{"id":812263,"date":"2026-08-13T12:48:11","date_gmt":"2026-08-13T12:48:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/812263\/"},"modified":"2026-08-13T12:48:11","modified_gmt":"2026-08-13T12:48:11","slug":"the-donroe-doctrines-china-paradox","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.newsbeep.com\/us\/812263\/","title":{"rendered":"The Donroe Doctrine\u2019s China Paradox"},"content":{"rendered":"

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\n\"Trump<\/a><\/p>\n

S\u00c3O PAULO\u2014For much of the past two decades, Washington worried that it was losing Latin America by neglecting<\/a> it. Today, the risk may be the opposite. The United States is paying attention again, but in ways that could accelerate<\/a> the geopolitical trends it is trying to reverse.<\/p>\n

President Donald Trump has made the Western Hemisphere central to U.S. foreign policy with the \u201cTrump Corollary<\/a>\u201d to the Monroe Doctrine<\/a>, asserting renewed U.S. leadership in the hemisphere and rejecting the influence of outside powers. \u00a0<\/p>\n

This week, amid escalating tensions<\/a> with Brazil, the State Department amplified the message once again, posting a video<\/a> on social media that concludes with Trump\u2019s assertion that American dominance in the Western Hemisphere \u201cwill never be questioned again.\u201d The timing is telling. What might once have sounded like presidential bravado is increasingly being presented as a governing principle of U.S. regional policy.<\/p>\n

The diagnosis behind this strategy is not entirely wrong. Trade between China and Latin America and the Caribbean exceeded<\/a> $500 billion in 2024, and China is now the region\u2019s second-largest trading partner and its largest bilateral creditor<\/a>. The Trump administration seems to assume that renewed attention, combined with enough economic and political pressure, can force the region\u2019s governments to reduce their exposure to Beijing.<\/p>\n

Paradoxically, U.S. pressure may make alternatives to Washington more appealing to Latin America. Recent diplomatic maneuvers between the U.S., Brazil and Argentina show how this dynamic is unfolding and the risks it carries.<\/p>\n

The costs of autonomy<\/p>\n

Relations between the U.S. and Brazil have deteriorated sharply ahead of the October presidential election<\/a> as trade measures<\/a> have become entangled with Brazilian politics. At the end of July Brazil denied<\/a> visas to U.S. officials who the government believed intended to question the country\u2019s electoral process, and on August 4 the U.S. revoked<\/a> the visa of Brazil\u2019s ambassador in Washington.<\/p>\n

Bras\u00edlia has framed the dispute as a question of sovereignty. Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira called<\/a> the actions \u201cunprecedented\u201d and insisted that Brazil \u201cwill not be governed by remote control from a foreign capital.\u201d His language captures the broader tension now emerging in the relationship: Where Bras\u00edlia sees sovereign autonomy, Washington increasingly sees resistance to its regional authority.<\/p>\n

Viera also criticized Argentine President Javier Milei for comments made in July while visiting <\/a>the country to support Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro\u2019s presidential campaign. Fewer than two weeks later, Brazil downgraded<\/a> diplomatic relations with Argentina after another round<\/a> of public attacks by Milei against President Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva.<\/p>\n

These developments reveal something important about Washington\u2019s emerging hemispheric strategy. Argentina under Milei represents the promise of alignment with Washington; Brazil under Lula symbolizes the costs of autonomy.<\/p>\n

The consequences of U.S. pressure<\/p>\n

Washington\u2019s approach may be tempting in the short term, particularly for an administration that understands foreign policy through the language of loyalty and leverage, but it carries a serious strategic risk. If Latin American governments conclude that access to Washington depends increasingly on ideological alignment, they will have stronger incentives to diversify their relationships to reduce their vulnerability to changes in U.S. politics.<\/p>\n

The most important consequence of U.S. pressure on Brazil is not that Lula will suddenly \u201cchoose\u201d China. Brazil has spent decades resisting binary alignment, and its foreign policy tradition is far more comfortable with diversification than with geopolitical camps. The more consequential shift is subtler: China, an indispensable economic partner, is becoming a useful strategic hedge for Brazil.<\/p>\n

Political rhetoric cannot easily undo China\u2019s structural role in Brazil\u2019s economy. In 2025, China bought<\/a> $55.3 billion in Brazilian agricultural products. This accounted for nearly one third of Brazil\u2019s agricultural exports<\/a>, compared to the U.S.\u2019s 6.7%.<\/p>\n

Moreover, economics and geopolitics are becoming more intertwined. When Lula and Xi Jinping spoke by phone in late July, Xi offered support for Brazil in resisting what Beijing described as \u201cexternal interference<\/a>.\u201d The leaders also discussed stronger strategic coordination, and Lula said the conversation included support for advancing talks on a potential trade agreement between China and Mercosur<\/a>. <\/p>\n

For years, Bras\u00edlia approached such an arrangement cautiously. It is now being discussed as relations with Washington worsen, underscoring the U.S. strategy\u2019s unintended consequences. The more Washington makes dependence on the U.S. feel like a political vulnerability, the more valuable diversification becomes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Argentina and the limits of alignment<\/p>\n

Even Argentina demonstrates the limits of the U.S.\u2019s more ideological strategy. Milei may be one of Trump\u2019s closest allies<\/a> in the hemisphere, but economic realities have forced Buenos Aires to preserve important ties with Beijing. Argentina has maintained a multibillion-dollar currency swap with China even as Milei aligned himself closely with Washington.<\/p>\n

Recent tensions<\/a> over Huawei have exposed how difficult it is to translate political affinity with the U.S. into economic disengagement from China. This should give Washington pause.<\/p>\n

Coercion can become self-defeating<\/p>\n

There is a paradox at the heart of the Donroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine sought to exclude European powers from the hemisphere, but China\u2019s presence cannot simply be pushed offshore. The Asian giant is deeply embedded in the region\u2019s trade, commodity markets, infrastructure and financial relationships.<\/p>\n

Greater Latin American autonomy does not necessarily amount to a victory for China. Washington makes a strategic mistake when it interprets every refusal to align as evidence of Beijing\u2019s advance. Bras\u00edlia\u2019s preference for autonomy predates China\u2019s rise, and today\u2019s more multipolar international system gives Brazil and other countries more instruments with which to pursue it.<\/p>\n

A successful U.S. strategy would need to make partnership with Washington more attractive, rather than making alternatives more necessary. The Donroe Doctrine\u2019s greatest risk is not that Latin America will reject the U.S. and embrace China. The region is too plural, too economically interconnected, and too politically heterogeneous for such a simple realignment. It is that by trying to make Latin America choose, Washington will teach its governments why they should never have to.<\/p>\n

ABOUT THE AUTHORFernanda Magnotta<\/p>\n

Reading Time: 4 minutesMagnotta is a senior fellow at the Brazilian Center for International Relations and a professor of the International Relations Program at Funda\u00e7\u00e3o Armando Alvares Penteado in S\u00e3o Paulo.<\/p>\n

\t\t\tTags: Argentina<\/a>, Brazil<\/a>, China<\/a>, China and Latin America<\/a>, Trump and Latin America<\/a>\t\t\t<\/p>\n

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Any opinions expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of Americas Quarterly or its publishers.<\/p>\n

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