and direct popular elections, because of the exceptional circumstances
\nSyria is passing through. That affected the level of representation of the
\nKurds and of the other components.<\/p>\n
\nthe timing of the selection process play a role?<\/p>\n
\nselection of assembly members in the Kurdish areas took place late compared
\nwith other Syrian areas, which gave deputies chosen earlier more time to reach
\nunderstandings and build alliances over the distribution of the assembly’s
\nposts and bodies. Information also circulated about certain figures receiving
\nsupport during the competition for positions, and in my assessment that was
\nreflected in the final results of the formation of the assembly’s bodies.<\/p>\n
\nthe Kurdish deputies working as a bloc?<\/p>\n
\nKurdish deputies have held several meetings and agreed during them to work in a
\nteam spirit and to coordinate on general national issues, alongside files
\nrelated to Kurdish society. This coordination is still in its early stages and
\nneeds more time and effort to reach a more effective formula for cooperation.
\nCollective work is the best way to strengthen the presence of Kurdish deputies
\nand to serve the national interest at the same time.<\/p>\n
\nyou define the balance between national and community work inside the assembly?<\/p>\n
\nNational work must be the basis inside the assembly, and the priority must be
\nto serve all Syrians, away from narrow partisan, nationalist or sectarian
\ncalculations. At the same time, the existence of parties and political currents
\nis a fundamental pillar of any sound political life, and the presence of a
\nresponsible national opposition inside or outside parliament<\/a> strengthens
\ndemocracy, transparency and oversight of the executive authority.<\/p>\n
\nfiles do the Kurdish deputies intend to raise?<\/p>\n
\npriorities are divided between general national issues and others linked
\ndirectly to Kurdish rights and the particularity of the Kurdish areas, but they
\nall fall within the project of building a state of citizenship and justice.<\/p>\n
\ncomes first?<\/p>\n
\nreview of the exceptional laws and measures related to land ownership in the
\nKurdish areas. Large areas still lack the real estate title deeds known as the
\n“green tabu,” and proof of ownership rests on judicial rulings or
\nother documents. The deputies will also work to open the files of land
\nexpropriation and the exceptional legislation that harmed residents of the
\nKurdish areas over past decades.<\/p>\n
\nabout services and the economy?<\/p>\n
\ndevelopment and services file carries similar importance, particularly
\nimproving infrastructure, securing water and electricity, developing road
\nnetworks and raising the level of education, health and public services.
\nSupporting the agriculture and industry sectors matters as well, in a way that
\ncontributes to providing jobs and achieving sustainable development in areas
\nthat suffered for years from neglect, war and declining investment.<\/p>\n
\nthere other consequences that need to be addressed?<\/p>\n
\nthe negative effects left by the years of self-administration, among them the
\ndangers threatening the safety of civilians, and the environmental and health
\ndamage caused by extracting and refining oil by primitive means.<\/p>\n
\nthe political level?<\/p>\n
\nRecognition of the national rights of the Kurdish people remains a main
\npriority and should be fixed in the new Syrian constitution, in a way that
\nacknowledges national and cultural plurality and guarantees equal citizenship
\nfor individuals and ethnic groups. The form of the Syrian state must be an
\nessential part of the national and constitutional dialogue, in a way that
\npreserves the unity of the country and establishes sound governance and a
\ndecentralized system that guarantees the participation of all components.<\/p>\n
\nspecific demands does that include?<\/p>\n
\nReconsidering the official name of the state so that it expresses all Syrians,
\nrecognizing the Kurdish language as an official language alongside Arabic in
\nKurdish-majority areas, and addressing the effects of the Arab Belt project
\naccording to a just national vision. It also includes completing the treatment
\nof the issue of Kurds deprived of citizenship, fixing the legal status of those
\nwho have regained it, and guaranteeing effective Kurdish participation in any
\ncommittee tasked with drafting the new Syrian constitution.<\/p>\n
\nthe assembly deliver on these demands?<\/p>\n
\ndemands related to the form of the state, language<\/a> and national recognition go
\nbeyond the direct powers of the People’s Assembly and are tied to the
\nconstitutional process and to national political understandings. The assembly
\ncan, however, prepare the political and legislative ground for these files and
\nopen a serious national discussion leading to just and sustainable solutions.<\/p>\n
\nthe relationship between the Kurdish forces and the government moved to
\ninstitutional work?<\/p>\n
\nSpeaking about such a transition requires first defining what is meant by the
\nKurdish forces, given the multiplicity of currents and projects inside the
\nSyrian Kurdish political scene.<\/p>\n
\nyou read the SDF’s approach?<\/p>\n
\nview, the political approach of the Syrian Democratic Forces is not based on a
\nKurdish national project in the traditional sense, but rests on the concepts of
\nthe democratic nation and the brotherhood of peoples, and calls for moving
\nbeyond closed national identities.<\/p>\n
\nhas that meant for the negotiations with Damascus?<\/p>\n